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We examined two fields within the behavioural finance framework as well as sports economics. 
We explored sports clubs’ wages and other team characteristics to explain managerial 
behaviour with regard to players’ playing time. Additionally, we conjectured that playing at 
home could affect team performance, and subsequently derived a team success model based on 
the home venue.  
The sunk cost concept is central to behavioural economists’ arguments, but evidence has 
mainly stemmed from laboratory experiments. Empirical evidence pertaining to sunk costs and 
their role in the decision-making processes is rather sparse. We used a novel dataset of the 
English Premier League (EPL), which has not been previously utilised, particularly in the 
context of sunk costs. We examined the frequent manager turnover within teams, where the 
self-justification explanation suggested that sunk costs may not apply in this case due to 
managerial change. Our findings provide evidence for a sunk cost effect within a football 
context where higher transfer fees could predict more playing time for players within different 
positions. The effect was robust to a number of specifications. Additionally, we provide 
evidence for managers’ bias towards granting free transferred players more playing time as a 
way to show their skills in securing bargain deals for their clubs. Lastly, we estimated a 
regression discontinuity (RD) model to test the effect of expensive players, and the results 
support the sunk cost hypothesis. 
Racial discrimination is a topic of considerable debate in the labour economics literature. We 
employed a novel market test approach that complements the established wage equation 
estimate approach in a sporting context while controlling for player performance metrics. We 
estimated the effect of nationality (of both players and managers) on player playing time. The 
findings suggest that British managers demonstrated bias towards their home players by 
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allocating them extra playing time. This extra playing time could not be explained merely by 
the players’ performance level, their transfer fees, or playing position. We also re-examined 
the models of Szymanski (2000) and Pedace (2008) with our recent dataset and found no 
evidence for discrimination against non-white players or for foreign nationalities.  
Home field (HF) advantage in competitive sports has garnered much empirical attention. Our 
panel regression results provide unequivocal evidence of a significantly strong and robust home 
field effect. We used bootstrap techniques to explore the HF effect in predicting team success 
and failure in the PL. Our results suggest that teams who outperformed the expected bootstrap 
results in their early home (as opposed to away) games would be secure in the Premier League. 
This was still the case even if they performed poorly in away games over this period. This 
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Economic behaviour is often modelled as rationale, where agents are expected to allocate 
resources based on maximum utility and ensuring that future benefits should exceed future 
costs (e.g. Vroom, 1964). However, the rationality of decisions has been challenged by 
psychology literature related to decision-making processes. Staw (1976) provided evidence on 
the motives behind people’s tendencies towards rationalising the negative outcomes (or 
feedback) that were consequences of their initial decisions. 
Many studies have based their findings on experimental setups, where surveys or 
laboratory experiments were conducted. These setups have revealed certain investment-related 
decision-making processes and behaviours. Research may show to what extent agents are risk 
averse or how much they can bear to lose before they quit. Apart from pure financial investment 
frameworks, the economics of professional team sports have attracted academic interest since 
the mid-1950s. Both theoretical and econometric aspects of the discipline have contributed to 
the literature, as many economists consider professional sports to be a legitimate area for 
scientific research. These studies cover broad economic aspects and implications of the sports 
market structure (e.g. free agency in players’ labour market, nature of production, utility 
maximisation). There were early contributions to data science in football in particular, such as 
forecasting models for football match results.  
In a seminal paper, Staw and Hoang (1995) departed from the conventional 
experimental setups to explain agents’ decision-making behaviour, which is related to 
escalation of commitments, in a real-world setup instead. A sports field was chosen to test for 
such established behavioural tendencies. They provided evidence of sunk cost effects 
associated with draft order in the National Basketball Association (NBA). A draft order ranks 
players based on their skills and quality of play, and the evidence suggests that a player who is 
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in the top rankings is likely to get excessive playing time that is not justified by his 
performance. A team manager’s perception of those highly ranked players, along with their 
high salaries, may lead to a sunk cost effect where excessive playing time is based on costs 
spent on the player rather than his on-field performance.   
The shift in salaries and compensation patterns stimulated a new wave of professional 
sports research. Theoretical contributions to sports stars’ salary determinations were proposed 
by some economists (e.g. Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Data on players’ salaries in European 
professional football are scarce due to confidentiality and disclosure restrictions, so the scope 
for empirical evidence is rather thin. Nevertheless, a number of studies have attempted to 
determine factors affecting players’ salaries in Europe (e.g. Lucifora & Simmons, 2003; 
Lehmann & Schulze, 2008; Frick & Deutscher, 2009).  
Racial discrimination is a topic of considerable debate in the labour economics 
literature. The focus of the related empirical discrimination literature is on the earnings gaps 
(i.e. salary differences) between specific groups, and discrimination through unequal pay is 
estimated through constructing earning functions (e.g. Szymanski, 2000). Szymanski argued 
that productivity measurements in sport economics studies were much more transparent than 
in other labour economic settings. With a relative scarcity of individual productivity 
measurements (at least before the beginning of the new millennia), an alternative was to relate 
wages (or salary) data with teams’ productivity measures, which were mainly measured by 
their position in the league rank. Szymanski (2000) and Pedace (2008) found that clubs’ wage 
payrolls could explain nearly 90% of the variation in team productivity. Thereafter, wage 
equation estimates were empirically employed as the cornerstone of employer taste-based 
discrimination, where some personal player characteristics such as race and nationality should 
not possess explanatory power in a non-discriminatory environment.  
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Another area of competitive sports literature that has garnered much empirical attention 
is the home field (HF) advantage. This advantage pertains to a higher probability of winning 
games at a team’s home ground as opposed to those at away grounds. The literature discusses 
several factors that may drive such an advantage (e.g. fans’ encouragement, players’ familiarity 
with stadium facilities, travel fatigue of opponents). The HF advantage is prevalent in many 
sports, such as basketball, football, rugby, American football, hockey, and baseball. The 
findings from these different sports are inconclusive; however, a positive association has been 
found between home advantage and the psychological state of athletes prior to sports events 
(e.g. Bray et al., 2000; Terry et al., 1998).  
With regard to home advantage historic patterns, even though the home win percentage 
in English football decreased from around 50% in the 70s and 80s to around 43% later in the 
new millennia, it remained well above the away win ratio when it reached its highest 
percentages of around 30% later in the decade (Dobson & Goddard, 2009). Allen and Jones 
(2014) analysed premier league results in the seasons 1992/93–2011/12 and showed that 
winning home games, on average, secured 60.7% of total points earned by teams.  
A thorough documentation and interpretation of HF advantage has been mainly directed 
towards the psychological aspects, while empirical research with respect to the effect on field 
performance is relatively limited. One explanation for this is the complicated nature of 
precisely quantifying factors that are closely related to match outcomes, such as individual 
players’ skills and qualities, teams’ principles and standards, managerial and coaching 
qualities, and match significance within the league fixtures. Despite that, several studies have 
attempted to empirically investigate HF advantage by means of (but not confined to) field 
performance style, match-based production functions, assessing scoring rate variations of the 
home and away teams during a match, HF outcomes and betting market, and distance between 
clubs’ grounds (fields). 
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This thesis revisits established behavioural biases, but from different perspectives. Two 
pertain to football managers and how they are affected by players transfer fees as well as some 
personal characteristics (nationality and ethnicity/common culture or language), and one 
pertains to players (or the team) and how they are affected by playing at home. First, it 
complements the sunk cost literature with a fresh football dataset that comprises different 
structures and financial features from the established NBA studies and some other sports. 
Second, it examines racial discrimination in a sporting context that explores players’ playing 
time rather than the conventional wage equations approach. Finally, it contributes to the well-
documented home field advantage literature by incorporating a new empirical approach.  
1.1 Contributions 
 
In Chapter 2, we demonstrate our use of a novel dataset of the PL that has not previously been 
utilised, particularly in the context of sunk costs. We provide evidence for a sunk cost effect 
within a football context where higher transfer fees could predict more playing time for players 
in different positions. Sunk cost effects were observed with incremental increases in transfer 
fees as well as a distinctive effect of expensive players in particular. The effect was robust to a 
number of specifications, and most importantly, the effect persisted even after a managerial 
change. This contradicts a rational decision-making standpoint where assigning a new manager 
should remove any sunk costs effects demonstrated by his predecessor (e.g. Wicklund & 
Brehm, 1976). In addition, to rule out the possibility that free transferred players could bias the 
results (as they do not incur a large sunk cost element), we tested the sunk cost hypotheses 
while removing those players from the sample. The effect remained robust, though with slightly 
lower magnitude.  
We also show evidence for managers’ bias towards granting free transferred players 
more playing time as a way to show their skills in securing bargain deals for their clubs (e.g. 
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Schindler, 1998). Additionally, we estimated the RD model to test the effect of expensive 
players. The results converged to support the sunk cost hypothesis. In other words, football 
managers tended to engage expensive players, even if they did not perform to the expected 
standard. This may help them to feel like they did not waste the fees spent on those players 
(e.g. Arkes & Blumer, 1985). 
The second contribution of this thesis (Chapter 3) is its examination of the nationality 
effect on player playing time in the English Premier League (EPL). The empirical evidence 
establishes a unique discrimination effect as it accounts for the effective use of players (i.e. 
their playing time relative to their performance). We employed a novel market test approach 
that complements the established wage equation estimate approach while controlling for player 
performance metrics. The analysis was conducted using a unique dataset of player performance 
metrics and their transfer fees. The findings suggest that British managers were biased towards 
their home players. We found evidence that British managers allocated extra playing time to 
British players of about 100 minutes per season. This extra playing time could not be explained 
merely by the players’ performance levels, their transfer fees, or their playing positions, 
therefore providing evidence of discrimination. Our findings also indicate that even if manager 
nationality was ignored, British players still got more playing time than non-British players 
after controlling for performances. Specifically, they got more playing time than European, 
South American, and African players by 102, 170, and 196 minutes per season, respectively. 
We also re-examined the models of Szymanski (2000) and Pedace (2008) with our recent 
dataset and found no evidence for discrimination either against non-white players or for foreign 
nationalities. These findings suggest a shift of the discrimination effect towards the individual 
player level from the club level. 
The final contribution of this thesis (Chapter 4) is its unique empirical approach to test 
for HF advantage in the Premier League (PL). Our findings provide unequivocal evidence of a 
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significantly strong and robust HF effect of 0.46 additional points per home game. It held with 
almost identical effects for top six teams, relegation teams, and the remaining teams in the 
league. After establishing the HF effect, we used bootstrap techniques to explore the HF in 
predicting team success and failure in the PL. More specifically, our bootstrap approach to 
modelling match results follows that of Bell et al. (2013). The findings suggest that teams who 
outperformed the expected bootstrap results in their early home (relative to away) games would 
be secure in the PL. This was still the case even if they performed poorly in away games over 
this period. This suggests a strong implication that home results dominate away results. 
Moreover, a great home performance, even if accompanied by poor away performance, could 
lead to a top four ranking. An average team performance at home that was associated with poor 
performance away from home increased the probability of relegation to the Championship by 
about 40%.  
Lastly, an average performance in home games that was accompanied by great away 
performance did not suffice to secure a top four ranking. This is additional evidence in favour 
of the HF effect in the context of predicting promotion in elite European football competitions. 
The implication of our results is that teams can evaluate their probability for promotion to the 
top four to six rankings or for relegation on the basis of the home results of only the first 20 




2. Sunk Costs and Premier League Transfer Fees 
 
Sunk costs are a subject of profound debate among neoclassical and behavioural economists. 
They show agents’ tendencies towards spending more resources on a project once a large fixed 
cost has been incurred. The sunk cost concept is central to behavioural economists’ arguments, 
but evidence has mainly stemmed from laboratory experiments. Staw and Hoang (1995) 
introduced a practical field study in a sporting discipline, and estimated the impact of draft 
position on playing time in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Rational decision 
making suggests that the most productive players would have more playing time irrespective 
of their cost to the team. In reality, sports pundits would argue that managers (agents) can be 
biased towards granting more playing time to high-cost players. One way of justifying this 
behaviour is by means of sunk cost or commitment effect.  
Empirical evidence pertaining to sunk costs and their role in the decision-making 
processes is rather sparse. Staw and Hoang (1995) and Camerer and Weber (1999) provided 
the main contributions to sunk cost studies with a real-world setup. Staw and Hoang (1995) 
provided evidence of sunk cost effects associated with draft order in the NBA, showing that 
highly drafted players would be granted more playing time and retained longer in their teams, 
even after controlling for performance. They rejected three explanations that were based on 
rational decision making. The first was the salary cap imposed by the NBA. They claimed that 
this could be mitigated by teams by the possibility of releasing their underperforming players. 
Second was the effect of a popular player, where managers might feel under pressure from fans 
to play them, but Staw and Hoang claimed that fans’ behaviour towards popular players could 
be fickle. Third, they tested the patience of teams with their highly drafted players hoping that 
they would perform as expected. They found that draft position could not predict performance 
in the longer run (in the 4th and 5th years) and thus it should not justify teams’ patience.  
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Camerer and Weber (1999) re-examined Staw and Hoang’s findings with different 
specifications, such as unbundling the performance index created by Staw and Hoang and 
introducing predicted performance, controlling for previous season performance, using a proxy 
for popular players, and testing for the first round pick effect. Their results generally supported 
those of Staw and Hoang but produced a lower magnitude of the sunk cost effect. Thus, their 
alternative specifications provided some rational explanations for the sunk cost effect.  
Leeds et al. (2015) used a more sophisticated method, a regression discontinuity RD, to 
disentangle the first-round draft or lottery pick in the NBA from those drafted later. The sunk 
cost effect found in the previous couple of studies had been diminished (or removed) in their 
model specification. This is due to the following: First, their RD model challenged the 
possibility of a mistaken conclusion that may have been a result of a global linear specification 
used in the previous literature. Second, they used different player performance measurements 
(wins produced per 48 mins). Lastly, a more precise measure of playing time was used by 
taking into account injuries and suspensions. Keefer (2017) used the RD method to test the 
sunk cost for the American National Football League (NFL). The results contrasted with Leeds 
et al. (2015) and provided evidence for a sunk cost element where a 10% increase in the salary 
cap value of NFL players resulted in an additional 2.7 game starts. 
Therefore, PL transfers provide the basis for an interesting study of sunk costs. We 
chose English Football as a fresh field for applying the sunk cost theory. We contribute to the 
literature with the following: first, we used a novel dataset of the PL that has not been 
previously utilised, particularly in the context of sunk costs. Previous literature mainly relied 
on broad player performance measures, such as goals scored and goal assists. From 2006 
onwards, the EPL started to provide more detailed player performance metrics that covered 
major aspects of playing, including the areas of attack and defence, in addition to team play 
measures and player discipline, for a total of 37 performance metrics. We explored these 
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measures, through correlation matrices and principal component analysis (PCA), to reflect a 
reliable player performance and conduct the hypotheses testing. Football (soccer) presents a 
different setup than the NBA and some other sports (e.g. NFL). Mainly, there are no draft picks 
in football, and instead players are traded through two transfer windows during a season. The 
NBA imposes constraints and limitations to the draft picks in both financial and technical 
aspects (e.g. salary caps, top teams and lower teams picking rules/lottery). Football clubs can 
freely choose players through their agents with no salary and transfer caps, but many operate 
under financial constraints. This implies a possible endogenous commitment effect. Second, 
we explored the frequent manager turnover within teams. The self-justification explanation 
suggests that sunk costs may not apply in this case due to managerial change. This provides an 
opportunity for testing that hypothesis. The managerial change effect has not been estimated 
in previous studies, and thus it is introduced as a robustness factor for the analysis of sunk 
costs. Third, we introduced a reverse sunk cost effect where free transferred players may be 
granted more playing time, showing a bargain deal bias of managers. We also tested whether 
transfer fees in the PL had similar effects to those in the NBA and NFL using the regression 
discontinuity method (RD).  
We provide evidence for a sunk cost effect within a football context where higher 
transfer fees could predict more playing time for players in different positions. The effect was 
robust to a number of specifications. It was associated with incremental increases in transfer 
fees as well as a distinctive effect of expensive players in particular. More importantly, the 
effect persisted even after a managerial change. This contradicts a rational decision-making 
standpoint where assigning a new manager should remove any sunk cost effect demonstrated 
by his predecessor (e.g. Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). To rule out the possibility of free 
transferred players biasing the results (as they do not incur a large sunk cost element), we tested 
the sunk cost hypothesis while removing those players from the sample. The effect remained 
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robust, though with slightly lower magnitude. We also showed evidence for managers’ bias 
towards granting free transferred players more playing time as a way to show their skills in 
securing bargain deals for their clubs (e.g. Schindler, 1998). Lastly, we estimated the RD model 
to test the effect of expensive players. The results converged to support the sunk cost 
hypothesis.    
2.1 Literature and Hypotheses  
 
The economics of professional team sports has attracted academic interest since the mid-1950s, 
with most literature originating in the US. Both theoretical and econometric aspects of the 
discipline have been explored in the literature, as many economists consider professional sports 
to be a legitimate area for scientific research. Articles by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) 
are regarded as fundamental to sports research, while Sloane (1971) influenced football 
economics research in particular. These studies covered broad economic aspects and 
implications of the sports market structure (e.g. free agency in players’ labour market, nature 
of production, utility maximisation). There were also early contributions to data science in 
football, such as forecasting models for football match results (e.g. Moroney, 1956; Reep et 
al., 1971) and game theory and football games (e.g. Chiappori et al., 2002).  
Abolition of the maximum wage in English football in 1961 and the introduction of the Bosman 
rule through the European Court of Justice in 1995 (i.e. free agency contracts) provided the 
basis for a fundamental shift in players’ salaries. Additionally, since introducing TV 
broadcasting rights for English football matches in the late 1980s, footballers’ salaries and 
transfer fees have been escalating. The annual fee for exclusive TV rights went from £191 
million in 1992 to as much as £5.1 billion in 2016 (see Table 11). 
 The shift in salaries and compensation patterns stimulated a new wave of professional 
sports research. Theoretical contributions to sports stars’ salaries determinations were proposed 
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by economists (e.g. Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Rosen, 1981). Data on players’ salaries in European 
professional football are scarce due to confidentiality and disclosure restrictions, so the scope 
for empirical evidence is rather thin. A number of studies attempted to determine factors 
affecting players’ salaries in Europe (e.g. Frick & Deutscher, 2009; Lehmann & Schulze, 2008; 
Lucifora & Simmons, 2003). Collectively, some performance measures were found to be 
significant in determining salaries, such as goal scoring and assists, matches played, and 
experience. Lucifora and Simmons (2003) found that goal scoring rate and assistance were 
associated with highly convex salaries.  
2.1.1 Literature review 
 
A rational economic decision suggests that future benefits should exceed future costs (Vroom, 
1964). It is expected from a rational economic perspective that allocating resources would 
follow that principle. The traditional models of Edwards (1954) and Vroom (1964) provide a 
basis for these economic-based decisions. The rationality of decisions has been challenged by 
the psychology literature that is related to decision-making processes, and individuals’ 
tendencies to rectify past failures or losses were scrutinised. Staw (1976) provided evidence on 
the motives behind people’s tendencies towards rationalising the negative outcomes (or 
feedback) that were consequences of their initial decisions. Rationalising a poor decision is 
manifested in an individual’s willingness to increase commitment in a failing course of action, 
labelled as escalation of commitment (EoC). Such behaviour increases after an initial decision 
receives negative feedback and more resources are likely to be invested in an attempt to recover 
any losses incurred, in addition to self-justification motives. Staw and Ross (1987) considered 
those predicaments along with the uncertainty of the consequences of persistence or withdrawal 
from the course of action as characteristics of an escalation situation.  
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The progress of Staw’s initial studies reveals the complex nature of EoC processes. 
Self-justification is a predominant theory attempting to explain the EoC phenomenon (see 
Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Staw’s research (e.g. Staw & Fox, 1977; Staw & Ross, 1978) 
provide support for self-justification as a factor influencing EoC, and that justification of 
previous decisions is a function of personal responsibility. Schaubroeck and Williams (1993) 
found that factors affecting escalation of commitment were stronger under personally 
responsible conditions. However, the appeal of self-justification was reduced following a 
prolonged course of action. This led to the use of external justification in addition to the 
established self or internal justification (Staw & Fox, 1979). That distinction considers 
exogenous causes of a setback, such as job loss or stiff public resistance to policies. They found 
that EoC was influenced by exogenous factors, which are external demonstrations of 
competence.  
Another source of escalating commitment is norms of consistency. Staw and Ross 
(1980) showed that being consistent in a course of action with ultimate success leads to 
escalating commitment. Their political context survey demonstrates that being consistent was 
generally a perception of the public, or the cultural norms surrounding decision makers.  
Whyte (1986) and Bowen (1987) were opponents of the self-justification explanation 
of escalating commitments. Whyte (1986) argued that the prospect theory of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) provided a better explanation for decisions involving escalating commitments. 
The theory states that there is a reference point from which a decision maker will be risk averse 
in the domain of gains and risk taking in the domain of losses. Hence, the decision will be 
directly linked to that reference point rather than rational factors. Both prospect theory and self-
justification seem to explain escalation when it is operationalised under a negatively framed 
condition (e.g. half empty bottle) with high personal responsibility. Nevertheless, the findings 
of Davis and Bobko (1986) that escalation would occur in some positively framed conditions 
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with no effect of personal responsibility gives greater support to self-justification than prospect 
theory.  
It was suggested by Northcraft and Neale (1986) that explicit consideration of 
opportunity cost alters the framing of situations, leading to more rational decisions. They 
illustrated that confining the choices between certain loss and low probability of no loss or 
small gain was a misleading setup. Though this illustration is not intended to support self-
justification, it points to possible weaknesses of prospect theory.  
Bowen (1987) proposed a decision dilemma theory and suggested that factors such as 
economic considerations, curiosity, need for greater efforts to reach success, and learning curve 
during the course of action are likely to influence decision makers, rather than their need for 
self-justification. Bowen’s view was that participants in the previous escalation research had 
not clearly received negative feedback with respect to their initial resource allocation decisions. 
However, some studies explicitly showed the negative feedback experienced by decision 
makers (e.g. Conlon & Parks, 1987).  
Brockner (1992) reviewed evidence supporting self-justification theory. He concluded 
that escalation behaviour was well explained by self-justification. The escalation studies used 
different strategies (i.e. differentiated control variables and manipulations) to explain the 
behaviour. This led Brockner to believe that the evidence converged to validate the self-
justification explanation, and he viewed other theoretical perspectives as complementary to the 
self-justification perspective, adding more insight to the explanation of the behaviour. Staw 
and Ross (1987) showed that the trade-off between economic factors and social factors 
depended on the stage of the decision-making process. Based on their argument, the initial 
stages of a course of action are likely to account for economic considerations, whereas later 
stages are likely to involve behavioural characteristics within the decision process.  
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Arkes and Blumer (1985) introduced another cognitive aspect to explain the behaviour: the 
sunk cost effect (SCE). They defined SCE as ‘a greater tendency to continue an endeavour 
once a non-refundable investment in money, effort or time has been made’. Because the 
decision maker does not wish to appear to be wasting resources, this becomes maladaptive 
behaviour. Arkes conducted a well-known experiment concerning theatre season tickets. 
Individuals who bought the tickets without a discount, which was provided randomly to others, 
were significantly more inclined to attend the theatre more often than those who bought the 
ticket at a discount. Arkes concluded that a sort of mental appreciation of sunk cost was 
experienced by those who bought tickets at full price. Several other experiments were 
conducted using different contexts (e.g. aeroplane radar, ski trips), which all revealed 
behaviour indicating a need to avoid waste. Arkes (1996) maintained that SCE was mainly 
explained by the this need, and the motive for justifying sunk costs was a continuous aspect 
during operations (Ayton & Arkes, 1998). 
The above studies attempt to explain the phenomenon of escalating commitments. 
Arkes and Blumer described it as a sunk cost effect. Decision makers’ tendencies to escalate 
commitments are likely to be grounded in sunk costs, whether it be money or time and effort. 
Hence, we may use both terminologies interchangeably. Research experiments are preceded 
by a sunk cost or loss scenario, followed by behavioural reasoning attempts such as personal 
responsibility, framing (i.e. processing of information), or other cognitive aspects that are being 
manipulated within these experiments. Thus, theoretical perspectives attempting to explain the 
phenomenon are embedded with sunk costs while different strategies are employed. The norm 
‘too much is expended to quit’ is likely to be an antecedent to behavioural reasoning. Hence, 
sunk cost is strongly associated with escalation of commitment (EoC), either as a main driver 
leading to escalation, or as an antecedent to needs for self-justification or need not to waste. 
Arkes and Ayton (1999) were of the view that sunk cost works with EoC as one entity; this can 
14 
 
be understood from their statement, ‘Justification plays another role in the analysis of the sunk 
cost effect’1. Staw and Hoang (1995) considered sunk costs to be central to the escalation 
question and confronting the assumptions of rational economic decision making. 
Staw and Hoang (1995) incorporated real organisational structure in escalation studies, 
incorporating NBA draft numbers and playing time. A main weakness they addressed was that 
previous escalation literature had been laboratory-based, which does not easily allow 
generalisation to natural fields. Thus, their study’s main purpose was to fill that particular gap 
rather than focusing on theoretical processes underlying the behavioural effect.  
They found significant sunk cost effects on managers’ decisions pertaining to playing 
time, trading the players, and their continuation in the NBA. High-cost (top draft) players 
gained longer playing time and were kept longer in the team even after controlling for their 
performance on court. Yet, Staw and Hoang pointed out that seeking a single theoretical model 
as a causal explanation for the behaviour was far from reality. A number of psychological 
processes (e.g. justification, wastefulness, commitment) could have simultaneously contributed 
to the effect. 
Camerer and Weber (1999) re-examined the results of Staw and Hoang (1995). They 
tested commitment to first round picks and included player trading cards as a proxy for 
popularity. Substitute players were a salient variable included in their test. In addition, they 
controlled for performance in previous and current seasons. They also incorporated predicted 
performance measures as a replacement for observed measures. Their results were generally 
consistent with Staw and Hoang; they found a positive impact of draft positions on playing 
time, specifically earlier in the players’ career (i.e. second and third year). The first round pick 
gained significantly higher playing minutes (up to 475 minutes during a season) than the second 
 
1 p. 597 
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round pick. However, their later career years showed significantly lower playing time for 
players than Staw and Hoang’s results, which is partly attributable to their added specifications.  
Leeds et al. (2015) found contrasting results to the previous NBA studies. They found 
no evidence of sunk cost (i.e. draft position) effect on playing time. They used a more 
sophisticated model specification, regression discontinuity (RD), at the cut-off between the two 
draft rounds, which distinguished their results from Staw and Hoang’s. First round players’ 
salaries are based on draft number, whereas second round players’ salaries are negotiated with 
their agents. This raises a possible endogenous effect of commitment, which made the 
distinction of using an RD method.  
Keefer (2017) employed a similar method to Leeds et al. (2015) using playing time in 
the NFL; however, his results showed an effect of sunk costs on playing time decision. The 
sample of the study had no salary cap on first round picks (i.e. all salaries were determined 
through free negotiations). Accordingly, Keefer (2017) suggested that financial commitment 
may increase when the cost is endogenously determined. This supports the personal 
responsibility effect when associated with sunk costs (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1982). 
2.1.2 Hypotheses  
 
Transfer fees are a sunk cost; the higher the fees, the more significant the sunk cost. Classical 
economics suggests that team managers should play their most productive players (e.g. Leeds 
et al., 2015) and hence not be influenced by the size of a player’s transfer fee. This gives rise 
to the following sunk cost hypotheses: 




H1A: Playing time is positively related to a player’s transfer fee after controlling for a player’s 
performance. 
The rationale for the sunk cost hypothesis is that managers do not want to feel they are 
wasting a large transfer fee spent on a player. Their personal responsibility in signing a player 
along with negative feedback (e.g. if a player is underperforming) may induce self-justification. 
They may also be under pressure from fans and pundits to play high transfer fee players (or 
stars), which could illustrate the external justification or exogenous causes of Staw and Fox 
(1979). Thaler (2015, p. 284) stated, ‘If a team is paying a high draft pick a lot of money, it 
feels under pressure to put him in the game, regardless of how well he is playing.’2 Thus, they 
may be biased towards granting playing time based on sunk costs (transfer fee) incurred rather 
than on player performance. The implication of the null hypothesis (H1) is that player transfer 
fees have no effect on their playing time, as the manager is expected to base his decisions 
purely on player performance metrics. However, if sunk cost affects the manager’s decisions, 
then the transfer fee will be a significant factor in determining a player’s playing time. This is 
the implication of the alternative hypothesis (H1A).  
Modifications and alternatives to the sunk cost hypothesis have been proposed. The 
self-justification explanation (e.g. Wicklund & Brehm, 1976) suggests that the sunk cost effect 
is removed or at least mitigated (i.e. a negative relation) when a new manager takes over from 
the manager who completed the transfer. If the sunk cost is considered a mental account, then 
when the owner of the mental account leaves, the account is closed, and the sunk cost effect is 
removed. This is consistent with personal responsibility, as mental accounting applies to 
 
2 Draft pick is a term related to the National Basketball Association (NBA). It has a different structure than the 
football transfer window in which players are ranked based on their qualities. Teams can trade those draft 
picks following sets of financial caps and lottery pick specifications by the NBA. 
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whoever bears the costs. We explore the frequent turnover of managers within teams to test 
this conjecture.  
H2: Playing time is independent of a player transfer fee under a manager who was not in place 
when the transfer was completed, after controlling for player performance.  
H2A: Playing time is positively related to a player transfer fee even under a manager who was 
not in place when the transfer was completed, after controlling for player performance. 
The implication of H2 hypothesis is that the sunk cost effect (transfer fee) is mitigated 
under a manager different from the one under whom the transfer was completed.  
There are players who run out of contract or may be highly established in their clubs 
(i.e. club legends) who progressed from the club youth system (e.g. Steven Gerrard in 
Liverpool, Ryan Giggs in Manchester United, Harry Kane in Tottenham). In both cases, the 
player does not add a sunk cost to his new team. If a player’s contract expires and his club 
(team) does not wish to renew it, then he will be able to move to another team without a transfer 
fee. Similarly, a player who progresses from a club youth system (or academy) will sign a 
contract that is free of a transfer fee for the first team of the club. Free transfers do not 
necessarily indicate that players are mediocre. For instance, Academy players signing for the 
same club indicate that they are within the required team standards. They might get more 
playing time than other established players once their performance is superior. This contrasts 
with NBA drafted players, where players drafted on the first round get more playing time than 
those from the second round, and the lottery-pick players play more than all of them (Leeds et 
al., 2015). NBA draft positions reflect player qualities while this is not necessarily the case 
with football while considering a free transfer condition. This allows us to test the conjecture 
that a free transfer is a bargain deal for the club, where established or academy players may 
provide a high performance level for a zero sunk cost.  
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The average playing time for free-of-cost players (who form about 12.4% of the data 
sample) was 1720 minutes, compared to 1794 minutes for others. The test of mean difference 
shows that this was statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, free transferred (or free-of-cost) 
strikers and defenders played on average fewer minutes than their non-free peers (1350 minutes 
compared to 1552 minutes and 1815 minutes compared to 2015 minutes, respectively), whereas 
the averages for free and non-free midfielders were very close (1721 minutes compared to 1730 
minutes). Additionally, free players had on average a lower injury rate than non-free players 
(2.57 games compared to 3.27 games), and this was statistically significant. This shows that 
free-cost players played regularly, and a test for reverse sunk cost hypothesis is viable.    
The psychological value of a bargain has been discussed in consumer psychology 
literature. The smart shopper hypothesis is an attempt to explain the value of a bargain, and 
proposes that ego-expressive goals may be satisfied by getting a discount or a bargain deal. 
Schindler (1998) suggested that the consequence of getting a bargain could lead to a 
noneconomic component whereby consumers (managers in our case) would attribute the 
success of a bargain deal to their own skills. This implies managers who have a successful 
bargain will communicate their deal through the players’ playing time. This is based on the 
assumption that managers select their team players. There might be instances where club 
owners or other technical staff select players; however, there is no reliable way to address that 
issue. Despite that, the general perception is that managers are usually approached before 
sealing a player deal.  
A rational economic decision suggests that player performance should determine his 




H3: Playing time is independent of a free transfer player after controlling for a player’s 
performance.  
H3A: Playing time is positively related to a free transfer player after controlling for a player’s 
performance. 
 
2.2 Empirical Analysis 
 
2.2.1 Data and sample 
 
The sample included all Premier League (PL) players who played a minimum of nine games 
(appearances) in any season for the period spanning 2006/07 to 2016/17. That period is used 
for strikers, while we confined the observations of midfielders and defenders to the period 
spanning 2012/13 to 2016/17. We opted to collect a longer sample period for strikers due to 
the fact that this position was held by a smaller number of players. There were more players in 
non-striker positions; thus, five seasons provided sufficient data to conduct the analysis. Each 
season spent by a player at a club was considered an observation. The maximum number of 
minutes a player can play in a single season is 3420 (90 minutes per game over a total of 38 
games). The season runs from approximately mid-August to mid-May, during which a winter 
transfer window opens in January (mid-season window), in addition to the summer window 
(pre-season window).3  
 A minimum of nine games (appearances) amounted to approximately 24% of the 
season’s games. The average player’s appearance was 24, with a standard deviation of 8. 
Players who made a minimum of nine appearances had an average of 440 minutes of playing 
time. This is sufficient time to play frequently, at least as a substitute player. Players who 
 
3 Pre-season window spans usually from beginning of June to end of August, while mid-season window spans 
from 1st January to 31st January (https://www.fifatms.com/itms/worldwide-transfer-windows-calendar/).  
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appeared less than the average (i.e. less than 24 appearances) had more injuries than those who 
played more than the average. Those had an average of roughly five games injured, with a 
standard deviation of 6.4 and a maximum of 29 games. On the other hand, players who made 
more than the average number of appearances had 1.54 average games injured with a standard 
deviation of 2.6 and a maximum of 13 games. This suggests that injury had a considerable 
effect on players who played a below average number of games. Thus, we consider the 
minimum of nine appearances as a threshold by which a player becomes established within a 
team squad (see Tables 7 and 8 for PT averages). The sample excludes observations of players 
who had injuries for a full season and goalkeepers.4  
We used a number of data sources (websites) to obtain the dataset, including 
Transfermarkt.co.uk for playing time metrics, Premierleague.com for players’ performance 
metrics, and Soccerbase.com for managerial turnover records, players’ transfer fees, and 
signing dates. The provided performance metrics are essentially derived from Opta sports, 
which is the leading sports data provider for major sports entities.  
2.2.2 Econometric model 
 
We ran the following panel regression models to test our hypotheses: 
𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡  𝐷1𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜹 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜼𝒊 + 𝝀𝐶𝒊 + 𝜽Ѵ𝒕 + 𝜓𝐹𝑇 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕       (1) 
𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 𝐷1𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜹 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜼𝒊 + 𝝀𝐶𝒊 + 𝜽Ѵ𝒕 + 𝜓𝐹𝑇 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕       (2) 
where PTit is the dependent variable representing playing time in minutes and in a separate 
panel—within the same regression model—as a percentage of total possible minutes for player 
i in season t. The percentage of PT is calculated by dividing the minutes played by the total 
number of theoretically possible playing minutes. Those possible minutes are calculated by 
 
4 Goalkeeper position is occupied by only one player. It is rare to substitute him unless an injury occurs.  
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subtracting suspension, injury, on-loan, and winter window game minutes from the season total 
minutes of 3420. We excluded added time (or injury time), which is usually added to each 
game’s total minutes (90 minutes), from the total possible minutes. 
The TFit variable in model (1) represents the transfer fee and captures the potential sunk 
cost effect. The transfer fee is adjusted for inflation for each player i in all seasons (see Tables 
4, 5, and 6 for TF spend averages). Discounting transfer fee is not applied, as its effect could 
be problematic due to the following: First, a player’s value could increase or decrease during 
his contract. Second, managers tend to refer to the original transfer fee when evaluating their 
players.5 This is consistent with the agent reference point of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
The expectation is that the TFit coefficient β1 will be positive according to hypothesis H1A. 
However, there is at least one scenario where the sunk cost effect may be mitigated, and this is 
captured by TFit interacted with a dummy. The 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡𝐷1𝑖𝑡  variable reflects the transfer fee 
conditional on managerial change in the transferred player’s team where 𝐷1𝑖𝑡 takes the value 
of 1 for the period during which a new manager is in charge. This is coded for each player once 
a team’s manager is changed after his signing date in that season. The expectation is that the 
β2 coefficient will be negative according to hypothesis H2, as the sunk cost effect should not 
apply in this case. If β2 is insignificant, then the implication is that a positive β1 coefficient (if 
any) is not influenced and hence the sunk cost is still positively related to playing time even 
after assigning a new manager to the team.  
The TFhighit variable in model (2) is a dummy that represents the transfer fee in the top 
quartile. It takes a value of 1 if the transfer fee of a player is within the top quartile values and 
0 otherwise. This captures the potential sunk cost effect of expensive players. We used the 
dummy to test any distinctive effect of expensive players, which is analogous to the first and 
 
5 Sir Alex Ferguson manifested this kind of thinking for managers in his books Autobiography and Leading.  
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second draft picks of other sports fields (e.g. NBA, NFL). The draft ranks the players based on 
their qualities and subsequently their related financial commitments, and these escalate with 
higher draft positions. The first round contains top players, while the second contains players 
with lower quality and lower financial commitment. Expensive players in football often have 
better qualities than the less expensive players (see Table 15 for comparison statistics). After 
controlling for their performance, classical economics predicts that there should be no effect of 
sunk costs (transfer fees) incurred. The expectation of β1 and β2 coefficients are the same as 
model (1) coefficients. The difference between models (1) and (2) lies in the econometric 
treatment of the transfer fee, where (1) takes into account each increment in TF in the cross-
section but (2) takes into account the effect of the top quartile TF. The rest of the variables 
apply the same way for models (1) and (2) as follows.  
The Perfit variable captures a player’s performance, and the 𝛾 coefficient is the effect 
on playing time (PT). A player’s performance is measured by several metrics, and we ran a 
separate regression for each position (strikers, defenders, and midfielders). Goals, assists, and 
passes were the main performance metrics applied for all positions, excluding assists from 
defenders. The other metrics––crosses, tackles, interceptions, and duels-lost––differed slightly. 
Performance metrics were selected based on their correlation coefficients, along with principal 
component analysis (PCA) (see Tables 9 and 10). Based on that, the selected variables in each 
position explained more than 67% of the variation in all performance metrics. We chose not to 
construct a performance index based on the PCA to reflect the distinctive variables effect. In 
addition to the main performance metrics mentioned above, tackles and crosses were assigned 
to strikers, tackles, and interceptions for midfielders and defenders, respectively, and duels-lost 
for both midfielders and defenders.  
A main difference between our model and the NBA-related models (e.g. Staw & Hoang, 
1995; Leeds et al., 2015) is that NBA players’ performance is captured, to a considerable 
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extent, by their experience. The NBA draft structure guarantees certain contract durations for 
players, which allows for a more balanced data panel. This is not the case in a football context 
due to the higher frequency of trading players. Football clubs may receive offers for their 
players that cannot be ignored due to their profit potential, whereas the financial caps imposed 
in the NBA and NFL prevent the clubs from that potential. The NBA salary cap could be 
exceeded in some cases, but with a luxury tax to be paid. The consequent limitation to our 
model is the lack of proper lagging performance specifications, especially if a player moves 
out of the EPL. Thus, we confine the analysis to current season performance metrics. 
The Controls is a vector that includes the following variables: The first is the number 
of games for which a player was injured, suspended and/or on loan. The second is a dummy 
for winter window transfers (WW) to account for the lower possible playing time for players 
being transferred in that window, as they did not participate in the first half of the season with 
their new team. Hence, those observations are included in the sample after the winter transfer 
takes place. (See Table 16 for definitions of performance metrics and control variables.) 
Lastly, η is the fixed effect for players. The C variable is a dummy to capture club 
effects. The V variable is a dummy to capture the seasonal trend of TF. The FT variable is a 
dummy representing free transferred players to capture the effect of players who went out of 
contract or academy players.  
2.3 Regression Results 
 
We estimated fixed effects (FE) panel regressions for models (1) and (2). The TF is the transfer 
fee value in £million and captures the potential sunk cost effect. The TFhigh is a dummy that 
represents the top quartile TF and captures the potential sunk cost effect of expensive players. 
This takes a value of 1 for any player whose transfer fee lies in the top quartile. For strikers 
and midfielders, the top quartile TF value starts from £10m, while it starts from £6m for 
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defenders. The £10m value represents a psychological level, as it is the first two digits TF in 
millions. It is in sync with the top quartile starting values. The lower starting value for defenders 
may be attributed to the football industry valuation of this position along with goalkeepers. 
Their performance measures are less clear than those of strikers and midfielders, where goals 
and assists are the major contributions to the team’s success.  
We estimated a second panel regression (Panel B) within each model but without 
including free transferred and club academy system players. This is a robustness test to rule 
out any potential influence on the results that may be caused by zero sunk cost players, and is 
based on the argument that free transfers (either out of contract or academy players) lack a sunk 
cost element and thus are not relevant to the EoC subject and its estimation model. In a rational 
world, it is expected that only playing performance determines playing time. Hence, it was 
expected that the regressions would yield significant coefficients for performance and control 
variables and insignificant coefficients for all other variables.  
We included the win ratio of clubs as a subsample to represent distinctive club 
characteristics. Higher paid players often possess stronger qualities. It was therefore expected 
that clubs with higher spending would yield higher win ratios (Figure 3). This allowed us to 
test whether winning clubs appreciated sunk costs differently. The average win rate was 37%. 
We conducted a chi-square test for homogeneity in playing time distribution among two groups 
of teams (i.e. winning vs. non-winning), where winning teams had above average wins and 
non-winning teams had below average wins. We defined playing time as above average when 
a player played more than 50.3% (the median of playing time) of his possible playing time, and 
below average when it was less than the median. The null hypothesis was not rejected. This 




2.3.1 Striker results 
 
The striker regression results are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable of these results 
is playing time in terms of percentage of minutes, whereas the results in terms of played 
minutes are presented separately in Table 12. The results of models (1) and (2) indicate that 
the transfer fee TF for strikers was positively related to their playing time. The results are 
statistically significant for both minutes and percentage of minutes terms. These results support 
the H1A sunk costs hypothesis. The economic impact of higher fees on playing time PT was 
strong. Model (2) indicates that top TF quartile players play on average an extra 14.8% of their 
possible playing time per season. In terms of minutes, (2) indicates 425 more minutes played 
per season. This is roughly equivalent to five more games per season on average. The results 
of Staw and Hoang (1995) indicated that a second round drafted player played on average 552 
fewer minutes in his second year in the NBA (in NBA, the first-round players are at a higher 
skill level than the second-round players and the higher the draft position—within each 
round—the lower the player quality). The NBA season consists of 82 games with a total of 
3936 minutes, which is 15.1% more than the total minutes of the EPL football season. Despite 
the differences in the two sporting fields, our results were fairly close to those of Staw and 
Hoang (1995) once we considered top quartile players in football to be similar to first round 
drafted players in the NBA in terms of performance quality. The performance metrics of 
players in the top TF quartile suggest that they possessed stronger qualities (e.g. their goals 
mean was 0.447 per 90 minutes relative to 0.307 for lower quartiles, and the assist mean was 
0.192 relative to 0.141). 
These results are supported by the more general model (1) results, which account for 
each increment in the TF. They indicate that an additional £1m in TF for a player resulted in 
0.68% extra playing time per season (or 18 minutes). Staw and Hoang’s (1995) results showed 
that each increment in draft position in the NBA led to 23 fewer playing minutes in the second 
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season. This is fairly close to (1) results. We may express the results in the following way: a 
player who cost £10 million will have on average, all else equal, 6.8% more playing time than 
a player who cost only £1 million. This is roughly equivalent to 2.5 more games per season on 
average. The results of (1) and (2) converge to provide evidence of the considerable economic 
impact of the higher transfer fees on playing time. Within (2), the transfer fee showed the 
highest economic impact of all variables. This is a striking result considering that player 
performance should be the ultimate time predictor from a rational standpoint.  
The results were robust to managerial changes in teams. A new manager can be 
expected to alter his new team players. We ran the regression first with only a managerial 
change variable6 (i.e. no interaction with the transfer fee). The variable was significant at the 
5% level with a high negative sign of 0.042. This indicates less playing time, on average, when 
a new manager was assigned. However, the interaction variable TFD1 was not significant. This 
suggests that a new manager’s behaviour can alter with increasing transfer fee and hence may 
still hold the mental account of his predecessor where the feeling of not wanting to waste a 
large fee on a player persists. This is consistent with H2A, and playing time was still positively 
related to transfer fees even after a new manager was assigned. The self-explanation was 
surpassed with a new manager bias towards keeping an old mental account.   
The results were also robust to the removal of free transferred and academy players 
from the estimation model. These players did not add a sunk cost element to their teams (TF=0). 
The expectation of the sunk cost hypothesis is that managers choose to play high TF players 
ahead of low TF players, including where TF might equal zero. However, panel B results show 
that the TF effect remained positive even after removing players with a zero sunk cost from the 
estimation model, where they accounted for 16.6% of the sample. The magnitude of the TF 
 
6 Not reported in the tables. 
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coefficient was, however, slightly reduced to 13% from 14.8% in (2) and reduced to 0.59% 
from 0.68% in (1). 
The FREE-TF variable was significant and positively related to playing time for teams 
with a less than average win ratio (the average win ratio for teams was 37.6%). We tagged 
these teams as non-winning teams. The economic impact of the variable was strong, with at 
least 19% extra playing time per season. These teams seemed to highly appreciate players with 
a bargain deal either through free transfer or through the club academy system. The results in 
columns 2 and 5 of panel A support the bargain deal hypothesis H3A. Managers of non-
winning teams may grant those players more playing time as a way to show their own skills of 
signing zero sunk cost players with good qualities.   
Within the Perf variable, Models (1) and (2) show that a striker’s PASS was the most 
statistically significant factor in predicting his playing time. It had a negative coefficient of 
0.39 in percentage terms and (2) confirmed it with a relatively similar magnitude of 0.34. A 
striker’s scoring performance GOAL was another main performance predictor of his playing 
time. The results indicate that goals were positively related to playing time, which is quite 
intuitive. The coefficient was significant at the 5% level in percentage terms and its economic 
impact was strong, where the percentage of extra minutes played was 10.6% in (1) and 10.3% 
in (2). This is a higher economic impact than TF within (1) but not within (2). This suggests 
the crucial importance of a top-paid player to the managers, sometimes to an irrational extent.  
From the rest of the performance metrics, TACKLE shows a significant statistical and 
economic impact. It indicates a negative relationship with playing time, where playing time of 
a player decreased by 5.6% in percentage terms for each increment in his tackles. The negative 
coefficients in passes and tackles may be explained by the different playing characteristics 
among strikers. Expensive players cost more than £10m and the rest cost less, but they formed 
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74% of the sample. The latter players played less on average (1461 minutes compared to 1798 
minutes); however, they had 10% more tackles than expensive ones (1.09 compared to 0.99). 
On the other hand, they had fewer passes than expensive players (27 compared to 30) but with 
much higher standard deviation and skewness (the maximum number of passes for expensive 
players was just 60, while the less expensive players had a maximum of 174). Panel (B) shows 
a higher negative TACKLE coefficient of 7.1%. This could imply that the higher the fees of a 
striker, the more he deviated from defensive roles. The results indicate that ASSIST was an 
insignificant factor. This is attributed to its high standard error relative to goals. 
The TF results were driven by both below-and above-average winning teams. Most of 
these subsamples’ coefficients were significant at least at the 5% level, except for panel B in 
model (2) non-winning teams where it was insignificant, and for panel A in model (1) where it 
was significant only at the 10% level. This provides restrained evidence that winning teams 
might be more influenced by higher fees.  
Season effect coefficients were negative and highly significant from 2013 onwards (see 
Table 12). There has been a higher spending trend for players since 2013, which mainly relates 
to new TV broadcasting rights deals (see Tables 6 and 11 for trends of TF spending and TV 
deals). That higher spending may induce fiercer competition among players to gain more 
playing time, and thus the possibility of reaching that aim may be reduced.   
2.3.2 Midfielders results 
 
Midfielders’ results are presented in Table 2. The dependent variable of these results is playing 
time in terms of percentage of minutes, and the results in terms of played minutes are presented 
separately in Table 13. The results of models (1) and (2) collectively indicate that transfer fee 
TF for midfielders, in most cases, was not related to their playing time. This does not support 
the alternative H1A sunk costs hypothesis.  
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Panel B estimation results show that top quartile TF was highly significant for non-
winning teams with a strong coefficient of 31.8%. Managers of these teams seemed to 
appreciate their midfielder sunk costs differently. However, this effect was totally mitigated by 
the managerial change variable TFD1 with a strong negative coefficient of 43.9%. This 
suggests that a managerial turnover was sufficient to remove the sunk cost effect for 
midfielders. Additionally, the TF was significant in column (1) Panel A, but only at the 10% 
level, and this effect was also mitigated by TFD1. These results support the H2A hypothesis.  
The TFD1 variable was highly significant within the top quartile results, despite the 
fact that the TF variable was insignificant. This supports the evidence that a new manager will 
close his predecessor’s mental account, thus removing the sunk cost effect. This gives rise to 
the self-justification phenomenon of former managers. These results were more mixed and 
weaker than strikers’ results. This may be attributed to having more midfielders in the team 
squad than strikers and simultaneously having a variety of playing roles (e.g. defensive, 
attacking, left or right wings, wide or deep position). This creates more options for team 
managers in the sense that the probability of player rotation could be higher.  
The FREE-TF variable was significant and positively related to playing time in model 
(1). The economic impact of the variable was strong, with 13% extra playing time per season. 
Model (2) results were also significant but only at the 10% level. This converges with striker 
results to support H3A hypothesis pertaining to bargain deal bias.   
The performance metrics GOAL, DUEL-LOST, and TACKLE were shown to be 
significant playing time predictors. The results indicate that the GOAL variable was positively 
related to midfielders’ playing time. Most of its coefficients were statistically and economically 
significant within all panels. Each extra goal scored indicated roughly 30% extra time per 
season in model (1) and less magnitude of roughly 21% in model (2). Each DUEL-LOST 
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implied 5.18% less playing time per season. The negative coefficient is intuitive, as losing the 
ball more often in duels can hurt teams. TACKLE was significant at the 10% level in percentage 
terms but highly significant in minutes terms. Its coefficient indicates roughly 3% less playing 
time per season. It is more puzzling than the duels-lost. It may be due to the unsuccessful 
tackles (they usually account for a quarter to a third of the total tackles) or the role of the 
midfielder, which may or may not involve defensive tasks. The ASSIST variable was significant 
and negatively related to playing time only in panel B, but it was not supported by either panel 
A or the results in minutes terms, where it was insignificant.  
The season dummy coefficients were negative and highly significant from 2013 
onwards (see Table 13). This is consistent with striker results.  
2.3.3 Defenders results 
 
The results are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable of these results is playing time in 
terms of percentage of minutes, and the results in terms of played minutes are presented 
separately in Table 14. The results indicate that the transfer fee for defenders was positively 
related to playing time minutes. They were highly significant in all model panels and support 
the H1A sunk costs hypothesis. The economic impact of higher fees on playing time PT was 
strong within models (1) and (2). The results in model (1) indicate that each incremental 
increase in TF for a player resulted in 1.63% extra playing time per season, while in model (2) 
it resulted in 22.8% extra playing time. These were driven by the winning teams, and their 
coefficient in (2) was 47%. This is an immense magnitude and suggests that playing time for 
defenders in winning teams was mainly driven by their transfer fees. This is supported by their 
insignificant intercept, which was an exception within all panel results reported. Defenders 
played more on average than midfielders (average minutes of 1998 compared to 1706) with a 
lower standard deviation, and this is consistent with the common practice of football managers, 
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with defenders usually less often rotated and substituted during games than midfielders. This 
may explain why the defenders’ results were much clearer than those of midfielders.  
There is some evidence that this sunk cost effect could be partially mitigated following 
a managerial change. The results of model (2), which are reported in minutes terms, show a 
significant negative TFD1 variable with a coefficient of 303 minutes. This reduces about 20% 
of the effect magnitude and is consistent with H2 hypothesis.   
The PASS and DUEL-LOST are significant performance metrics to predict playing time 
for winning teams with coefficients of 0.76% and -5.06%, respectively. The negative DUEL-
LOST coefficient is intuitive, as losing the ball more often in duels can hurt teams. Non-winning 
teams’ players have no significant variable to predict their play time except for the intercept 
with a magnitude of 70.4% in (1) and 87.9% in (2). This implies that their squads are less 
vulnerable to changes within the defender position. This is supported by their insignificant ON-
LOAN variable (Table 14). The TACKLES variable for defenders was replaced by the 
INTERCEPTION variable due to their high correlation coefficient of 0.40; however, it was not 
significant. 
Panel B results indicate that the GOAL variable was significant and positively related 
to playing time in winning teams. Its economic impact was enormous, as an extra goal scored 
indicated 69% extra playing time per season. This result mitigates the effect of TF within the 
winning teams panel; however, the effect remained robust for the overall sample.  
The FREE-TF variable was insignificant. This may be attributed to the higher 
percentage of free transferred players relative to other positions (accounting for 25.7% of the 
sample) and the lower cost for a defender in general. This may make the bargain bias less 
appealing. The result supports the H3 hypothesis, where a free transfer is not related to playing 
time. On the other hand, this may explain the GOAL results in Panel B, where the removal of 
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free transferred players emphasised the importance of scoring to the winning teams. The season 
dummy coefficients were negative and highly significant from 2013 onwards (see Table 14).  
2.4 Regression Discontinuity Effect (RD) for Strikers 
 
The RD effect is presented in Figure 1. We employed RD to test for the expensive strikers’ 
effect. This is an analogous treatment effect to the draft effect of NBA conducted by Leeds et 
al. (2015) and NFL draft effect by Keefer (2017). The first-round draft pick in the NBA 
involves significantly higher financial commitments than the second round. In our sample, the 
intercept gap between the green-fitted line (players worth £10m or more) and the orange-fitted 
line (players worth less than £10m) represents the regression discontinuity (RD) effect of TF 
being equal to £10m or more. Thus, we consider the £10m TF as a cut-off line for being an 
expensive value. The average performance metrics of players in that category are more 
distinctive than those who are below that category value (see Table 15). However, using a 
narrower bandwidth around the cut-off line reduces the variation in players’ performance. For 
instance, using a bandwidth of £3m around the cut-off line shows a reduction in the GOAL 
mean difference from 0.14 (when using the total observations above the cut-off line) to only 
0.03. Additionally, the top TF quartile starts from the £10m value. This is an inflation-adjusted 
value.  
The result implies that the £10m TF had a positive effect on playing time while 
controlling for performance. In other words, strikers who were just above the cut-off line of 
£10m TF were likely to get more playing time than strikers who were just below that same line. 
We use the RD method, which relies on the nearest-matching technique and randomises the 
playing time of roughly similar quality players around the cut-off line (i.e. players below and 
above the cut-off line). The test result shows that strikers worth £10m or slightly above got 
10.7% more playing time than strikers who were worth less than £10m, despite the similarities 
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in players’ productivity. The result was highly significant. This supports Keefer’s (2017) 
findings, which showed that a 10% increase in the salary cap value of NFL players resulted in 
an additional 2.7 games starting when using the RD regression.  
On the other hand, this generally contradicts the findings of Leeds et al. (2015) 
concerning NBA players. They employed RD and considered it a main contribution relative to 
Staw and Hoang’s (1995) seminal paper. Their results showed that there was no draft pick 
effect on NBA playing time. Hence, the employed RD removed the positive effect of draft 
order found by Staw and Hoang (1995) and Weber and Camerer (1999). Keefer (2017) 
indicated that the different results may be explained by the different contract negotiation 
schemes between the NBA and the NFL. NBA players who are drafted in the first round cannot 
freely negotiate their contracts’ compensation, while NFL players can do it through their agents 
with their potential teams. This induces an endogenous financial commitment, and thus the 
escalation of commitment is relevant when the decision maker bears the sunk cost. This is 
supportive of the personal responsibility-related findings of Bazerman et al. (1982)., which 
showed that the decision maker of hiring an employee was more inclined to promote their 
chosen employee than others, despite similarities in their productivity.   
2.5 Conclusion 
 
We introduce new evidence that supports the sunk cost hypothesis. We used a novel dataset 
from the English Premier League to test the effect of transfer fees on playing time. The rationale 
was that managers should play their most effective players regardless of their cost. However, 
when a player’s transfer fee escalates, it may induce the manager’s need to not feel like money 
was wasted on him, in addition to pressure from fans to play the team stars (i.e. high cost 
players). Hence, those players may get more playing time even after controlling for their 
performance. Moreover, we explored the frequent manager turnover within clubs to test 
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whether the sunk cost effect could be mitigated. The rationale of this conjecture was that a self-
justification explanation of the escalation of commitment or sunk cost effect was removed 
when a new manager replaced the one who was involved in signing the players (i.e. who bore 
the sunk cost account).  
Our empirical findings support the sunk cost hypothesis. The transfer fee was shown to 
be positively related to playing time. This was especially true for strikers and defenders. 
Expensive strikers got on average 14.8% more playing time per season, while expensive 
defenders got on average 22.8% more. These results were robust to a managerial change in 
teams and when zero sunk cost players were removed from the estimation model. Managerial 
change could in some cases mitigate the sunk cost effect. This change reduced expensive 
defenders’ playing time by roughly 20% and by 9.4% for expensive midfielders, even with the 
absence of a sunk cost effect. The RD estimation model results showed that the £10m transfer 
fee worked as a burden to teams where players may have had more playing time due to that 
value privilege. Lastly, we showed the bargain deal bias of managers pertaining to free 





2.6 Tables and Figures 
 
2.6.1 Figure 1 
 
Notes: The orange line represents players who cost less than £10m while the green line represents players who 
cost more than £10m. The gap after the end of the orange line followed by the beginning of the green line on top 
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2.6.2 Figure 2(a) A scatterplot of minutes played and their relevant TF for the period  
2006/07–2016/17 - Strikers 
 
 Figure 2(b) A scatterplot of minutes played and their relevant TF for the period 





















































2.6.3 Figure 3 
 
Notes: The y-axis represents the average transfer fee spent by clubs per player. The x-axis represents the win 
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2.6.4 Table 1 Strikers’ Results - 2006/07 to 2016/17  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel A: Zero TF player included 
 
   
TF 0.0068*** 0.0088* 0.0059** 0.1485*** 0.1866** 0.1664*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0046) (0.0030) (0.0402) (0.0892) (0.0600) 
TFD1 -0.0022 -0.0056 -0.0017 -0.0288 -0.0453 -0.0182 
 (0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0017) (0.0367) (0.0787) (0.0467) 
GOAL 0.1059** 0.1390* 0.1226* 0.1031** 0.1308 0.1304* 
 (0.0477) (0.0819) (0.0690) (0.0476) (0.0816) (0.0683) 
ASSIST 0.0635 0.2095 -0.0141 0.0594 0.1976 -0.0113 
 (0.0833) (0.1372) (0.1207) (0.0831) (0.1375) (0.1195) 
PASS -0.0039*** -0.0056 -0.0070*** -0.0034*** -0.0045 -0.0061** 
 (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0027) 
CROSS -0.0125 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0131 -0.0040 -0.0017 
 (0.0114) (0.0227) (0.0170) (0.0114) (0.0224) (0.0168) 
TACKLE -0.0566** -0.0781** -0.0533 -0.0572** -0.0761** -0.0559 
 (0.0243) (0.0366) (0.0406) (0.0242) (0.0366) (0.0402) 
FREE-TF 0.0162 0.2167** 0.2313 0.0161 0.1934** 0.1838 
 (0.0594) (0.0939) (0.2448) (0.0590) (0.0920) (0.2392) 
CONSTANT 0.5398*** 0.8638*** 0.7826*** 0.5408*** 0.8479*** 0.7219*** 
 (0.1009) (0.1520) (0.1469) (0.1002) (0.1525) (0.1488) 
N 796 487 309 796 487 309 
R2 0.2497 0.4147 0.2771 0.2528 0.4160 0.2927 
Panel B: Zero TF player excluded 
 
   
TF 0.0059** 0.0138** 0.0075** 0.1301*** 0.1749 0.2189*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0064) (0.0036) (0.0471) (0.1096) (0.0732) 
TFD1 -0.0020 -0.0065 -0.0016 -0.0329 -0.0535 -0.0186 
 (0.0016) (0.0052) (0.0018) (0.0380) (0.0837) (0.0476) 
GOAL 0.1062** 0.1591* 0.1208 0.1051** 0.1542 0.1335* 
 (0.0534) (0.0946) (0.0750) (0.0533) (0.0951) (0.0737) 
ASSIST 0.0835 0.2261 0.0682 0.0814 0.2063 0.0616 
 (0.0926) (0.1622) (0.1330) (0.0924) (0.1631) (0.1309) 
PASS -0.0034** -0.0038 -0.0068** -0.0031** -0.0033 -0.0061** 
 (0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0028) 
CROSS -0.0151 -0.0022 -0.0059 -0.0161 -0.0042 -0.0070 
 (0.0127) (0.0262) (0.0186) (0.0127) (0.0265) (0.0182) 
TACKLE -0.0714** -0.0991** -0.0490 -0.0718** -0.0997** -0.0443 
 (0.0279) (0.0422) (0.0484) (0.0279) (0.0425) (0.0477) 
CONSTANT 0.5731*** 0.7532*** 0.8308*** 0.5860*** 0.7819*** 0.7557*** 
 (0.1136) (0.1959) (0.1605) (0.1122) (0.1965) (0.1611) 
N 664 406 258 664 406 258 
R2 0.2650 0.4532 0.3029 0.2676 0.4456 0.3272 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Fixed effect (FE) panel regressions are estimated. Dependent variable is percentage of played minutes. Panel 
A presents the results using the full sample data. Panel B presents the results while excluding free transferred and academy players from the 
sample (i.e. 0 TF players). However, we kept on-loan players in the Panel B sample, as some of them did have loan fees reported. Columns 
(2), (3), (5), and (6) are win ratio subsamples for both models. They account for different clubs’ characteristics. The mean club win ratio was 
37.6%. The average spend per player was considerably higher for clubs with a win ratio of more than 37% (see Figure 3 in appendix). 




2.6.5 Table 2 Midfielder Results - 2012/13 to 2016/17 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel A: Zero TF player included 
 
   
TF 0.0051* 0.0004 0.0038 0.0530 0.0388 -0.0869 
 (0.0031) (0.0084) (0.0066) (0.0558) (0.1136) (0.1304) 
TFD1 -0.0026* -0.0129* -0.0030* -0.0940*** -0.2987** -0.0980*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0072) (0.0016) (0.0341) (0.1220) (0.0364) 
GOAL 0.3044*** 0.5266*** 0.2242* 0.3005*** 0.5105*** 0.2177* 
 (0.0941) (0.1644) (0.1247) (0.0939) (0.1629) (0.1229) 
ASSIST -0.0991 -0.0177 -0.1769 -0.1095 -0.0232 -0.2032* 
 (0.0821) (0.1404) (0.1181) (0.0821) (0.1394) (0.1168) 
PASS 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0045* 0.0004 -0.0011 0.0039* 
 (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0023) 
TACKLE -0.0296* -0.0344 -0.0234 -0.0314* -0.0431* -0.0257 
 (0.0164) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0164) (0.0253) (0.0247) 
DUEL-LOST -0.0518*** -0.0636*** -0.0501*** -0.0519*** -0.0637*** -0.0473*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0152) (0.0155) (0.0090) (0.0152) (0.0151) 
FREE-TF 0.1299** 0.0643 0.1238 0.1150* 0.0765 -0.0254 
 (0.0658) (0.0885) (0.1963) (0.0651) (0.0831) (0.1821) 
CONSTANT 0.6181* 1.1651*** 0.7016*** 0.7168** 1.2040*** 0.8808*** 
 (0.3292) (0.1859) (0.2482) (0.3275) (0.1857) (0.2564) 
N 811 481 330 811 481 330 
R2 0.2817 0.2826 0.3006 0.2860 0.2923 0.3197 
Panel B: Zero TF player excluded 
 
   
TF 0.0062 0.0225** 0.0161* 0.0531 0.3178** -0.0588 
 (0.0046) (0.0113) (0.0095) (0.0723) (0.1438) (0.1502) 
TFD1 -0.0023 -0.0196** -0.0026 -0.0940*** -0.4389*** -0.0952** 
 (0.0015) (0.0076) (0.0016) (0.0340) (0.1232) (0.0376) 
GOAL 0.2171** 0.4979** 0.2204 0.2162** 0.4397** 0.2368* 
 (0.1022) (0.1920) (0.1338) (0.1015) (0.1863) (0.1323) 
ASSIST -0.1847** 0.1440 -0.2827** -0.2002** 0.1429 -0.3149** 
 (0.0932) (0.1787) (0.1308) (0.0930) (0.1739) (0.1305) 
PASS 0.0011 0.0001 0.0040 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0039 
 (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
TACKLE -0.0420** -0.0317 -0.0189 -0.0450** -0.0496 -0.0262 
 (0.0191) (0.0311) (0.0281) (0.0190) (0.0312) (0.0281) 
DUEL-LOST -0.0350*** -0.0550*** -0.0451** -0.0348*** -0.0555*** -0.0387** 
 (0.0102) (0.0184) (0.0175) (0.0101) (0.0180) (0.0172) 
CONSTANT 1.1343*** 0.7889*** 0.5925** 1.1611*** 0.8716*** 0.9067*** 
 (0.1734) (0.2642) (0.2751) (0.1730) (0.2558) (0.2785) 
N 616 349 267 616 349 267 
R2 0.2775 0.3475 0.3281 0.2857 0.3748 0.3364 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Fixed effect (FE) panel regressions are estimated. Dependent variable is percentage of played minutes. 
Panel A presents the results using the full sample data. Panel B presents the results while excluding free transferred and academy players from 
the sample (i.e. 0 TF players). However, we kept on-loan players in the Panel B sample, as some of them did have loan fees reported. Columns 
(2), (3), (5), and (6) are win ratio subsamples for both models. They account for different clubs’ characteristics. The mean club win ratio was 
37.6%. The average spend per player was considerably higher for clubs with a win ratio of more than 37% (see Figure 3 in appendix). 








2.6.6 Table 3 Defenders Results - 2012/13 to 2016/17 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel A: Zero TF player included 
 
   
TF 0.0163*** 0.0225 0.0217** 0.2284*** -0.1645 0.4707** 
 (0.0046) (0.0309) (0.0095) (0.0694) (0.2587) (0.1890) 
TFD1 -0.0004 0.0103 -0.0027 -0.0096 0.1606 -0.0660 
 (0.0025) (0.0137) (0.0029) (0.0366) (0.1612) (0.0436) 
GOAL -0.0953 0.2939 0.0049 -0.0698 0.2090 0.0189 
 (0.2073) (0.3872) (0.2874) (0.2076) (0.3833) (0.2846) 
PASS 0.0038** 0.0012 0.0078*** 0.0039** 0.0009 0.0076*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0026) 
INTERCEPTION -0.0076 -0.0281 0.0096 -0.0083 -0.0300 0.0089 
 (0.0229) (0.0342) (0.0398) (0.0229) (0.0343) (0.0398) 
DUEL-LOST -0.0211 -0.0159 -0.0449** -0.0235 -0.0178 -0.0506** 
 (0.0151) (0.0259) (0.0210) (0.0152) (0.0257) (0.0208) 
FREE-TF 0.1200 0.2535 0.0363 0.1199 0.2765 0.2175 
 (0.1046) (0.1951) (0.2177) (0.1064) (0.2024) (0.2486) 
CONSTANT 0.2406 0.7041** 0.3005 0.2833 0.8791*** 0.1493 
 (0.1902) (0.2918) (0.2762) (0.1879) (0.2709) (0.3041) 
N 653 384 269 653 384 269 
R2 0.2030 0.2264 0.2334 0.1990 0.2234 0.2471 
Panel B: Zero TF player excluded 
 
   
TF 0.0236*** 0.0019 0.0194 0.3421*** 0.0399 0.4171 
 (0.0075) (0.0368) (0.0187) (0.1110) (0.3253) (0.2756) 
TFD1 -0.0003 0.0090 -0.0019 -0.0233 0.0946 -0.0572 
 (0.0026) (0.0157) (0.0030) (0.0365) (0.1798) (0.0416) 
GOAL 0.4042 0.4013 0.6954** 0.4116 0.4089 0.6942** 
 (0.2535) (0.5092) (0.3244) (0.2536) (0.5063) (0.3197) 
PASS 0.0050** 0.0029 0.0083*** 0.0047** 0.0029 0.0082*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0026) 
INTERCEPTION -0.0063 -0.0375 -0.0023 -0.0094 -0.0409 -0.0015 
 (0.0266) (0.0452) (0.0409) (0.0268) (0.0454) (0.0411) 
DUEL-LOST -0.0228 -0.0339 -0.0183 -0.0265 -0.0349 -0.0247 
 (0.0174) (0.0339) (0.0225) (0.0174) (0.0336) (0.0216) 
CONSTANT 0.4580** 0.7546*** 0.4534** 0.3330* 0.7527*** 0.3514* 
 (0.1876) (0.2320) (0.1818) (0.1995) (0.2240) (0.2053) 
N 485 258 227 485 258 227 
R2 0.1536 0.2028 0.1936 0.1523 0.2035 0.2095 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Fixed effect (FE) panel regressions are estimated. Dependent variable is percentage of played minutes. 
Panel A presents the results using the full sample data. Panel B presents the results while excluding free transferred and academy players from 
the sample (i.e. 0 TF players). However, we kept on-loan players in the Panel B sample, as some of them did have loan fees reported. Columns 
(2), (3), (5), and (6) are win ratio subsamples for both models. They account for different clubs’ characteristics. The mean club win ratio was 
37.6%. The average spend per player was considerably higher for clubs with a win ratio of more than 37% (see Figure 3 in appendix). 









2.6.7 Table 4 Average TF (£m) spend per player sorted by seasons – All teams 
Panel A: Average TF per player (Nominal Value)  
Season Average SD Min Max 
2006 3.0 4.1 0.3 18.6 
2007 3.3 2.5 0.7 11.9 
2008 3.8 2.4 1.2 11.1 
2009 3.7 3.5 0.2 13.3 
2010 4.3 5.5 0.0 19.2 
2011 3.3 3.3 0.5 13.1 
2012 3.7 3.7 0.0 13.5 
2013 5.7 6.1 0.0 22.3 
2014 5.6 5.9 0.5 20.8 
2015 6.3 6.0 1.4 28.2 
2016 11.9 12.9 1.6 53.4 
 
Panel B: Average TF per player (Inflation Adjusted) 
  
2006 3.87 5.34 0.33 24.24 
2007 4.20 3.15 0.84 15.31 
2008 4.61 2.98 1.41 13.50 
2009 4.42 4.23 0.22 16.04 
2010 4.89 6.35 0.00 22.38 
2011 3.66 3.63 0.58 14.56 
2012 3.98 4.03 0.05 14.65 
2013 6.04 6.50 0.00 23.64 
2014 5.86 6.15 0.47 21.74 
2015 6.58 6.30 1.47 29.52 
















2.6.8 Table 5 Average TF (£m) spend per player sorted by seasons and positions – All 
teams 
 Panel A: Average TF for Strikers   
     Obs Season Average SD Min Max 
74 2006 5.00 7.18 0.00 39.09 
74 2007 6.79 8.03 0.00 38.47 
73 2008 7.39 9.32 0.00 39.60 
73 2009 7.86 10.85 0.00 56.60 
72 2010 7.77 10.59 0.00 54.90 
71 2011 8.34 12.46 0.00 55.56 
66 2012 8.21 11.49 0.00 54.35 
68 2013 7.98 10.16 0.00 52.93 
76 2014 8.15 9.28 0.00 39.74 
83 2015 9.08 10.60 0.00 46.06 
66 2016 11.50 11.78 0.00 45.65 
 
  Panel B: Average TF for Midfielders  
 
158 2012 5.30 7.51 0 34.78 
164 2013 6.11 8.75 0 44.99 
165 2014 6.87 10.08 0 62.44 
165 2015 7.66 9.89 0 57.58 
159 2016 10.12 12.68 0 92.65 
 
 Panel C: Average TF for Defenders  
135 2012 3.96 5.64 0 32.61 
136 2013 3.98 5.54 0 31.76 
140 2014 4.31 6.03 0 33.47 
127 2015 5.15 6.39 0 33.50 
116 2016 6.47 8.63 0 49.28 
*Notes: All values are adjusted for inflation.   
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2.6.9 Table 6 Average TF (£m) spend per player sorted by clubs 
Team 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Chelsea 8.3 4.9 6.4 4.6 19.2 6.5 13.5 10.6 16.1 6.6 24.0 
Man UTD 18.6 11.9 6.2 3.8 5.2 13.1 9.2 22.3 20.8 28.2 33.7 
Man City 0.5 4.5 11.1 13.3 17.2 9.8 5.4 17.4 13.5 14.3 20.0 
Liverpool 2.6 4.9 5.0 10.0 8.3 5.6 8.2 6.9 10.6 10.6 8.1 
Arsenal 0.9 2.6 6.0 10.0 4.6 5.4 9.5 8.5 13.2 3.6 14.5 
Spurs 4.0 5.4 7.5 4.1 3.2 0.8 6.8 13.2 3.4 9.1 17.3 
Stoke - - 1.6 3.6 1.8 4.4 1.8 0.8 0.6 3.0 6.3 
Sunderland - 2.9 1.9 4.8 4.7 1.9 3.9 1.3 2.0 3.6 2.7 
Newcastle 4.3 2.3 2.2 - 0.9 2.4 1.6 0.0 2.8 9.2 - 
Norwich - - - - - 1.4 0.3 2.7 - 1.8 - 
Crystal Palace - - - - - - - 0.6 1.2 1.9 7.8 
Aston Villa 2.2 3.4 3.5 3.1 10.7 3.3 2.5 2.8 0.8 3.7 - 
Everton 5.5 3.6 3.0 5.0 0.2 1.8 1.9 3.5 5.5 4.0 4.5 
Southampton - - - - - - 2.0 12.0 8.3 4.4 7.6 
Westham 0.6 3.9 2.8 0.2 0.6 - 1.4 2.5 2.8 3.8 4.4 
QPR - - - - - 0.8 1.6 - 4.0 - - 
Hull City - - 1.2 0.8 - - - 2.2 2.4 - 1.6 
West Brom - - 1.9 - 0.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 4.4 6.2 
Leicester - - - - - - - - 1.5 7.3 9.8 
Swansea - - - - - 0.5 1.2 1.8 0.8 1.9 2.5 
Burnley - - - 0.6 - - - - 0.5 - 3.9 
Watford 0.3 - - - - - - - - 1.4 3.7 
Bournemouth - - - - - - - - - 3.0 2.4 
Blackburn 1.2 1.0 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.2 - - - - - 
Reading 0.7 0.7 - - - - 0.0 - - - - 
Portsmouth 0.7 2.6 3.2 1.0 - - - - - - - 
Mid'brough 3.0 4.1 2.6 - - - - - - - 1.9 
Fulham 0.8 1.5 1.9 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.4 - - - 
Wigan 1.7 1.4 2.8 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.5 - - - - 
Sheffield UTD 0.8 - - - - - - - - - - 
Charlton 1.6 - - - - - - - - - - 
Bolton 1.1 1.1 3.4 1.2 0.4 1.2 - - - - - 
Birmingham - 2.0 - 2.6 2.4 - - - - - - 
Derby - 0.9 - - - - - - - - - 
Wolves - - - 1.6 0.0 3.1 - - - - - 
Cardiff - - - - - - - 2.3 - - - 
*The average is calculated by dividing the total value spent by a club over the number of transferred players to 





2.6.10 Table 7 Playing time metrics averages-sorted by clubs 
   Possible minutes played Minutes played  Appearances 
     Obs Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Panel A: Total Clubs Averages         
 829 0.503 0.493 0.251 1501 1392 847 23.8 25.0 8.8 
   
Panel B: Individual Clubs averages         
Arsenal 50 0.530 0.541 0.250 1531 1416 841 24.1 25.0 8.7 
   
Man City 48 0.453 0.465 0.234 1345 1157 782 22.2 23.0 9.2 
   
Stoke 44 0.495 0.481 0.244 1570 1359 845 24.9 26.5 8.8 
   
Westham 40 0.475 0.491 0.215 1274 1274 606 20.9 22.0 7.9 
   
Everton 40 0.442 0.375 0.267 1272 1079 852 20.6 18.5 9.7 
   
Man Utd 39 0.584 0.622 0.238 1814 1860 742 26.7 28.0 6.3 
   
Liverpool 39 0.525 0.495 0.255 1472 1241 805 23.3 24.0 8.1 
   
Newcastle 38 0.474 0.450 0.228 1414 1332 737 22.4 24.0 8.8 
   
Chelsea 38 0.491 0.521 0.280 1534 1556 912 24.8 27.5 8.7 
   
Spurs 37 0.473 0.484 0.277 1481 1478 931 23.7 27.0 10.3 
   
Sunderland 33 0.516 0.544 0.260 1568 1763 906 23.1 26.0 9.4 
   
West Brom 32 0.445 0.383 0.231 1355 1166 719 24.3 24.0 7.6 
   
Aston Villa 31 0.589 0.688 0.272 1767 1812 928 25.2 28.0 9.0 
   
Fulham 28 0.587 0.550 0.241 1714 1533 904 24.8 27.0 9.5 
   
Blackburn 27 0.450 0.432 0.219 1372 1446 689 22.6 23.0 7.1 
   
Bolton 20 0.609 0.669 0.290 2045 2204 985 29.4 30.5 6.7 
   
Crystal Palace 20 0.431 0.444 0.245 1185 984 871 19.9 19.0 8.8 
   
Wigan 20 0.566 0.511 0.208 1699 1655 854 25.8 26.5 8.2 
   
Portsmouth 19 0.429 0.381 0.224 1345 1048 805 22.5 19.0 7.5 
   
Southampton 19 0.536 0.549 0.272 1573 1538 1026 25.1 30.0 10.7 
   
Swansea 19 0.471 0.496 0.262 1387 1148 899 23.1 20.0 8.6 
   
Hull City 15 0.457 0.426 0.172 1176 1195 371 20.3 20.0 5.3 
   
QPR 14 0.477 0.497 0.238 1255 1148 739 19.8 19.5 8.8 
   
Middlesbrough 13 0.524 0.609 0.267 1576 2084 926 23.4 29.0 9.3 
   
Leicester 12 0.510 0.508 0.262 1664 1637 854 28.3 29.5 7.9 
   
Norwich 12 0.470 0.485 0.201 1470 1536 690 26.5 29.0 8.2 
   
Watford 12 0.600 0.595 0.263 1772 1564 992 24.3 19.0 10.1 
   
Birmingham 12 0.502 0.472 0.223 1516 1498 822 24.3 27.5 9.2 
   
Bournemouth 11 0.495 0.562 0.235 1090 899 699 20.0 15.0 8.2 
   
Burnley 11 0.577 0.601 0.249 1777 1874 853 28.1 30.0 7.7 
   
Reading 11 0.480 0.436 0.224 1614 1492 789 27.2 29.0 7.7 
   
Wolves 9 0.523 0.399 0.200 1709 1365 703 26.9 28.0 6.2 
   
Derby 4 0.508 0.506 0.183 1453 1161 668 22.0 21.0 5.1 
   
Sheffield Utd 4 0.515 0.527 0.214 1396 1109 617 22.5 23.5 5.5 
   
Cardiff 3 0.465 0.365 0.252 1592 1250 861 24.7 22.0 9.2 
   
Charlton 3 0.531 0.433 0.221 1817 1480 757 29.0 30.0 2.9 
   
Blackpool 2 0.544 0.544 0.224 1530 1530 1097 20.0 20.0 11.0 
   
*Notes: Possible minutes played are the percentage of the actual minutes played relative to the total available minutes for a 






2.6.11 Table 8 Playing time (PT) metrics averages-sorted by positions and TF 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: PT average for strikers 
Minutes 796 1552.15 825.45 123.00 3390.00 
Possible minutes 796 0.52 0.25 0.04 1.00 
Appearance 796 24.48 8.26 9.00 38.00 
      
Panel B: PT average when TF is less than £10 m 
Minutes 582 1461.68 825.52 123.00 3387.00 
Possible minutes 582 0.48 0.24 0.04 1.00 
Appearance 582 23.78 8.31 9.00 38.00 
      
Panel C: PT average when TF is more than £10 m 
Minutes 214 1798.18 775.28 340.00 3390.00 
Possible minutes 214 0.61 0.22 0.10 1.00 
Appearance 214 26.38 7.84 9.00 38.00 
      
Panel D: PT average for Midfielders and Defenders 
Minutes 1,462 1849.55 846.69 74.00 3420.00 
Possible minutes 1,462 0.61 0.25 0.03 1.00 
Appearance 1,462 24.68 8.43 9.00 38.00 
      
Panel E: PT average when TF is less than £5 m 
Minutes 896 1,793.70 873.21 74.00 3,420.00 
Possible minutes 896 0.59 0.26 0.03 1.00 
Appearance 896 24.04 8.67 9.00 38.00 
      
Panel F: PT average when TF is more than £5 m 
Minutes 566 1937.97 795.69 135.00 3420.00 
Possible minutes 566 0.66 0.23 0.04 1.00 
Appearance 566 25.70 7.92 9.00 38.00 
*Notes: Panels B & C relate to strikers, while Panels E & F relate to midfielders and defenders. Possible minutes played are 
the percentage of the actual minutes played relative to the total available minutes for a player, taking into account his injuries, 






2.6.12 Table 9 Correlation matrix and PCA for strikers’ performance metrics 
 
Correlation Matrix  
 
Principal components’ analysis (PCA) 
 
  
   clearance     0.1184  -0.1464   0.0777  -0.0787   0.1214   1.0000
interception     0.1874   0.3370   0.4817   0.0518   1.0000
       block     0.1298   0.1055  -0.0259   1.0000
      tackle     0.1514   0.2386   1.0000
       cross     0.1113   1.0000
        pass     1.0000
                                                                    
                   pass    cross   tackle    block interc~n cleara~e
                                                              
       clearance     0.0970    0.7376    0.2905         .2498 
    interception     0.6024    0.0933   -0.1316         .3098 
           block     0.1213   -0.4813    0.6474         .2573 
          tackle     0.5490    0.1580   -0.2530         .3535 
           cross     0.4489   -0.4242   -0.2035         .3759 
            pass     0.3318    0.1034    0.6114         .3928 
                                                              
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3   Unexplained 
                                                              
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
                                                                              
           Comp6        .487128            .             0.0812       1.0000
           Comp5        .672983      .185855             0.1122       0.9188
           Comp4        .778903       .10592             0.1298       0.8066
           Comp3        1.05361      .274703             0.1756       0.6768
           Comp2        1.18419      .130585             0.1974       0.5012
           Comp1        1.82319      .638995             0.3039       0.3039
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)            Rho              =     0.6768
                                                 Trace            =          6
                                                 Number of comp.  =          3
Principal components/correlation                 Number of obs    =        796




2.6.13 Table 10 Correlation matrix and PCA for midfielders’ and defenders’ 
performance metrics 
 
Correlation Matrix  
 
 




    Recovery     0.4329   0.0154   0.3992   0.1475   0.2449  -0.3339   0.3193   0.3204   1.0000
    Duallost     0.1379   0.3138   0.2795   0.4639  -0.2227  -0.5431   0.5487   1.0000
     Dualwon     0.0487  -0.0523   0.5328   0.1150   0.1475  -0.0248   1.0000
   Clearance    -0.3106  -0.4817  -0.1370  -0.4883   0.3544   1.0000
Interception     0.0602  -0.3690   0.4006  -0.3407   1.0000
       Block     0.1541   0.3959  -0.0380   1.0000
      Tackle     0.2261  -0.1038   1.0000
       Cross    -0.0631   1.0000
        Pass     1.0000
                                                                                               
                   Pass    Cross   Tackle    Block Interc~n Cleara~e  Dualwon Duallost Recovery
                                                              
         Dualwon     0.2801    0.3556    0.5248         .1694 
       Clearance    -0.4619    0.1921    0.2250          .245 
           Block     0.3861   -0.2531    0.0068         .4289 
          Tackle     0.2298    0.4818    0.1333         .3102 
           Cross     0.2849   -0.3696    0.0868         .4535 
            Pass     0.2410    0.1840   -0.6654         .2375 
    Interception    -0.1491    0.5104   -0.0693         .3501 
        Recovery     0.3307    0.3307   -0.3171         .3238 
        Duallost     0.4853    0.0079    0.3171         .2048 
                                                              
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3   Unexplained 
                                                              
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
                                                                              
           Comp9        .193464            .             0.0215       1.0000
           Comp8        .340416      .146952             0.0378       0.9785
           Comp7        .418809     .0783925             0.0465       0.9407
           Comp6         .49867     .0798612             0.0554       0.8941
           Comp5        .558887     .0602169             0.0621       0.8387
           Comp4        .712994      .154107             0.0792       0.7766
           Comp3        1.17482      .461829             0.1305       0.6974
           Comp2        2.22746      1.05264             0.2475       0.5669
           Comp1        2.87447      .647009             0.3194       0.3194
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)            Rho              =     0.6974
                                                 Trace            =          9
                                                 Number of comp.  =          3
Principal components/correlation                 Number of obs    =      1,462
. pca Duallost Recovery Interception Pass Cross Tackle Block Clearance Dualwon, mineigen(1)
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2.6.14 Table 11 Premier League TV rights deals: Historic data 
Period Years Broadcaster Games Per Year Total Games in deal Cost for Whole Deal Cost Per Game 
1992–97 5 Sky 60 300 £191m £0.64m 
1997–01 4 Sky 60 240 £670m £2.79m 
2001–04 3 Sky 110 330 £1200m £3.64m 
2004–07 3 Sky 138 414 £1024m £2.47m 
2007–10 3 Sky & Setanta 138 414 £1706m £4.12m 
2010–13 3 Sky & ESPN 138 414 £1773m £4.28m 
2013–16 3 Sky & BT 154 462 £3008m £6.53m 




2.6.15 Table 12 Strikers’ results including season dummy (played minutes as a 
dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel A: Zero TF player included 
 
   
TF 18.20*** 30.89** 19.74** 424.78*** 585.79** 566.02*** 
 (6.48) (14.76) (9.92) (130.36) (289.09) (198.55) 
TFD1 -5.71 -15.84 -4.69 -72.03 -135.10 -41.27 
 (4.93) (15.74) (5.67) (117.16) (255.62) (150.99) 
GOAL 290.16* 322.08 300.38 281.72* 290.52 324.65 
 (151.70) (269.67) (225.84) (151.05) (269.43) (223.02) 
ASSIST 34.15 466.49 -130.45 25.73 442.24 -118.96 
 (264.85) (457.35) (388.43) (264.03) (458.68) (383.56) 
PASS -12.54*** -21.02* -21.92** -11.28*** -17.87 -19.07** 
 (4.20) (11.68) (8.51) (4.21) (12.00) (8.44) 
CROSS -37.36 22.35 3.09 -38.34 12.60 2.11 
 (36.39) (73.59) (54.45) (36.32) (72.99) (53.71) 
TACKLE -172.02** -221.39* -215.45 -173.29** -215.91* -225.70* 
 (77.10) (117.89) (130.47) (76.90) (118.01) (128.77) 
FREE-TF 90.80 713.99** 828.03 97.73 620.81** 664.96 
 (188.62) (302.81) (781.73) (186.96) (296.71) (762.86) 
SUSPENSION -58.12* -53.93 -33.40 -56.82* -57.68 -32.65 
 (32.51) (51.86) (46.67) (32.34) (52.14) (46.14) 
INJURY -48.56*** -53.62*** -51.89*** -50.06*** -54.99*** -53.81*** 
 (6.35) (10.55) (10.04) (6.38) (10.54) (9.91) 
ON-LOAN -50.61*** -53.23*** -82.90** -51.65*** -55.15*** -86.69** 
 (11.68) (14.64) (38.40) (11.66) (14.64) (37.70) 
WW -1106.68*** -1111.14*** -1134.56*** -1127.51*** -1146.01*** -1168.52*** 
 (165.66) (242.14) (338.24) (165.72) (242.28) (329.77) 
2007.season -70.82 -504.16** -81.09 -89.78 -492.51** -148.74 
 (126.77) (243.74) (201.44) (127.19) (245.17) (200.13) 
2008.season 14.34 -118.38 -17.56 -6.26 -105.82 -79.27 
 (137.82) (237.62) (225.11) (137.90) (238.10) (222.06) 
2009.season -37.12 -73.09 -51.34 -72.90 -83.62 -130.07 
 (144.03) (262.02) (209.32) (144.41) (264.55) (206.82) 
2010.season -243.44* -591.81** -34.78 -263.51* -626.56** -75.76 
 (141.90) (244.07) (226.85) (141.81) (244.68) (224.27) 
2011.season -218.79 -651.60** -154.80 -242.69* -674.22** -225.94 
 (145.97) (260.74) (230.02) (146.13) (262.95) (228.15) 
2012.season -183.74 -786.56*** 33.58 -222.85 -821.28*** -52.45 
 (157.13) (275.78) (235.60) (157.35) (277.43) (234.86) 
2013.season -424.19** -1164.52*** -268.31 -474.79*** -1196.71*** -363.22 
 (168.01) (309.62) (246.33) (168.55) (313.71) (243.88) 
2014.season -498.34*** -1114.34*** -461.34* -552.57*** -1145.49*** -566.22** 
 (168.20) (308.59) (254.24) (169.10) (311.30) (254.03) 
2015.season -683.26*** -1456.73*** -412.46 -735.84*** -1500.26*** -502.39* 
 (178.47) (318.49) (287.04) (179.54) (321.30) (286.32) 
2016.season -665.05*** -1478.35*** -337.51 -723.13*** -1530.32*** -458.33 
 (192.04) (336.65) (292.86) (191.15) (340.96) (286.52) 
CONSTANT 1920.85*** 2995.18*** 2732.42*** 1914.52*** 2988.87*** 2535.52*** 
 (319.91) (495.31) (471.20) (317.72) (496.23) (475.01) 
N 796 487 309 796 487 309 
R2 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.43 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 12 Strikers’ results including season dummy (played minutes as a dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel B: Zero TF player excluded 
 
   
TF 16.62** 43.52** 22.72* 394.28** 485.04 665.80*** 
 (7.95) (20.75) (11.89) (152.86) (353.73) (238.50) 
TFD1 -5.68 -17.50 -4.52 -79.86 -129.38 -41.11 
 (5.11) (16.93) (5.85) (122.11) (272.19) (154.38) 
GOAL 303.28* 426.68 272.06 298.92* 425.42 310.40 
 (171.25) (313.49) (246.24) (170.76) (315.95) (242.52) 
ASSIST 146.57 627.54 271.26 144.14 539.70 257.53 
 (296.52) (541.07) (427.21) (295.59) (543.71) (420.96) 
PASS -11.27** -19.22 -22.07** -10.32** -18.12 -20.12** 
 (4.46) (13.50) (8.99) (4.46) (13.85) (8.80) 
CROSS -49.15 16.60 -24.48 -52.22 11.28 -28.22 
 (40.68) (85.49) (59.20) (40.59) (86.43) (57.90) 
TACKLE -196.15** -261.38* -236.38 -196.71** -266.14* -219.64 
 (89.55) (136.32) (157.66) (89.29) (137.40) (155.35) 
FREE-TF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
SUSPENSION -35.97 -48.09 -18.85 -35.76 -56.87 -18.31 
 (35.34) (56.36) (48.15) (35.12) (56.72) (47.42) 
INJURY -47.48*** -62.49*** -52.27*** -48.96*** -60.96*** -51.86*** 
 (7.20) (11.85) (11.59) (7.23) (11.80) (11.37) 
ON-LOAN -47.25*** -55.28*** -92.97** -48.06*** -57.12*** -95.39** 
 (12.64) (15.69) (39.13) (12.62) (15.74) (38.31) 
WW -1069.25*** -1236.48*** -1125.89*** -1072.79*** -1251.55*** -1168.04*** 
 (201.10) (289.47) (342.77) (200.40) (291.33) (332.72) 
2007.season -106.22 -357.05 -195.56 -120.81 -330.08 -269.14 
 (144.68) (318.77) (213.54) (145.08) (324.16) (211.30) 
2008.season 19.82 164.06 -133.72 -2.67 168.71 -187.76 
 (161.07) (334.93) (243.23) (161.14) (338.87) (239.38) 
2009.season -59.97 196.53 -202.84 -97.62 183.69 -272.24 
 (168.47) (361.54) (228.40) (169.09) (369.30) (224.60) 
2010.season -212.38 -340.48 -136.88 -230.93 -368.26 -146.40 
 (168.53) (353.23) (243.90) (168.43) (358.22) (239.62) 
2011.season -213.27 -437.64 -183.02 -240.70 -461.46 -241.49 
 (170.79) (364.13) (252.05) (170.96) (370.90) (248.23) 
2012.season -156.17 -615.71 -42.60 -195.26 -652.94* -92.18 
 (181.46) (376.09) (263.47) (181.43) (381.40) (258.31) 
2013.season -429.69** -1072.77*** -301.76 -486.72** -1123.48*** -372.51 
 (195.06) (401.71) (273.42) (195.61) (410.29) (267.51) 
2014.season -559.27*** -1136.31*** -587.02** -620.38*** -1185.96*** -691.19** 
 (192.47) (404.14) (273.45) (193.52) (410.27) (270.69) 
2015.season -671.78*** -1320.93*** -555.46* -734.35*** -1383.01*** -645.96** 
 (202.45) (413.87) (305.93) (204.04) (420.81) (303.87) 
2016.season -716.12*** -1461.78*** -497.50 -783.78*** -1516.03*** -606.03* 
 (216.53) (429.02) (317.65) (215.52) (436.91) (307.04) 
CONSTANT 1979.17*** 2889.77*** 3008.98*** 2007.93*** 3004.70*** 2781.55*** 
 (362.96) (635.40) (516.20) (358.42) (638.19) (519.04) 
N 664 406 258 664 406 258 
R2 0.36 0.51 0.44 0.36 0.50 0.46 







2.6.16 Table 13 Midfielders’ results including season dummy (played minutes as a 
dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel A: Zero TF player included 
 
   
TF 10.87 -3.54 16.57 120.71 158.61 -151.29 
 (9.41) (26.54) (20.73) (172.18) (374.45) (401.59) 
TFD1 -8.79* -40.31* -10.44** -290.68*** -811.86** -334.35*** 
 (4.62) (23.18) (4.87) (104.79) (404.49) (111.04) 
GOAL 936.03*** 1377.25*** 971.33** 921.39*** 1310.02** 963.12** 
 (289.83) (514.30) (386.83) (288.76) (512.18) (380.80) 
ASSIST -212.28 293.89 -459.59 -243.89 258.33 -556.96 
 (252.57) (444.97) (366.60) (252.44) (444.45) (362.90) 
PASS 1.06 -7.39 15.88** 0.08 -8.56 14.01* 
 (4.87) (8.19) (7.34) (4.86) (8.20) (7.24) 
TACKLE -112.98** -162.51** -66.92 -118.84** -183.06** -72.04 
 (50.77) (79.30) (77.44) (50.61) (80.31) (76.40) 
DUEL-LOST -152.65*** -181.01*** -159.30*** -152.47*** -182.74*** -150.83*** 
 (28.17) (48.46) (47.35) (28.01) (48.48) (46.35) 
FREE-TF 416.18** 206.63 455.83 383.80* 265.80 -4.64 
 (202.38) (278.19) (599.28) (200.09) (262.05) (555.41) 
SUSPENSION -6.21 -34.36 33.08 -5.17 -34.94 32.36 
 (24.28) (37.26) (32.67) (24.16) (37.12) (32.18) 
INJURY -55.65*** -52.23*** -65.81*** -55.43*** -52.33*** -65.69*** 
 (5.94) (9.35) (9.10) (5.90) (9.37) (8.90) 
ON-LOAN -69.53*** -77.13*** -48.46** -68.77*** -71.17*** -44.60** 
 (15.45) (24.60) (21.95) (15.40) (25.03) (21.35) 
WW -1175.08*** -1204.92*** -1046.81*** -1180.62*** -1233.89*** -992.68*** 
 (152.50) (209.08) (325.80) (152.56) (214.87) (321.87) 
2013.season -209.01*** -169.57 -157.19 -474.79*** -1196.71*** -363.22 
 (75.60) (110.10) (116.86) (168.55) (313.71) (243.88) 
2014.season -285.83*** -147.29 -203.21 -552.57*** -1145.49*** -566.22** 
 (82.29) (127.12) (128.21) (169.10) (311.30) (254.03) 
2015.season -365.21*** -352.11*** -206.79 -735.84*** -1500.26*** -502.39* 
 (85.30) (123.12) (140.10) (179.54) (321.30) (286.32) 
2016.season -474.28*** -461.07*** -388.80*** -723.13*** -1530.32*** -458.33 
 (95.44) (140.56) (145.60) (191.15) (340.96) (286.52) 
CONSTANT 1919.13* 4041.53*** 2287.65*** 1914.52*** 2988.87*** 2535.52*** 
 (1017.32) (589.44) (755.27) (317.72) (496.23) (475.01) 
N 811 481 330 796 487 309 
R2 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.43 




Table 13 Midfielders’ results including season dummy (played minutes as a dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel B: Zero TF player excluded 
 
   
TF 16.76 70.36* 45.04 227.49 1152.63** -98.75 
 (14.02) (35.64) (29.47) (221.43) (468.85) (460.35) 
TFD1 -7.47 -61.69** -9.07* -288.85*** -1406.77*** -322.73*** 
 (4.58) (24.52) (4.99) (104.30) (421.19) (114.28) 
GOAL 756.45** 1413.16** 1027.09** 749.82** 1182.89** 1090.84*** 
 (313.96) (600.64) (416.56) (311.61) (585.37) (409.07) 
ASSIST -455.12 715.93 -718.07* -503.05* 668.55 -848.21** 
 (286.23) (560.42) (406.32) (285.22) (546.10) (404.58) 
PASS 4.18 -3.05 14.08* 3.39 -6.42 13.56 
 (5.61) (9.41) (8.43) (5.58) (9.21) (8.36) 
TACKLE -124.62** -110.02 -46.72 -132.69** -163.22 -61.47 
 (59.17) (98.64) (86.81) (58.81) (98.82) (86.58) 
DUEL-LOST -113.93*** -177.61*** -133.36** -113.67*** -173.42*** -117.88** 
 (31.23) (58.26) (53.37) (30.98) (57.13) (52.26) 
FREE-TF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
SUSPENSION 20.22 49.57 39.37 20.96 46.54 41.34 
 (28.45) (55.21) (34.73) (28.29) (54.12) (34.30) 
INJURY -53.13*** -52.65*** -65.23*** -53.14*** -51.64*** -65.16*** 
 (6.60) (11.04) (9.52) (6.54) (10.92) (9.40) 
ON-LOAN -46.33** -38.10 -60.77** -45.07** -15.08 -57.45** 
 (19.60) (34.60) (24.79) (19.49) (35.41) (24.56) 
WW -1114.27*** -1041.02*** -1133.76*** -1127.69*** -1174.97*** -1008.93*** 
 (163.14) (226.04) (337.28) (162.11) (225.45) (332.31) 
2013.season -257.94*** -167.71 -189.76 -247.21*** -223.37* -182.28 
 (86.14) (132.05) (128.87) (85.50) (127.81) (128.03) 
2014.season -393.94*** -205.80 -261.36* -392.43*** -301.13** -278.35* 
 (93.51) (149.30) (142.66) (92.75) (145.08) (142.49) 
2015.season -433.55*** -387.14*** -266.78* -431.68*** -428.08*** -289.04* 
 (96.08) (136.75) (155.68) (95.33) (135.96) (154.04) 
2016.season -567.78*** -502.25*** -490.05*** -547.19*** -585.34*** -464.37*** 
 (107.87) (167.79) (157.18) (105.12) (161.80) (154.87) 
CONSTANT 3635.94*** 2656.11*** 1965.93** 3723.88*** 2820.84*** 2836.01*** 
 (532.83) (835.76) (838.08) (531.14) (808.58) (847.43) 
N 616 349 267 616 349 267 
R2 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.55 0.54 






2.6.17 Table 14 Defenders’ results including season dummy (percentage of PT as a 
dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel A: Zero TF player included 
 
   
TF 51.85*** -27.30 70.43** 690.43*** -1251.88 1529.07** 
 (14.79) (99.34) (31.13) (221.12) (834.29) (609.63) 
TFD1 -4.57 25.55 -13.99 -90.87 342.55 -303.91** 
 (8.01) (45.22) (9.30) (116.48) (536.91) (137.85) 
GOAL 74.15 1080.19 534.51 147.98 875.56 625.02 
 (661.61) (1242.41) (902.21) (663.45) (1218.60) (889.36) 
PASS 12.59** 3.12 24.92*** 12.54** 1.90 24.45*** 
 (5.96) (11.45) (8.27) (5.98) (11.41) (8.14) 
INTERCEPTION -27.10 -140.08 62.33 -30.22 -134.67 59.00 
 (72.99) (110.16) (129.15) (73.28) (109.91) (128.79) 
DUEL-LOST -67.22 -23.92 -168.54** -74.74 -32.14 -189.07*** 
 (48.12) (84.23) (66.51) (48.38) (82.74) (65.89) 
FREE-TF 250.53 478.55 99.83 243.47 699.67 674.65 
 (341.17) (670.77) (690.81) (349.66) (679.92) (789.31) 
SUSPENSION 13.90 36.95 23.75 6.31 28.63 16.42 
 (44.37) (71.68) (72.88) (44.44) (71.64) (71.26) 
INJURY -66.77*** -79.22*** -75.34*** -67.02*** -80.23*** -77.90*** 
 (7.32) (11.70) (11.22) (7.36) (11.57) (11.08) 
ON-LOAN -5.99 -55.38 132.73* -4.11 -56.75 138.48* 
 (35.88) (43.61) (76.77) (35.99) (43.31) (75.63) 
WW -1452.22*** -1442.07*** -1733.12** -1502.66*** -1403.42*** -1773.43*** 
 (230.01) (359.09) (684.58) (231.11) (361.94) (665.94) 
2013.season -153.03* -193.61 23.51 -150.72* -167.50 46.93 
 (89.22) (134.67) (141.11) (89.48) (128.50) (139.82) 
2014.season -263.85*** -437.08*** -153.29 -252.17** -409.78*** -117.45 
 (99.27) (148.39) (169.07) (99.50) (147.02) (165.74) 
2015.season -277.01*** -362.56** -227.84 -269.06** -325.77** -211.64 
 (105.51) (157.80) (183.68) (106.16) (154.62) (179.99) 
2016.season -361.17*** -316.05* -371.58* -330.99*** -248.30 -297.11 
 (115.39) (167.76) (191.33) (115.69) (165.07) (186.24) 
CONSTANT 710.72 2686.90*** 965.26 896.68 3015.00*** 474.98 
 (612.31) (945.70) (861.41) (602.88) (873.37) (940.96) 
N 653 384 269 653 384 269 
R2 0.39 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.48 0.46 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 14 Defenders’ results including season dummy (percentage of PT as a dependent variable) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE Model 
 
Full Sample WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
 Top Quartile WIN<37% WIN>37% 
 
Panel B: Zero TF player excluded 
 
   
TF 73.03*** -139.57 44.20 987.63*** -1125.73 1154.14 
 (23.65) (120.01) (57.67) (355.60) (1073.16) (841.63) 
TFD1 -5.14 28.67 -13.60 -137.90 321.20 -278.86** 
 (8.16) (51.47) (9.51) (115.85) (607.78) (130.28) 
GOAL 1788.73** 1536.39 2627.74** 1831.78** 1613.89 2706.34*** 
 (799.65) (1642.34) (1001.99) (800.76) (1638.47) (983.86) 
PASS 16.57** 9.51 26.87*** 15.41** 9.71 26.46*** 
 (6.60) (14.98) (7.98) (6.59) (15.02) (7.83) 
INTERCEPTION -30.91 -203.53 75.29 -37.80 -185.85 75.40 
 (84.70) (148.03) (130.01) (85.30) (150.18) (130.28) 
DUEL-LOST -71.80 -48.77 -105.49 -84.39 -60.73 -120.89* 
 (55.22) (111.97) (70.96) (55.36) (110.79) (67.77) 
SUSPENSION 31.74 5.38 93.46 29.06 -3.65 82.07 
 (53.31) (84.40) (87.81) (53.23) (85.54) (85.63) 
INJURY -67.81*** -82.84*** -70.67*** -68.59*** -81.46*** -72.56*** 
 (8.16) (15.17) (10.97) (8.17) (15.14) (10.73) 
ON-LOAN -38.63 -51.26 0.00 -43.46 -51.27 0.00 
 (40.94) (46.56) (.) (41.19) (46.65) (.) 
WW -1515.25*** -1561.78*** -1888.59*** -1547.47*** -1500.83*** -1894.72*** 
 (245.37) (399.95) (648.57) (246.93) (404.02) (639.95) 
2013.season -144.55 -183.38 -36.73 -143.34 -159.91 -15.11 
 (100.25) (185.30) (135.30) (100.26) (174.73) (133.44) 
2014.season -241.73** -384.13* -143.11 -227.92** -366.04* -118.57 
 (112.47) (195.66) (166.09) (112.44) (193.71) (164.47) 
2015.season -252.21** -385.93* -193.90 -234.21* -384.67* -182.61 
 (120.16) (204.96) (180.67) (119.79) (200.99) (178.24) 
2016.season -338.92** -263.95 -384.18** -288.68** -244.93 -321.60* 
 (135.50) (228.71) (188.11) (133.96) (223.42) (180.48) 
CONSTANT 1515.86** 2865.96*** 1711.30*** 1192.93* 2769.97*** 1461.21** 
 (592.13) (744.22) (624.72) (632.12) (719.87) (681.99) 
N 485 258 227 485 258 227 
R2 0.41 0.51 0.43 0.40 0.51 0.45 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
55 
 
2.6.18 Table 15 The difference in some performance metrics between expensive players (worth 
£10 or more) and others 
 Panel A: Performance of players worth more than £10m 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
      
Goal 
   214 
0.4467 0.2255 0 1.2209 
Assist 0.1916 0.1289 0 0.6274 
Shoot_accuracy 0.3971 0.0874 0.1764 1.0806 
Tackle 0.9817 0.5138 0.1113 3 
Pass 30.7 9.04 9.2 60.3 
 
 Panel B: Performance of players worth less than £10m 
Goal 
582 
0.3067 0.2116 0 1.15 
Assist 0.1408 0.1199 0 0.6225 
Shoot_accuracy 0.3686 0.1018 0 1 
Tackle 1.09 0.6046 0 3.17 
Pass 27.5 9.4 0 174 
Notes: Metrics are presented as per 90 minutes of a game. For instance, a top (expensive) player 
needs, on average, almost two games to score one goal.  
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2.6.19 Table 16  Definitions of performance metrics for the Perfit variable and Control 
variables 
Performance Metric Definition  
Goal per Minute (GPM)  Number of goals per 90 minutes. 
Assist per Minute (APM) 
 
 
Number of assists per 90 minutes. 
Cross per Minute (CPM)  
 
 
Number of crosses per 90 minutes. 
A medium-long range ball passing towards the opponent's area. 
 
Pass per Minute (PPM)  
 
 
Number of passes per 90 minutes. 
All ball passes. 
 
Tackle per Minute (TPM)       
 
 
Number of tackles per 90 minutes. 
to dispossess an opponent of the ball. 
Interception per Minute 
(IPM)  
 
Number of interceptions per 90 minutes. 




Duel-lost per Minute 
(DLM) 
  
Number of duel-losts per 90 minutes. 
When the ball is lost to the opponent. 
  
Control Variables   Definition 
WW Winter window transfers.  
Win Win ratio of teams; calculated by dividing the won games over 38 during the season.  
Suspension Number of matches that a player is legally suspended.  
On loan 
                                           
Number of games not played while being on loan (either part or full season) to another 
team. 
Manager change A managerial change that takes place after a player transfer date. 
Free transfer A player transferred to another team with zero transfer fee. 
Injury Number of matches that a player could not play due to an injury. 
  
*Notes: The relevant data are taken from Premierleague.com, the official website that represents the PL authority. 
We opted to adjust the variables per 90 minutes rather than per match appearance. This gives a proper reflection 






3. Do British Premier League managers exhibit home bias? 
 
Racial discrimination is a topic of considerable debate in the labour economics literature. The 
focus of the related empirical discrimination literature is on the earnings gaps between specific 
groups. Those groups have to share similar levels of productivity or talent to enable one to 
conclude their pay gap as a discrimination factor. Discrimination through unequal pay is 
estimated through constructing earning functions (Szymanski, 2000). After controlling for 
productivity or performance, there should be no residual race or ethnicity difference in earnings 
in a non-discriminatory setup. However, if there are some unobserved productivity 
measurements that are correlated with a specific group, then the empirical estimates of 
discrimination might be biased (Heckman, 1998). Szymanski (2000) argued that this critique 
may be resolved by an alternative market test approach. In sport economics studies, 
productivity measurements are much more transparent than in other labour economic settings. 
Studies concerning European professional sports are sparse relative to those on North 
American sports. This is primarily due to the availability of relevant data (e.g. individual player 
salaries, wide range of productivity-related data). A number of studies (e.g. Pedace 2006; 
Szymanski 2000; Wilson & Ying 2003) provided evidence for some discrimination within the 
European football profession with regard to race, ethnicity, and nationality. Wage equation 
estimates are the cornerstone of an employer’s taste-based discrimination. With a relative 
scarcity of productivity measurements, the alternative way is to relate wage (or salary) data 
with teams’ productivity measures, which are mainly measured by their position in the league 
rank. Both Szymanski and Pedace found that clubs’ wage payroll could explain nearly 90% of 
the variation in team productivity. Hence, if there is discrimination in the wage structure, then 
some personal players’ characteristics, such as race and nationality, may have a significant 
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impact on team performance. In other words, teams may achieve a given productivity or 
success level with a lower wage payroll.  
Pedace (2008) found evidence that players from South America received preferential 
treatment in terms of salary. Teams with a larger number of South American players tend to 
perform poorly, and this implies that these players are overpaid. However, this result is justified 
by the increased stadium attendance when a team plays with a South American player on the 
pitch. The author considers it a rational reaction from club owners to hire South American 
players if they seek more gate revenue. The findings of Szymanski (2000) indicated that teams 
that hired more black players tended to perform better. This implies that there was racial 
discrimination in the sense that black players were being underpaid. This was based on the 
evidence that wages reflected team productivity (performance), and hence performance 
measures were not expected to be significant. However, if it turned out to be significant, then 
the implication is that a group of players were underpaid if the team performed systematically 
above average with them, and would be overpaid if the team performed poorly with them. In 
these studies, team performance was used as a dependent variable, and hence discrimination 
was determined through team (or club) level measurement. This is an intuitive approach, as the 
club wage bill is almost the only factor that can be matched with productivity measurement at 
the club level, provided that it explains about 90% of its variability.  
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the nationality effect on player 
playing time in the English Premier League (EPL) from 2012–2016. The empirical evidence 
establishes a unique discrimination effect as it accounts for the effective use of players (i.e. 
their playing time relative to their performance). We employ a novel market test approach that 
complements the established wage equation estimate approach while controlling for player 
performance metrics. Recently, the explanatory power of wages for team success has been 
considerably reduced to about half. We conducted a regression of team position on wages for 
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33 EPL clubs during the period 2009–2016 and showed that wages explained about 46% of the 
variation in team performance. This result challenges both the financial efficiency of clubs and 
their discrimination levels. While escalating transfer fees for players (which are mainly due to 
the exponential increases in TV broadcasting revenues) are beyond the full control of clubs, 
the best use of their players should be at their discretion. We draw on this conjecture to estimate 
the effect of nationality (both of players and managers) on player playing time.  
The second contribution is that the analysis was conducted using a unique dataset of 
player performance metrics and their transfer fees. These have not been utilised, to the best of 
our knowledge, in the discrimination literature to date. The data for player performance were 
first published in the 2006 season. We have hand-collected the data from the relevant sporting 
websites, which supply them in a sporting context, thereby constructing a novel sporting dataset 
for empirical research.  
Our third contribution relates to the behaviour of British football managers. The 
findings suggest that British managers are biased towards their home players. We found 
evidence that British managers allocated extra playing time to British players of about 100 
minutes per season. This extra playing time cannot be explained merely by the players’ 
performance levels and their transfer fees and playing positions. Accordingly, discrimination 
in this context was evident. On the other hand, we found that if the manager nationality was 
ignored, British players still got more playing time than non-British players. Specifically, they 
got more playing time than European, South American, and African players by 102, 170, and 
196 minutes per season, respectively.  
We also re-examine the models of Szymanski (2000) and Pedace (2008) with our recent 
dataset and find no evidence for discrimination, either against non-white players or foreign 
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nationalities. These findings suggest a shift in the discrimination effect towards the individual 
player level from the club level. 
 
3.1 Literature Review 
  
Racial discrimination in labour markets has been well documented. Becker (1971) found that 
owners (firms) who were non-discriminatory against their workers had a competitive advantage 
over discriminating firms. If firms systematically generate higher profits while hiring more of 
a particular group of workers than average, then there is evidence of discrimination 
(Szymanski, 2000). This implies that this particular group may earn less while possessing 
equivalent talent or productivity levels to their higher earning peers. Less discriminating 
employers seek to hire those who are earning a lower market wage rate, and hence 
discrimination would be competed away (Arrow, 1973). Szymanski indicated that employers 
who discriminated the most would earn lower profits than their less discriminating peers, but 
they would compensate that profit gap with higher psychic profits. Becker (1971) related wage 
discrimination to three sources: customer preferences, owners’ prejudice, and co-workers’ 
preferences.  
Gwartney and Haworth (1974) researched racial discrimination in a sports setting, 
namely Major League Baseball (MLB). They showed that attendance (an index for customer 
preference) could be significantly affected by the team’s racial composition. Burdekin et al. 
(2005) found a similar attendance preference pattern in the National Basketball Association 
(NBA). Scully (1974) found some evidence for attendance preference to watch non-black 
players in the MLB. In Europe, Carnibella et al. (1996) found that during the 1970s and 1980s, 
discrimination persisted among fans through racist chants in stadiums, but some of this has 
been moderated in recent years.  
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Kahn and Sherer (1988) found evidence of owners’ discrimination in the sense that 
NBA black players outperformed their white peers while earning similar salary levels. 
Hamilton (1997) found that white players in the NBA earned an 18% premium in the upper 
quantile of the salary distribution, while Holmes (2011) found that black player salaries in the 
MLS were discounted by 25% in the lower quartile. Other studies also uncovered evidence of 
earnings premiums of more than 10% for white players in the NBA (e.g. Koch & Vander Hill 
1988; Wallace 1988; Brown, Spiro, & Keenan 1991). However, Bodvarsson and Bradstow 
(1999) provided evidence of diminished wage discrimination in the NBA during the 1990s. 
Sommers and Quinton (1982) found no evidence of a wage differential based on teams’ racial 
composition. 
 In a co-worker or teammate environment, the story of MLB player Jackie Robinson 
back in 1947 has been documented in a film named “42,” which refers to the player’s shirt 
number. He suffered discrimination and humiliation from his teammates and opponents. The 
story is told as a demonstration and indictment of the racial discrimination phenomenon.  
Wage discrimination is conventionally identified through an earnings function where it 
could be influenced by personal characteristics matched with productivity (Szymanski, 2000). 
Heckman (1998) raised the problem of possible omitted-variable bias associated with that 
approach where discrimination may falsely appear due to unobserved characteristics that may 
correlate with one group’s productivity.  
Szymanski (2000) proposed a market test approach utilising a sport setting that aimed 
to overcome the omitted-variable bias. He built on the assumption that English football was a 
competitive labour market, where player performance was reasonably measurable, and wages 
would tend to reliably explain their productivity and hence team performance. His sample panel 
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regression of teams’ performance (represented by team position in the league rank) on their 
wages produced an R2 of almost 90%. This supports the competitive market hypothesis.  
In addition, European sports clubs are generally assumed to be utility maximisers (i.e. primarily 
seeking team success subject to a break-even constraint) rather than profit maximisers, which 
prevail in US sports (Sloane, 2006). In North America, sports are bounded by financial and 
competition constraints such as salary caps, players drafts, selling players for cash, and the 
absence of international competitions. The freedom of such constraints in Europe should lead 
to more efficient sporting decisions, even though Sloane (2015) indicated that evidence was 
limited in that respect. Another aspect of competition is stadium attendance (spectators) and 
sponsorship. It is plausible to assume that spectators will seek entertainment through watching 
talented players, and hence clubs will compete to acquire them. Club density is high in the UK, 
where fifty clubs might exist within a hundred miles (e.g. in Manchester) (Szymanski, 2000). 
It surpasses those of North America, resulting in a higher competition for talent. Szymanski 
and Zimbalist (2006) regarded American baseball as an effective monopoly under a closed 
league system, while football (or soccer) is more competitive under an open league system 
where promotions and relegations are allowed. This explains the difference in profitability. 
If a particular group (e.g. specific nationality or race) of players appears to be positively 
related to team success, this is an indication of wage discrimination against them. Team success 
should not be affected by players’ personal characteristics in a discrimination-free 
environment. Szymanski (2000) found evidence of wage discrimination against black players 
in English football for the 1978–93 period. Teams recruiting a higher proportion of black 
players tended to perform better, and their ability surpassed their white peers in certain aspects 
of the game, such as career longevity and participation in their national teams. That 
discrimination effect was higher during the 1986–93 period, which is mostly attributed to the 
increasing immigration to the UK in general and the increased number of black players in 
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particular. His results also showed that teams who discriminate—in the sense that they do not 
hire black players—would end up paying a 5% wage premium just to maintain their position 
in the league table. Szymanski concluded that clubs hiring more black players tended to 
perform better, and that black players were paid less for their talent than white players with 
equal ability. 
In parallel, Pedace (2008) found evidence of wage discrimination in a nationality 
context in English football. However, this came in a form of preferential treatment in which 
players from South America received higher salaries, but their teams did not perform better. 
The author attributes this behaviour as a rational owner’s reaction to the evidence of increased 
stadium attendance that is associated with the appearance of a South American player on the 
team. It is perceived as a revenue-seeking approach.  
Wilson and Ying (2003) used a specification similar to Szymanski (2000) to determine 
discrimination. They used both performance and attendance regressions. Their dataset covered 
the top five European leagues (England’s Premiership, France’s Le Championnat, Germany’s 
Bundesliga, Italy’s Serie A, and Spain’s Primera Division) during the 1997–2000 period, which 
were post-Bosman seasons. Their performance regression results suggest that the more players 
from South America and Eastern European countries were used, the better teams performed. 
However, teams were not hiring an adequate composition of such nationalities. Attendance 
regression results do not indicate fans’ discrimination against non-domestic players. Therefore, 
Wilson and Ying concluded that management and/or ownership preferences would lead to 
lower hiring of non-domestic talent (i.e. race discrimination). These results were criticised by 
Pedace (2008) as the lack of salary controls in their specification leads to misinterpretation of 
the positive coefficients of nationalities. Moreover, the exclusion of team fixed effect may have 
biased the estimates due to its probable correlation with time-varying team nationality.  
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After the Bosman rule in 1995, clubs were exposed to a significant change towards a 
more internationalised player transfer market. Subject to their budget constraints, clubs would 
compete and seek to acquire the best players. Despite that, clubs in different league positions 
could experience relative concentration of a particular nationality player group (see Table 5). 
Such concentration or hiring bias is not a simple reflection of an open transfer market. 
McGovern (2002) rationalised that management behaviour by emphasising their social network 
roles. For instance, some managers or coaches in the Premier League praised the merits of 
Northern European players (especially Scandinavians) and, on the other hand, the unique styles 
of play of South American players. The author challenged the literature of globally integrated 
markets (e.g. Dicken, 1998; Hirst & Thompson, 1996) by testing the market for professional 
footballers. He argued that players’ market trends evolved over regional rather than global 
lines. While the decision to hire players has its economic base, it is socially embedded with 
recruitment networks and personal relationships. When clubs hire players, they seek to 
resemble their own local concept of a professional player. Their scouts or foreign sources draw 
on talents who can match the local standards in terms of climate, culture, language, and style 




3.2 Research Hypotheses 
 
In the sport economics literature, wage functions are widely used to test for discrimination. 
Within English football, Szymanski (2000) found that black players earned less than their white 
peers. Pedace (2008) found that players from South America earned more than those from other 
continents, provided that their talents were matched with their peers. They used team 
performance as the dependent variable. Until these studies were published, there was a lack of 
sufficient player performance measures, and hence, a wage function seemed the most 
convenient and appropriate specification. This approach is reinforced by the evidence that 
supports clubs’ efficiency, where wages explain about 90% of team performance variation and 
hence their estimation is based on the crucial assumption that the market for players is efficient. 
In recent years, even though the explanatory power of wages has remained reasonably high, it 
falls to about half of its 90% level. Starting in the 2006 season, more sophisticated player 
performance measures were published. We explore these data and establish a new perspective 
for addressing discrimination that complements the existing literature. Building on the work of 
Szymanski (2000) and Pedace (2008), we use player playing time as a dependent variable and 
test for discrimination using a player performance function where individual player 
productivity metrics are employed.  
To test for a nationality effect, we estimate models at the player and club levels. First, 
we test for a discrimination effect in player playing time while controlling for his individual 
performance. We devised two types of hypotheses for this test. One uses a common nationality 
variable shared between managers and players as an explanatory variable, while the other 
constructs five nationality subgroups, using a dummy for each player relating him to his 
specific subgroup. These are two distinct hypotheses, but both are concerned with nationality 
rather than race, where the second one disregards the fact that a manager may or may not share 
nationality with his players. Second, we re-examine the work of Szymanski (2000) and Pedace 
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(2008) using a recent EPL dataset. This can capture discrimination effects on team performance 
and hence involves a club-level hypothesis. 
3.2.1 Player level hypotheses 
 
H1: Sharing a common cultural background (nationality) between managers and players is 
independent of the players’ playing time after controlling for performance. 
H1A: Managers sharing a common cultural background (nationality) with players increase their 
playing time after controlling for performance. 
The second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Managers do not discriminate in playing time against any specific nationality subgroup 
after controlling for player performance. 
H2A: Managers discriminate in playing time against specific nationality subgroups, even after 
controlling for player performance. 
3.2.2 Club level hypotheses 
 
H3: Managers do not discriminate against particular player subgroups after controlling for club 
wages and number of squad players. 
H3A: Managers discriminate against particular player subgroups after controlling for club 




3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
The sample includes all PL players who made a minimum of one appearance in any season for 
the period spanning 2012/13 to 2016/17. We opted to choose the most recent five seasons of 
available data as they sum to form sufficient (1809) observations. It also takes into account the 
new Sky TV contract with the PL that began in the 2013/14 season, which is higher in value 
and associated with higher spending on players (see Table 4 on p. 42). Each season spent by a 
player at a club is considered an observation. The maximum number of minutes a player can 
play in a single season is 3420 (90 minutes per game over a total of 38 games). 
We used a number of data sources (websites) to build the dataset, including 
Transfermarkt.co.uk for player playing time metrics and personal profiles (through which we 
observe their pictures to determine skin colours), Premierleague.com for players’ performance 
metrics, Soccerbase.com for managerial records, and players’ transfer fees and signing dates. 
The performance metrics provided are derived from Opta Sports, which is the leading sports 
data provider for major sports entities. Club turnover and wage bill data are obtained from the 
David Conn blog in the Guardian newspaper. These are derived from the published annual 
reports at Companies House. 
To examine discrimination in the PL, we tested for the nationality effect on player 
playing time. This was estimated based on the player-level hypotheses H1 and H2. We departed 
from the widely used earning function to a unique market test where (player) playing time was 
employed as the dependent variable. The rational decision of employing a player in the best 
interests of a team should be based on his talent and performance. However, other factors with 
respect to the personal player characteristics may play a role. McGovern (2002) argued that the 
decision to hire a player in English football was embedded within the social networks of a 
club’s managers and scouts. They tended to praise players who resembled the local culture 
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professional standards even if foreign players with similar quality levels were available. 
Therefore, we predicted a nationality effect that influences player playing time even after 
controlling for performance.  
Descriptive statistics for playing time of different player nationalities are reported in 
Table 1. 
[ insert Table 1 here] 
These show that British players played more than non-British players, with an average of 1827 
minutes per season compared to 1749 minutes per season, respectively. The difference of 78 
minutes is close to a full game, and hence British players played on average almost one more 
game per season than non-British players. Additionally, British players got more playing time 
even under different managerial scenarios. They got 1834 minutes of playing time compared 
to 1700 minutes for non-British players while playing under a British manager, and 1815 
minutes compared to 1787 minutes for non-British players while playing under a non-British 
manager.  
To examine the representation of different nationalities among clubs, we divided the 
teams into four categories, and this is presented in Table 2.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
These are based on five league position levels (i.e. first five teams or top teams followed 
by second five teams, third five teams, and bottom five teams). This reveals player recruitment 
patterns among different club levels. Table 2 shows that the top five teams tended to recruit a 
majority of European players. A team in that level had a mean of eight European players in its 
squad, and this decreased in the lower league levels, reaching a mean of four European players 
for the teams in the lower half of the league table. By contrast, teams in the last three levels 
had a mean of nine British players compared to six players for the top five teams. These 
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statistics are generally consistent with the findings of Pedace (2008), who showed that one 
additional player from the British Isles decreased team performance by one position on 
average, while one additional player from Europe increased team performance by one position 
on average. Top teams also recruited more South American players than the rest (a mean of 2.7 
compared to 1.5), while they recruited fewer African players (a mean of 1.3 compared to 2.2-
2.5).  
The representation of British managers according to clubs’ turnover and league 
positions is presented in Table 3. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
This shows the patterns of recruiting British managers among different club levels. It 
reveals that clubs who earned the most (a turnover above the median of £121 million) tended 
to recruit fewer British managers. There are only 233 observations in that category that include 
a British manager compared to 714 observations in clubs who earned less than the median. The 
prevalence of British players within the smaller teams may be attributed to the British managers 
of those teams who are expected to have a preference for their home players over the 
uncertainty of hiring players from abroad. That preference may be more pronounced when 
clubs’ resources are limited compared to top teams, and their overseas networks for players are 
consequently limited.  
For a manifestation of different players’ characteristics with respect to their 
nationalities, we present player performance descriptive statistics in Table 4.  
[insert Table 4 here] 
They show that British players’ performance records were mediocre relative to players 
from other nationalities. The goals average for British players was 0.121, which is below the 
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goal metric mean (for the full sample) of 0.135, while for non-British players the goals average 
was 0.146.7 British players were also less expensive.  
In a player-level analysis, the nationality effect is estimated by means of a random-
effect (RE) panel regression model. This is to allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables 
such as player nationality and playing position. We also include club and season dummies in 
the estimation to capture specific club characteristics and time trends to control for the 
heterogeneity of these unobserved factors. As Pedace (2008) indicated, including club and year 
dummies (or fixed effects) addresses the possible correlation between them and ethnic player 
appearances. 
In a club-level analysis, we estimated the ethnicity and nationality effects by means of 
fixed-effects models. This was to allow for a within-estimation among different clubs, whereas 
nationality and ethnicity are time-varying covariates, as they encompass the number of relevant 
players in the team squad.  
We run the following RE model to test hypothesis H1: 
𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1,𝑛 𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 + + 𝜂𝑀𝐶 + ¥ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡 +  𝜓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑖 + 𝜽𝑡𝑉𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (1) 
where PTit is the dependent variable that represents playing time for each player i in season t. 
This is measured by the total minutes played per season. The NE variable is a vector that 
captures the nationality effect, by which a manager might allocate extra playing time to a player 
who shares his nationality or continent. This vector accounts for four possible scenarios (four 
dummies) and takes a value of 1 or 0 otherwise in each. We ran four versions of model (1) to 
 
7 We conducted an equality of means test and it showed that the British players’ goals average was statistically 
different (less) than non-British players’ goals average and significant at the 1% level. The maximum of the goal 
metric records is 1.02. The highest and consistent (played at least 3 seasons with above average playing time) 
records were achieved by players like Aguero in Manchester City, Lukaku in Everton, Walcott in Arsenal, and 
Harry Kane in Tottenham.  
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test for each scenario separately. Each one has a distinct acronym for the NE effect: (i) BB is 
for a British player and a British manager; (ii) BN is for a British manager and a non-British 
player; (ii) NB is for a non-British manager and a British player; and (iv) NN is for a non-
British manager and a non-British player. There are 947 sample observations (out of 1809) 
where the team manager is British. The MC variable stands for managerial change. This is an 
interaction dummy that takes a value of 1, or 0 otherwise, if a new manager is appointed to the 
team after the start of a season (i.e. after August), and simultaneously there is a change in the 
manager nationality (i.e. either from British to non-British or vice versa). This captures the 
effect of a manager change on player playing time subject to a change in the manager’s 
nationality.  
The perf variable is a vector that captures player performance by accounting for the 
following performance metrics: goals, passes, crosses, and interceptions per player per season 
(see Table 13 for their definition). The number of each metric per season is divided by the 
number of games a player had during that season, and then multiplied by 90 to reflect a full 
game time. These metrics are common and available for players in all positions. We dropped 
both the assist and tackle metrics due to their high correlation with cross and interception 
metrics, respectively (see Table 5 for performance correlation matrix). The inclusion of 
defensive measures such as interceptions relaxes the argument of Pedace (2008) that most 
sports performance measures used in the literature (e.g. Lucifora & Simmons, 2003) are biased 
towards the offensive side of player roles. Controls is a vector of three control variables: injury, 
suspension, and on-loan players (i.e. when a player in team A is on loan to team B for only part 
of the season). We used the number of games to account for a player being unavailable due to 
any of those circumstances. C is club fixed effects, and V are season dummies. The C variable 
is essential even though the dataset is based on player observations. This is to allow for different 
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team qualities that may affect player performance (e.g. midfielders who do not sufficiently 
provide their strikers with proper assistance).  
There are other factors that may influence player playing time and are indirectly related 
to player performance. One is the player transfer fee. Although it does not reveal specific 
information with respect to player performance metrics, it works as a proxy for the general 
quality of a player. Higher transfer fees are expected to be associated with higher-level talent 
and better performance. Thus, managers might be inclined, especially in the early stage of 
player employment, to allocate him extra playing to allow for that talent to be revealed or to 
adapt to the English football atmosphere if it is a fresh foreign talent. The other is the player 
position. Different teams might have similar proportions of players employed in each playing 
position. However, it is expected that playing position would have a large impact on the 
retention of players in their teams. Goddard and Wilson (2009) indicated that those retained 
players had more appearances than others, and this is a natural outcome. In other words, player 
retention is closely related to player playing time.  
To address possible omitted variable bias in model (1), we include these two variables 
(transfer fee and playing position) in the specification as follows: 
 𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1,𝑛 𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 + ¥ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡 +  ø𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑀𝐶 +  𝜃𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑖 + 𝜽𝑡𝑉𝑡 +
𝜺𝒊𝒕      (2) 
where TF is the player transfer fee measured in £million and PP is a dummy that indicates the 
player position (taking a value of 1 or 0 for each position). There are three main player outfield 
positions: striker (or forward), midfielder, and defender. In the regressions, we drop the 
midfield position to use as a basis for the other positions.  
We ran the following RE model to test the H2 hypothesis:  
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𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1,𝑛 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ¥ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑀𝐶 +  𝐶𝑖 + 𝜽𝑡𝑉𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (3) 
The variables PTit, Perfit, Ci, and Vt are the same as those in models (1) and (2). The 
rest are different as follows. The Nationality variable consists of five subgroups: Africa, 
Europe, Britain, South America, and Asia. Each one is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
player nationality belongs to that subgroup, and 0 otherwise. MC is a dummy that takes a value 
of 1 if a new manager is appointed to the team after the start of the season. This is different 
from the MC variable in model (1) in terms of the manager nationality consideration, which is 
disregarded in this case according to the hypotheses H1 and H2 differences.  
Consistent with the modification in model (1), we then tested the hypothesis by 
including player transfer fees and playing position in specification (3), and the model is as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1,𝑛 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ¥ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑀𝐶 +  𝜃𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝜓𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑖 + 𝜽𝑡𝑉𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕   (4) 
where the TF and PP variables are identical to specification (2).  
We run the following fixed effect model to test the H3 hypothesis:  
𝑃𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑁𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝜽𝑡𝑉𝑡 + 𝜺𝒄𝒕    (5) 
This demonstrates a re-examination of Szymanski’s (2000) model, which uses a fixed 
effect approach. We included season dummies to capture time trends and used an EPL dataset, 
while other league divisions were not considered. Following Szymanski’s specification, the 
dependent variable was the log of position calculated as ln[ P/ (21-P) ]. The logWage variable 
is the log of wages for club i in season t. Wage is represented by the aggregate wage bill for 
clubs, whereas wage payroll for individual players is confidential. The NPlayer variable is the 
number of squad players (or squad size) that clubs use per season. The non-white variable is 
the number of non-white players each club uses per season. A minimum of a single appearance 
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was required for a player in both variables to be included in the sample. It is not clear how 
Szymanski (2000) selected black players. In this sample, we chose a non-white player based 
on the following criteria8: (i) Being African and/or from an African origin (i.e. even if a player 
held a different nationality than his origin). A salient example of this is an English player with 
Jamaican origins. (ii) Having clearly black-coloured skin (i.e. dark black). (iii) Originating 
from a black or non-white ethnicity. For instance, British players with a black ethnicity may 
have a skin colour that is not clearly black but is simultaneously non-white. (iv) South 
Americans and Asians are not considered black unless their skin is dark black. The Ѵi 
represents season dummies.  
We re-estimate model (3) using four nationality groups, rather than black players’ 
subgroups, to test for nationality discrimination.  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽6 𝑆. 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑡  + 𝜆𝑀𝐶 + 𝜽𝑡𝑉𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕      (6) 
Each nationality variable represents the number of players of that nationality that clubs 
use for their squad per season, relative to the average per season. British Isles represents British 
players from England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and Northern Ireland). The Europe variable 





8 We used relevant data provided on player profiles from data sources that we used for the purpose of player 
groupings. However, some of the groupings are based on our discretion, as they were not explicitly mentioned 
on the profiles.   
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3.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
3.4.1 Player level regression 
 
The regression results for models (1) and (2) are presented in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. 
[insert Tables 6 and 7 here] 
The dependent variable is playing time represented by total played minutes per season. 
Model (1) results show that the BB coefficient was significantly positive at the 5% level. The 
economic impact of belonging to a particular nationality was considerable. A British player 
playing under a British manager got on average an extra 107 minutes playing time per season, 
which is equivalent to more than a full game’s minutes. This result suggests that player playing 
time is positively associated with belonging to a particular nationality. Specifically, a British 
player who played under a British manager was likely to get extra playing time relative to non-
British players. The BN coefficient was significantly negative at the 10% level. The economic 
impact was also considerable with a 95-minute coefficient, equivalent to just over a full game, 
including extra (or injury) time. The negative coefficient means that British managers allocated 
less playing time to non-British players in their teams. These results support the taste-based 
discrimination hypothesis H1A. The coefficients of NB and NN in columns 3 and 4 were not 
significant, and this implies that non-British managers were not discriminating in player 
playing time.  
All the performance metric coefficients were significant at the 1% level, except for the 
crosses, which were not. Goals were the most significant playing time predictor, with a high 
coefficient of more than 600 minutes. This was followed by interceptions with a more than 
120-minute coefficient and, lastly, passes with an above 7-minute coefficient (the economic 
impact of passes was also meaningful, as the average number of passes per game was naturally 
much higher than other performance metrics). Goals were expected to have an immense impact 
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on playing time, as it is a clear-cut indication of a player’s contribution to team success. 
Interceptions, while correlated with other defensive performance measures such as tackles, 
proxy for the contribution to pressing and defending aspects of teams, while passes proxy for 
the contribution to teamwork in general. These coefficient signs are intuitive and cover most 
of the playing attributes in the outfield. The MC coefficients were insignificant in all four 
scenarios. While there is some evidence in the literature that managerial changes may affect 
team performance (Pedace, 2008), it seems not to have affected player playing time. Injury and 
on-loan coefficients were, as expected, highly significant with a negative effect, as they made 
players unavailable, typically for several weeks or months. The suspension coefficient was 
interestingly significantly positive, suggesting that suspended players may possess talent that 
secured them playing time that outweighed their suspension period.  
When we added player transfer fees and playing position to the general specification in 
model (1), the coefficients changed in significance and magnitude. We first ran the regression 
including only transfer fees, and this did not change the general pattern in (1), except for the 
NN coefficient, which became significant at the 10% level (this result is not reported in Table 
7). In addition, the TF added variable was highly significant with a 23-minute coefficient, 
suggesting that higher transfer fees predicted more playing time. We then ran the full regression 
specification (2), and consequently the BB coefficient significance was reduced to the 10% 
level with a slight decrease in magnitude to 100 minutes. The NB coefficient turned out to be 
insignificant. The goals’ coefficient dramatically increased to more than 1000 minutes, while 
crosses and interceptions were insignificant and passes remained highly significant with similar 
magnitude. This emphasises the player position role in determining the importance of each 
performance metric. The position coefficients were highly significant with a high economic 
impact, where the striker coefficient was negative with 285 minutes magnitude, and the 
defender coefficient was 407 minutes. These are interpreted with respect to the midfield 
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position, and they suggest that strikers were more likely to be rotated, while defenders were 
expected to play the most. These are consistent with Goddard and Wilson’s (2009) findings in 
the sense that playing positions had a considerable impact on playing time and revealed a high 
predictive power towards it. To wrap up, we conclude that British managers exhibited home 
bias as they allocated extra playing time to British players, even after controlling for 
performance. The result was robust to the inclusion of player transfer fees and playing position 
in the specification in (1).  
The results were driven by teams that were in the top half of the league table (top 10). 
We focused on the BB variable for this purpose, as the other scenario variables were not 
significant in model (2). The results of the subsample regressions are presented in Table 8. 
[insert Table 8 here] 
Specifically, teams ranked in the 5th to 10th places in the league table (see Table 2) had 
more influence on the results.9 The BB coefficient was highly significant at the 5% level, with 
a stronger economic impact of 174 minutes of playing time. This coefficient was not significant 
within the lower ranked teams. The implication is that British managers tended to allocate extra 
playing time to British players in the top ranks of the league table.  
Clubs can freely trade players in the transfer market that takes place twice a year 
(between May and August in summer and in January in winter). Owners and/or team managers 
are able to recruit their required level of professional players subject to their budget constraints 
and UK immigration barriers.10 We tested that conjecture using model (3), and the results are 
presented in Table 9. 
 
9 These teams included Liverpool, Westham, West Bromwich, Swansea and Stoke who were managed by a 
British manager for most of the 2012–2016 seasons and simultaneously achieved their top 10 ranks more than 
once.   
10 In order for foreign players to get a work permit to play in the UK there are some pre-requisites which have 
to be filled, such as playing for the national team and the position of that team in the FIFA rankings. 
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[insert Table 9 here] 
The dependent variable of model (3) is playing time represented by total played minutes 
per season. The African coefficient was significant at the 1% level in most cases when matched 
against the European and British coefficients. These included the regressions when Europe, 
Britain, and Africa variables were dropped, as per the estimation specification. When Europe 
and Britain variables were dropped, then the Africa coefficients showed a negative sign, while 
if the Africa variable was dropped, the Europe and Britain coefficients showed a positive sign. 
This indicates less playing time for African players. The economic impact was large, with an 
Africa coefficient of 200 and 253 minutes less than Europe and Britain, respectively. On the 
other hand, Europe and Britain coefficients were 215 and 267 minutes, respectively, against 
the Africa variable. The results suggest that African players got less playing time per season 
compared to their British and European peers, and hence there is evidence of taste-based 
discrimination against African players. The results support the discrimination hypothesis H2A 
and are also generally consistent with the findings of Szymanski (2000). He showed evidence 
of wage discrimination against black players, of which Africans form a large part. In addition, 
part of the result was consistent with those pertaining to hypothesis H1A, where British players 
got extra playing time per season compared to non-British players.  
Nonetheless, the modifications in model (4) have a considerable impact on the 
estimates. These results are presented in Table 10. 
[insert Table 10 here] 
 The Britain coefficients were highly significant at the 5% and 1% levels against the 
South American and Africa coefficients, respectively, and significant at the 10% level against 
the Europe coefficient. The economic impact was large, with a magnitude of 170, 197, and 103 
minutes against South America, Africa, and Europe coefficients, respectively. The results 
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support the discrimination hypothesis H2A and were robust to the inclusion of player transfer 
fees and playing position. We conclude that the findings in models (3) and (4) combined to 
yield strong evidence for discrimination in playing time in favour of British players. By 
contrast, the discrimination against African players in model (3) reduces in extent in model (4), 
as the majority of the other nationality coefficients are also significant in a negative direction 
against the British coefficient. This implies that not only African players are being 
discriminated against, but that they indirectly suffer from greater playing time than British 
players. The descriptive statistics in Table 4 provide support to the evidence that British players 
are favoured in their playing time when quality level is held constant.  
McGovern (2002) provided evidence that clubs used their social networks to hire 
players who matched their preferred local standards. Team scouts were likely to hire players 
they knew individually or through their outsourced scouting links. In other words, the 
availability of equal foreign talent might not alter the scout’s decision to hire their preferred 
locals. The evidence pertains to hiring players but not playing them. Nevertheless, if the 
assumption that those hired players played most of the time is true, then one may infer that the 
behaviour could, to some extent, be rationalised.  
3.4.2 Club level regression 
 
The regression results of models (5) and (6) are presented in Tables 11 and 12, respectively. 
[insert Table 11 here] 
The dependent variable in model (5) is the team rank in the league table (or its position), 
represented by the log of position equation suggested by Szymanski (2000). The non-white 
coefficient is significantly positive, but only at the 10% level. Its economic impact was not 
large compared to the other main predictors (club wages and size of team squad). We recall 
that the value of the dependent variable decreased with higher league table position. 
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Accordingly, variables with positive coefficients had negative effects on team performance and 
vice versa. Unlike Szymanski’s result, this means that a higher usage of non-white players was 
not associated with better team performance. This suggests that teams recruiting an above 
average number of non-white players tended to systematically underperform in the league. If 
the player market was efficient (Szymanski, 2000; Pedace, 2008), then we may also imply that 
non-white players could earn higher salaries relative to other players with equal ability. 
However, considering the coefficient magnitude in addition to its large standard error, it is 
unlikely that team performance would be worse off by recruiting one additional non-white 
player.  
Simultaneously, there is only weak evidence that non-white players were favoured in 
their salaries. They may belong to different nationalities and play on various team levels. The 
average squad size consisted of 27 players, of whom 9 players on average were non-white. 
There was no statistical difference either in the means of non-white players between top teams 
and lower tier teams, or in the means of league position between teams who recruited above 
average numbers of non-white players and the ones who recruited below average.11 
Accordingly, to disentangle a discrimination effect for non-white players is not a simple task.  
The wage variable logWAGE was highly significantly negative at the 1% level, as 
expected. Its economic impact was huge, with a coefficient of -1.60 relative to -0.53 in 
Szymanski (2000). This supports the notion that the player market is competitive. The squad 
size variable N_Player was also highly significant in the expected positive direction. 
Szymanski indicated that it worked as a proxy for a high number of injuries and also for a lack 
of players’ chemistry within teams.  
The dependent variable in model (6) is identical to model (5). 
 
11 The tests for two means differences are available upon request. 
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[insert Table 12 here] 
The wage variable logWAGE was significantly negative, as expected, at the 5% level 
with a coefficient of 1.40. This was the only significant predictor in the specification. In 
addition to the fixed effects model that we used, we also ran the regressions using OLS and 
random effects approaches, and it turned out that none of the nationality variables were 
significant. The R2 is quite reasonable with 36.6%, but including the manager change and 
nationality variables did not add much explanatory power to model (5). The results suggest that 
there was no evidence for wage discrimination that was associated with the nationality 
composition of teams’ squads. This is contradictory to the findings of Pedace (2008). His fixed 
effect estimation with respect to the Premier League did not produce significant salaries and 
manager change coefficients, but it did produce significant coefficients for the squad size 
(aggregate number of team players) and, more importantly, the South American players. These 
findings are interpreted as evidence for salary discrimination in favour of that subgroup, but 






This paper introduces a new discriminatory variable associated with player playing time in the 
English Premier League, which we call the nationality effect. The basic intuitive idea is that 
managers favour players who share a common cultural background with them, be it nationality, 
language, or even a particular playing style. Additionally, clubs’ sources (e.g. managers, 
agents, scouts) who are responsible for searching and recruiting players may be embedded in 
social networks, and hence seek players who resemble the local standards, even if equal or even 
better foreign talent is available in the market. Therefore, we conjectured that players who share 
a common cultural background with their manager would be allocated extra playing time per 
season relative to those who do not, and to an extent that cannot be attributed to mere 
performance. We also conjectured that British players in particular would be allocated extra 
playing time, considering the embedded social networks of clubs’ managerial power and the 
resemblance of a British player to the preferred local professional football standards. 
The nationality effect was supported by our empirical findings. British players playing 
under a British manager got an extra 100 minutes of playing time per season. Additionally, 
even if the manager’s nationality was not considered in the estimation, British players got more 
playing time than European, South American, and African players by 102, 170, and 196 
minutes per season, respectively. Our tests showed that the nationality effect prevailed even 
when we included player transfer fees and playing positions, which are indirectly related to 
playing time.  
Lastly, our empirical findings showed no evidence for wage discrimination either 
against non-white players or players from different nationalities. These findings are 
inconsistent with those of Szymanski (2000) and Pedace (2008), and they suggest a shift of the 
discrimination effect towards the individual player level instead of the established club level 
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analysis. In other words, there is evidence for discrimination in player playing time rather than 
in player salary. However, managers’ decisions could be embedded within social networks (e.g. 
scouts, player agents) that enforce the resemblance of home standards for professional 






3.6.1 Table 1 Player playing time according to nationality differences  
 N PT SD Min Max 
Panel A 
Player nationality      
      
British 834 1827 866 110 3420 
Non-British 975 1749 845 74 3420 
Panel B 
NE scenario       
BB 520 1834 865 110 3420 
BN 427 1700 846 74 3420 
NB 314 1815 867 190 3420 
NN 548 1787 843 157 3420 
                    Notes: Panel A presents the player playing time average (PT) among British and non-British players, and this is 
in total minutes played per season. SD is the standard deviation and min and max represent the minimum and 
maximum, while N is the number of observations. Panel B presents the same averages as Panel A but with the 
consideration of the manager’s nationality under whom the player is playing. NE stands for nationality effect, and 
the scenarios are as follows: i) BB when both the player and the manager are British, ii) BN when the manager is 
British and the player is not, iii) NB when the manager is non-British and the player is British, and iv) NN when 






3.6.2 Table 2 Means of nationality groups in teams among four position categories 
Nationality 
of player 
 Britain Europe South 
America 





Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1st Five 
 
457 6 6 8 9 2.7 3 1.3 2 .13 0 
2nd Five 
 
455 8.3 8 6 6 1.5 1 1.7 2 .49 0 
3rd Five 
 
450 9.2 10 4.3 3 1 1 2.5 2 .69 1 
4th Five 447 9.6 10 4.3 4 1.5 2 2.2 2 .38 0 
            
Notes: 1st Five and the following tranches represent five positions in the league table sorted into an ascending 
order. Each tranche shows the average and the median number of players who belong to a particular nationality. 
For instance, a top team that is ranked in the top five of the league table recruits on average 6 British players, 




3.6.3 Table 3 British managers within different clubs’ turnover and positions 
 
 











Position in the league table (1–10 and 11–20) 
 
                       if T.O >121                                         if T.O <121 
 
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half 
 
163 70 159 555 
Notes: There are 947 observations in the dataset (out of 1809) where the team manager was British. We first split 
teams according to their clubs’ turnover and the figure £121 million is their median. In the second part, the 
observations were sorted based on team positions in the league table subject to their clubs’ turnover. For instance, 
teams with a turnover of more than £121m and ranked in the top 10 position included 163 observations where the 
manager of the team was British. Teams with a turnover of less than £121m and ranked in the top 10 position 




3.6.4 Table 4 Performance, playing time, and transfer fees comparison between 
different nationality players 
Full sample 
Nationality Britain Europe Africa S. America 
Performance 
Metric 
Mean   SD Mean   SD Mean   SD Mean   SD 
Goals .121 .163 .141 .177 .166 .191 .158 .218 
 
Assists .106 .117 .118 .142 .120 .116 .133 .142 
 
Passes 39.2 13.1 43.3 14.3 36.2 15.1 43.3 12.4 
 
Crosses 2.82 2.33 2.2 2.2 1.83 1.98 2.08 2.14 
 
Interceptions 1.42 .753 1.50 .93 1.22 .887 1.62 .928 
 
PT (mins) 1827 865 1812 847 1600 849 1715 831 
         
TF (£m) 3.82 5.8 9.12 10.4 5.6 6.8 11.4 11.3 
 
TF Median (£m) 1.65 6 3.5 8 
 
Obsv (N) 834 561 196 171 
Notes: The comparison is presented for the full sample and the top 10 ranked teams. This is to reflect performance 
among different clubs’ characteristics. The 5 performance metrics are calculated using the total number of each 
metric per player per season divided by the number of games a player had, then multiplied by 90 to reflect a full 
game measurement. PT stands for playing time and is measured by the total minutes played per season. TF stands 




3.6.5 Table 5 Correlation matrix for player performance metrics 
 Goals Assists Passes Crosses Tackles Interceptions 
Goals 1 
 
     
Assists 0.320*** 1 
 
    
Passes -0.214*** 
 
0.0337 1    
Crosses 0.00707 0.435*** -0.0391 1 
 
  
Tackles -0.387*** -0.137*** 0.385*** 0.0179 1 
 
 
Interceptions -0.508*** -0.345*** 0.341*** -0.179*** 0.559*** 1 





3.6.6 Table 6 Playing time according to nationality effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BB  BN NB NN 
BB 107.29** - - - 
 (54.56)    
BN - -94.98* - - 
  (55.90)   
NB - - 42.42 - 
   (59.50)  
NN - - - -39.39 
    (60.65) 
Goals 668.65*** 657.62*** 651.03*** 653.65*** 
 (135.83) (135.72) (135.89) (135.97) 
Passes 7.54*** 7.32*** 7.57*** 7.66*** 
 (2.02) (2.02) (2.02) (2.02) 
Crosses -4.75 -4.26 -3.61 -3.78 
 (10.09) (10.08) (10.10) (10.09) 
Interceptions 123.18*** 122.63*** 120.19*** 119.97*** 
 (29.66) (29.63) (29.66) (29.65) 
MC -110.54 -47.61 -95.63 -80.16 
 (86.48) (47.09) (89.09) (90.14) 
Suspension 35.15* 34.61* 33.25* 33.56* 
 (18.69) (18.69) (18.68) (18.69) 
Injury -54.24*** -54.45*** -54.48*** -54.44*** 
 (3.65) (3.65) (3.65) (3.65) 
On-Loan -61.56*** -60.79*** -61.05*** -61.23*** 
 (10.05) (10.06) (10.06) (10.07) 
_cons 1342.70*** 1359.66*** 1335.99*** 1366.38*** 
 (161.14) (161.47) (162.02) (164.30) 
N 1809 1809 1809 1809 
R2 0.199 0.199 0.198 0.198 
Notes: This table reports the nationality effect on player playing time, which is represented by total playing minutes per 
season. We tested the nationality effect through four scenarios in columns 1 to 4, where (i) BB stands for British player 
and a British manager, (ii) BN stands for British manager and a Non-British player, (iii) NB stands for non-British 
manager and a British player, and (iv) NN stands for non-British manager and a non-British player. Each one of these 
is a dummy that takes a value of 1 or 0 considering the pair nationalities. Goals, passes, crosses, and interceptions are 
individual player performance metrics. These were calculated using the aggregate number of each metric per season 
divided by the total played minutes per season, and the resulting number was multiplied by 90 to reflect a full game 
minutes measurement. MC stands for managerial change, and this is an interaction dummy where its first part takes a 
value of 1 if a new manager was appointed to the team after the start of a season (i.e. after August) and 0 otherwise, and 
its second part takes a value of 1 if there was a change in the manager nationality (i.e. either from British to non-British 
or vice versa). Suspension, injury, and on-loan are control variables and are measured by the total number of games a 
player could not make per season due to these circumstances. Clubs and seasons fixed-effects coefficients are not 






3.6.7 Table 7 Playing time according to nationality effect (transfer fee and player 
position variables included) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 BB  BN NB NN 
BB 99.68* - - - 
 (52.56)    
BN - -69.09 - - 
  (53.93)   
NB - - 77.03 - 
   (57.91)  
NN - - - -95.88 
    (59.00) 
Goals 1058.12*** 1054.38*** 1045.53*** 1050.77*** 
 (145.26) (145.40) (145.47) (145.34) 
Passes 8.73*** 8.58*** 8.77*** 9.01*** 
 (2.11) (2.12) (2.11) (2.11) 
Crosses -7.67 -7.28 -6.44 -6.58 
 (10.22) (10.23) (10.22) (10.21) 
Interceptions 36.70 35.86 34.47 34.47 
 (31.24) (31.26) (31.21) (31.18) 
MC -87.92 -58.62 -98.96 -64.69 
 (84.92) (84.67) (87.67) (88.66) 
TF 22.62*** 22.41*** 22.88*** 23.16*** 
 (3.15) (3.15) (3.18) (3.19) 
Striker -284.72*** -288.80*** -285.16*** -282.31*** 
 (82.31) (82.34) (82.36) (82.38) 
Defender 406.69*** 406.16*** 410.97*** 413.82*** 
 (59.25) (59.37) (59.20) (59.18) 
Suspended 36.13** 35.13* 34.52* 35.15* 
 (18.32) (18.32) (18.32) (18.32) 
Injured -54.44*** -54.63*** -54.68*** -54.64*** 
 (3.56) (3.56) (3.56) (3.56) 
On Loan -57.03*** -56.74*** -56.61*** -57.06*** 
 (9.81) (9.81) (9.81) (9.82) 
_cons 1073.32*** 1098.48*** 1053.15*** 1114.16*** 
 (175.13) (175.28) (176.26) (176.10) 
N 1809 1809 1809 1809 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.212 0.212 
Notes: The table presents the regression results of model (2). This is a modification to model (1) where two variables 
are added: player transfer fee (TF) and playing position (striker and defender). The TF is calculated as the value of the 
transfer in £million. The playing positions are dummy variables that take a value of 1 for each respective position to the 
player. The notes on the rest of variables in Table 6 apply here. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 




3.6.8 Table 8 Playing time according to nationality effect and team ranks 
 (1) (2) 
 1st 10 teams 2nd 10 teams 
   
BB 174.07** 52.15 
 (83.11) (65.96) 
Goals 1051.74*** 1080.27*** 
 (184.08) (253.42) 
Passes 10.77*** 6.19* 
 (2.77) (3.34) 
Crosses -5.31 -11.41 
 (14.57) (13.71) 
Interceptions 19.44 74.54 
 (44.04) (45.83) 
MC -110.71 -62.70 
 (182.39) (126.58) 
TF 23.20*** 19.43** 
 (3.57) (7.87) 
Striker -316.16*** -243.76** 
 (118.20) (109.07) 
Defender 470.10*** 339.63*** 
 (87.01) (75.63) 
Suspended 34.90 52.05* 
 (23.95) (29.33) 
Injured -55.50*** -53.80*** 
 (4.81) (5.47) 
On-Loan -53.82*** -61.74*** 
 (15.43) (13.43) 
_cons 939.37*** 1524.95*** 
 (221.91) (353.78) 
N 912 897 
R2 0.234 0.234 
Notes: The results in the table are based on two subsamples: (i) the top 10 positions ranked teams, and (ii) the 
lower 10 ranked teams (the second half of the table). Only the first scenario of model (1) is presented, as the rest 
were insignificant in the subsequent model (2). Column 1 represents the first subsample, and column 2 represents 
the second subsample. The definitions of all variables presented in Tables 6 and 7 apply here. Clubs and seasons 
fixed-effects coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 




3.6.9 Table 9 Nationality effect on playing time using player nationality subgroups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 European Britain S.America America.Asia Africa 
      
Europe - -48.51 68.26 123.84 214.94*** 
  (58.56) (87.28) (153.21) (83.26) 
Britain 56.83 - 120.89 175.62 266.99*** 
 (58.52)  (86.92) (150.57) (79.77) 
S. America -50.47 -103.13 - 69.26 160.28 
 (87.62) (87.32)  (166.43) (105.29) 
America-
Asia 
-69.93 -123.52 -5.86 - 139.99 
 (155.47) (152.91) (168.24)  (164.11) 
Africa -199.90** -253.20*** -135.87 -80.98 - 
 (83.53) (80.08) (105.21) (162.24)  
Goals 670.06*** 670.06*** 670.71*** 668.83*** 669.12*** 
 (135.69) (135.71) (135.65) (135.68) (135.64) 
Passes 7.41*** 7.41*** 7.39*** 7.38*** 7.38*** 
 (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01) 
Crosses -5.74 -5.74 -5.77 -5.96 -5.89 
 (10.08) (10.08) (10.08) (10.08) (10.08) 
Interceptions 119.03*** 118.92*** 119.37*** 119.12*** 118.63*** 
 (29.71) (29.71) (29.70) (29.70) (29.70) 
MC -48.51 -48.66 -47.80 -48.27 -48.25 
 (47.06) (47.06) (47.05) (47.06) (47.05) 
Suspended 38.02** 37.99** 38.12** 38.06** 38.26** 
 (18.72) (18.72) (18.72) (18.71) (18.71) 
Injured -54.69*** -54.69*** -54.68*** -54.70*** -54.71*** 
 (3.64) (3.64) (3.64) (3.64) (3.64) 
OnLoan -61.29*** -61.28*** -61.29*** -61.35*** -61.29*** 
 (10.04) (10.04) (10.04) (10.04) (10.04) 
_cons 1360.46*** 1412.20*** 1295.25*** 1241.60*** 1151.34*** 
 (163.16) (164.40) (179.03) (215.47) (173.18) 
N 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 
R2 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 
Notes: The dependant variable is the total played minutes for each player per season. The first five variables are 
the nationality subgroups where Europe stands for players from Europe, Britain for players from Great Britain 
(England, Wales, Scotland), Ireland and North Ireland, S. America for players from South or Latin America, and 
America-Asia for players from North America and Asia. These are dummy variables where each player takes a 
value of 1 or 0, according to his relevant nationality subgroup. In columns 1 to 5 (i.e. in each regression), one 
nationality subgroup dummy is withdrawn. This is to interpret the other nationality coefficients relative to it. The 
definitions of all other performance and control variables are identical to the ones in Tables 6, 7, and 8. The MC 
is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a new manager was appointed to the team after the start of the season. Clubs 
and seasons fixed-effects coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 




3.6.10 Table 10 Nationality effect on playing time using player nationality subgroups 
(TF and PP included) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Europe Britain S. America America-
Asia 
Africa 
      
Europe - -96.49* 70.15 59.81 97.51 
  (55.89) (82.10) (144.31) (79.16) 
Britain 102.60* - 169.93** 158.77 196.77*** 
 (55.87)  (82.82) (141.61) (76.10) 
S. America -58.01 -157.28* - -1.01 36.58 
 (82.39) (83.15)  (156.84) (99.66) 
America-
Asia 
-21.45 -121.65 45.84 - 72.55 
 (146.37) (143.70) (158.53)  (154.68) 
Africa -86.37 -186.18** -19.21 -30.10 - 
 (79.33) (76.29) (99.51) (152.80)  
Goals 1041.20*** 1042.73*** 1040.89*** 1040.60*** 1039.60*** 
 (145.33) (145.33) (145.30) (145.33) (145.34) 
Passes 8.65*** 8.65*** 8.64*** 8.62*** 8.64*** 
 (2.11) (2.11) (2.11) (2.11) (2.11) 
Crosses -7.64 -7.66 -7.65 -7.83 -7.72 
 (10.23) (10.23) (10.23) (10.23) (10.23) 
Interceptions 41.63 41.36 41.98 41.70 41.61 
 (31.35) (31.36) (31.35) (31.35) (31.35) 
MC -32.05 -32.34 -31.78 -31.94 -31.73 
 (46.33) (46.33) (46.33) (46.32) (46.33) 
TF 23.51*** 23.46*** 23.53*** 23.48*** 23.48*** 
 (3.20) (3.20) (3.20) (3.20) (3.20) 
Striker -266.47*** -267.85*** -265.97*** -267.25*** -265.42*** 
 (82.62) (82.61) (82.61) (82.57) (82.62) 
Defender 399.22*** 399.25*** 398.87*** 398.46*** 398.23*** 
 (59.40) (59.42) (59.39) (59.41) (59.40) 
Suspended 38.15** 38.15** 38.21** 38.18** 38.33** 
 (18.38) (18.38) (18.38) (18.37) (18.37) 
Injured -54.70*** -54.69*** -54.69*** -54.70*** -54.71*** 
 (3.56) (3.56) (3.56) (3.56) (3.56) 
On Loan -56.78*** -56.77*** -56.78*** -56.83*** -56.79*** 
 (9.81) (9.81) (9.81) (9.81) (9.81) 
_cons 1360.46*** 1412.20*** 1295.25*** 1241.60*** 1151.34*** 
 (163.16) (164.40) (179.03) (215.47) (173.18) 
N 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 
R2 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198 
Notes: This is a modification to the model in Table 9 where three variables are added: TF, which stands for player 
transfer fees; and striker and defender, which are dummies for player playing position. Clubs and seasons fixed-
effects coefficients are not reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 






3.6.11 Table 11 The effect of non-white players on team performance: Seasons 2009–
2016 
 (1) 












Notes: The regression is conducted by means of a fixed effect model. The dependant variable is the team 
performance represented by the log of its position on the league rank. NON-WHITE is the number of non-
white players in the team squad. LogWAGE is the log of wages for club i in season t. N_PLAYER is the total 
number of players in the team squad. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Season dummies are not 





3.6.12 Table 12 The effect of nationality groups on team performance: Seasons 2009–
2016 
 (1) 






















Notes: The regression is conducted by means of a fixed effect model. The dependant variable is the team 
performance represented by the log of its position on the league rank. LogWAGE is the log of wages for club i in 
season t. N_PLAYER is the total number of players in the team squad. MC stands for managerial change and takes 
a value of 1 if the manager was new to team i in season t and 0 otherwise. BRITISH is the number of British players 
in a team squad who appeared in at least one league match. EUR is the number of European players in a team squad 
who appeared in at least one league match. SAMERICAN is the number of South American players in a team squad 
who appeared in at least one league match. AFRICAN is the number of African players in a team squad who 
appeared in at least one league match. USASIA is the number of American and Asian players in a team squad who 
appeared in at least one league match. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Season dummies are not reported. 





3.6.13 Table 13  Definitions of performance metrics for the Perfit variable and Control 
variables 
Performance 
Metric Definition  




Number of crosses performed per 90 minutes. 





Number of passes performed per 90 minutes. 




Number of interceptions performed per 90 minutes. 
When the ball is intended for a player of the same team but caught by a player of the opposing 
team. 
Control Variables   Definition 
Suspension Number of games that a player is legally suspended. 
On loan                                           
 
Number of games not played while being on loan to another team. 
                
Injury Number of matches that a player could not play due to an injury. 
MC A managerial change that takes place after the start of the season. 
  
*The relevant data are taken from Premierleague.com, the official website that represents the PL authority. We 
opted to adjust the variables per 90 minutes rather than per match appearance. This gives a proper reflection of 




4. Can home field advantage predict team success? 
 
Home field (HF) advantage in competitive sports has garnered much empirical attention. This 
advantage pertains to a higher probability of winning games at a team’s home ground as 
opposed to those at away grounds (e.g. Dobson & Goddard, 2009). Despite the empirical 
difficulty in identifying with precision the sources of home field advantage, five main factors 
are discussed in the literature that may drive that advantage. These comprise fans (or crowd 
encouragement), players’ familiarity with stadium facilities, travel fatigue of opponents, rules 
and probable biased referees’ decisions under pressures favouring the home team, and lastly, 
the territoriality aspect (Carron et al., 2005; Courneya & Carron, 1992; Nevill & Holder, 1999; 
Pollard, 2006a).  
Human physical conditioning naturally plays a major role in sports, with its 
determinants such as training programmes, nutrition, and genetics. However, athletes, coaches, 
and referees are also likely to be influenced by the psychological factors derived from HF 
advantage. The five main factors provide a basis for explaining the behavioural states of 
athletes while playing at home. For instance, the evidence on HF advantage did not show a 
strong long-term trend in MLB and NFL, and it was consistently lower in baseball (MLB) than 
in other sports. In English football, besides NBA and NHL (hockey), the trend seems to have 
declined in recent decades (Dobson & Goddard, 2009). One of the explanations for such 
differences among sport disciplines relates to the crowd size effect, where some sports facilities 
have lower capacity for crowds, especially indoor ones such as ice-hockey or basketball. The 
crowd effect, whether its influence is on players’ encouragement or referee decisions, can be 
related to crowd density (e.g. Agnew & Carron, 1994).  
This paper contributes to the HF literature in two respects. The effect continues as the 
rate of home wins regularly exceeds away wins. However, is this effect statistically and 
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economically significant? The paper’s first contribution is that it employs a unique sample of 
all PL games played during the 2012/13 to 2016/17 seasons to test for the continued relevance 
of the HF advantage. The total number of games played for each season is 380, and this yields 
a total of 1900 matches. However, our full sample contains 3,800 matches, as a home match 
for team A simultaneously constitutes an away match for team B. Our panel regression results 
provide unequivocal evidence of a significantly strong and robust home field effect. The HF 
effect over the full sample period is a resounding 0.46 additional points per home game, and it 
is significant at the 1% level. It holds with almost identical effects for both top six teams and 
remaining teams in the league.  
 The paper’s second contribution is that it uses bootstrap techniques to explore the HF 
effect in predicting team success and failure in the PL. More specifically, our bootstrap 
approach to modelling match results follows that of Bell et al. (2013). This bootstrap approach 
is applied to the first half of the season’s games (20) to predict the success and failure of teams 
at the end of the season. The implication of our results is that teams can evaluate their 
probability for promotion to the Top four to six rankings, or for relegation on the basis of the 
home results of the first 20 games each season. 
Our empirical findings are novel in the context of the Premier League. They suggest 
that teams who outperform the bootstrap expected results in their early home (relative to away) 
games will be secure in the PL. This is still the case even if they perform poorly in away games 
over this period. This is a strong implication that home results dominate away results. 
Moreover, a great home performance, even if accompanied by poor away performance, can 
lead to a top four ranking. An average team performance at home that is associated with poor 
performance away from home increases the probability of relegation to the Championship by 
about 40%. Lastly, an average performance in home games that is accompanied by great away 
performance may not suffice to secure a top four ranking. This is additional evidence in favour 
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of the home field effect in the context of predicting promotion in elite European football 
competitions. 
 
4.1 Literature Review 
 
It is established in the literature that the home field effect favours home teams and creates 
difficulties for away teams in professional sports. Evidence shows that winning home games 
is significant to the extent that it cannot be explained by mere chance. In Courneya and Carron’s 
(1992) review of the literature, they identified that consistently winning over half of the games 
played at home represented a home advantage. Pollard (1986) defined home advantage as a 
higher percentage of points gained while playing on the home field. Bray (1999) defined home 
advantage as a difference of greater than 5% between home and away winning percentages. 
This is particularly related to sport competitions where the schedule for home and away games 
is balanced, i.e. each team plays an identical number of games in its home field and in away 
field within a season.  
Studies related to home advantage were mainly established in the United States, 
covering many professional sports such as basketball, baseball, ice hockey, and American 
football. Historical evidence suggests a clear indication of an HF advantage despite variations 
in its magnitude between different sports, and some declining patterns were also identified 
(Dobson & Goddard, 2009). Courneya and Carron (1992) showed home win percentages for 
different sports as follows: baseball 53.5%, American football 57.3%, ice hockey 61.1%, 
basketball 64.4%, and football (soccer in American terms) 69%. Jamieson’s (2010) extended 




Social psychology provides explanations for the causes of HF advantage (e.g. Edwards 
& Archambault, 1989; Schwartz & Barsky, 1977). These fall within five main categories: (i) 
familiarity with stadium facilities, such as physical features of the playing ground (pitch) and 
stands; (ii) travel fatigue that may be experienced by the visiting team and its consequential 
effect on match preparation routines; (iii) rules factors through some privileges given to the 
hosting team, such as the last bat in baseball; and (iv) the crowds’ psychological effect on 
hosting and visiting teams, where support is extended to home team players and intimidation 
towards visiting teams. Crowd pressure also may have an influence on referees’ decisions 
where hosting teams could gain, for instance, soft fouls or penalties (at least before the 
introduction of the VAR). Finally, (v) territoriality, where certain geographic area norms arise 
and are reflected in home games (Catalonia norms, for instance). Generally, there is evidence 
for minimal effect with regard to travel fatigue (e.g. Ramchandani & Wilson, 2010), the 
familiarity aspect (e.g. Pollard, 2002), and to a lesser extent, rule factors (e.g. Courneya & 
Carron, 1990). Crowd effects have received more attention, but results vary among different 
sports, with no clear association established between crowd support and home advantage. 
Indoor sports such as basketball and ice-hockey, which display closer interrelation among 
players and the crowds, have shown clearer evidence for the positive effect of crowd support. 
This is due to the fact that indoor facilities are more uniform (e.g. size and quality of the playing 
surface, hall temperature, and atmosphere) than outdoor facilities.   
British football also grasped attention (e.g. Clarke and Noman, 1995; Nevill et al., 1996; 
Pollard, 1986; Pollard & Pollard, 2005). Pollard and Pollard showed that since the league 
formation in 1888, there was only a small change in home advantage as it varied among the 
four divisions, from 63% to 65.5% over the seasons 1970–1981. They suggested that 
familiarity with home field conditions was more influential than crowd support and travel 
fatigue experienced by opponent teams. Their finding contrasts with that of Nevill et al. (1996), 
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who suggested that home advantage varied significantly among eight major divisions of the 
English and Scottish football leagues. Average attendance, unlike some other sports 
disciplines, in each division was influential in those home advantage differences. Nevill et al. 
(2002) implied that crowd pressure provoked more aggressive behaviour from away team 
players as well as influencing referees’ decisions. Downward and Jones’ (2007) findings 
support the crowd size effect, in particular on referees’ decisions.   
With regard to home advantage historic patterns, even though the home win percentage 
in English football decreased from around 50% in the 70s and 80s to around 43% later in the 
new millennia, it remained well above the away win ratio when it reached its highest 
percentages of around 30% later in the decade (Dobson & Goddard, 2009). That declining trend 
might be attributable to the introduction of the Premier League beginning in 1992, where clubs 
gained more financial power, through which grabbing talents was more viable and hence 
competition increased. Allen and Jones (2014) analysed PL results in the seasons 1992/93–
2011/12 and showed that winning home games, on average, secured 60.7% of total points 
earned by teams.  
A thorough documentation and interpretation of HF advantage has been mainly directed 
towards the above-mentioned psychological aspects, while empirical research with respect to 
the effect on field performance is relatively limited. One explanation for this is the complicated 
nature of precisely quantifying factors that are closely related to match outcomes, such as 
individual players’ skills and quality, teams’ principles and standards, managerial and coaching 
qualities, and match significance within the league fixtures. Therefore, another strand of 
research has focused on the manifestation of home advantage within match outcomes. For 
instance, one can assume—ceteris paribus—that home teams may adapt a more offensive 
tactical approach for the match, while away teams may follow a more defensive approach. 
Moreover, a frustration hypothesis suggests that away team players may be more inclined to 
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make fouls or violate rules (e.g. Volkamer, 1971). The findings of Edwards and Archambault 
(1989) suggest that the HF effect manifests itself in a non-outcome (non-result) aspect as well, 
where home teams tend to outperform away (visiting) teams.  
Carmichael and Thomas (2005) extended that strand of literature through a more explicit 
empirical approach, where they examined match-play data from the EPL in the 1997/98 season. 
They estimated match-based production functions for home and away team performances. 
Their results indicated that adapting an attacking play style at home could produce more goals 
and consequently better results, while adapting a defensive style at away games was more 
important for achieving better results.  
Team tactical preparation and starting line-up may vary based on whether a match is played 
at home or away. Carmichael et al. (2000) employed player performance statistics to test for 
match-based production functions of the FA cup 1997/98 season. They used goal differential 
as a proxy to measure team performance and incorporated a home field advantage variable, 
which had a significant positive effect on match results for the observed team. Crowder et al. 
(2002) focused on the probabilities of home win, draw, or away win, as their outcomes 
constituted the betting market, to estimate English teams’ attacking and defending capabilities 
through a refined Poisson model. Clarke and Norman (1995) used English football match 
results to produce a home advantage effect in addition to a team rating. They investigated the 
reasons behind some home advantage differences among teams between the 1981/82 to 
1990/91 seasons. They showed that the distance between club grounds (fields) was linearly 
related to home advantage. Dixon and Robinson (1998) used home advantage as a part of their 
soccer match model parameters to eventually assess scoring rate variations of the home and 
away teams during a match. Barnett and Hilditch (1993) assessed the home advantage of a few 
English teams during the 1980s and 1990s seasons by investigating the impact of adopting 
artificial grass on home teams’ match performance and outcome.  
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4.2 Research Hypotheses 
 
In the home field advantage literature, a positive association is found between playing at home 
and a better behavioural state of athletes prior to games. Most studies discuss psychological 
factors that may drive such a state. The findings differ across a wide range of sports with respect 
to the longevity of the HF advantage and the intensity of its effect, as well as its probable 
drivers. The HF advantage effect seems to have declined over the years and is at its highest 
levels in the early years of a particular sport (Dobson & Goddard, 2009). Nevertheless, the 
effect has remained relatively robust.  
Some studies have focused on the advantage effect by country (e.g. Pollard, 2006) while 
some have focused on two-leg knockout ties played in European football competitions (e.g. 
Eugster et al., 2011). Bray et al. (2003) provided evidence in English football that higher 
division teams had greater home advantage than lower division teams. Familiarity with stadium 
facilities, including using artificial grass, size of attendance and effect on referees, travel to the 
home stadium, and territoriality are all psychological factors that have been studied within 
English football. 
Statistics from the Sky Sports Football Yearbook show the mean proportion of home 
wins in the EPL across the 1970–2009 seasons was near the 50% threshold in the 1970s and 
1980s, and declined to a low of 43% in 2009. Away wins, on the other hand, increased from 
around the 20% level in the 1970s and 1980s to reach around 30% from the beginning of the 
new millennium.  
Another strand of the literature provides evidence on predicting match results and team 
success. Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2003, 2004) used forecasting models (e.g. Poisson 
models and ordered probit models) to predict match results and goals scored while focusing on 
the fixed-odds betting markets. Dobson and Goddard (2003) studied the persistence in 
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sequences of consecutive football match results by means of Monte Carlo analysis, while 
taking into account the venue (home or away) at which the game was played. Other studies 
have used artificial neural networks (ANNs) to predict team success. For instance, Arabzad et 
al. (2014) found that football match results could be predicted through a machine learning 
approach. Their model predicted five out of the six Iranian football teams promoted to the 
Asian Football Confederation Champions League (ACL). Lebovic and Sigelman (2001) 
studied how information processes may affect team rankings in American college football. 
They showed that rankings exhibited strong inertial tendencies that changed only with the flow 
of new information about games played in prior weeks. Carmichael and Thomas (2005) 
provided evidence that a team’s tactical approach (or within match performance) varied 
depending on whether a match was played at home or away. Thus, this could affect how the 
team performs at home, and their findings support those of Edwards and Archambault (1989), 
which indicated a tendency for home teams to outperform their visiting (away) teams on a 
number of non-outcome measures.  
4.2.1 Home field effect hypotheses 
 
We combined the above two strands of literature to test for a new home field effect. First, we 
estimated a model following the approach of Bell et al. (2013) that accounted for several factors 
that may affect a team match performance. We added an HF variable to their original model, 
which captured the effect on team performance of playing at home represented by the average 
earned points. Hence, our first hypothesis is that playing at home can significantly improve 
team performance and hence earn higher points compared to away games. 
H1: Playing at home has a positive effect on team performance after controlling for factors 
such as player absences, fatigue, and club financial resources. 
H1A: Playing at home is independent of team performance after controlling for factors such as 
player absences, fatigue, and club financial resources.  
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Second, we estimated the expected points for teams by means of a bootstrap approach, 
and this provided a benchmark for our analysis. The bootstrap allows for reliable probabilities 
of match outcomes, and its prediction lies on outcome averages rather than a simple prediction 
of discrete match outcomes. We then compared the actual points won during the season to these 
expected benchmark points. Comparing these two can help evaluate whether the team 
performance at home games was superior to those of away games in predicting team success. 
To assess the predictive power of home games for the final team rankings in the league, we 
used bootstrap confidence intervals to generate success and failure signals. The second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The information from home game results is superior to that from away games in predicting 
team success and survival in the Premier League. 
H2A: Home and away game results have the same predictive power for team success and 
survival in the Premier League. 




The sample includes all Premier League games (matches) played during the 2012/13 to 2016/17 
seasons. The total number of games played for each season was 380, and this yields a total of 
1900 matches. However, our sample contains 3,800 observations, as we analysed each game 
from a team perspective (i.e. one game can generate a loss for one team and a win for another, 
or a draw for each). The relevant dataset used is the league table rankings at the end of each 
season, which totals 100 observations (20 team rankings in the PL in each of the five seasons). 
Table rankings are the outcomes of the 380 league games played. 
We used a number of data sources (mainly websites) to build the dataset. These include 
Transfermarkt.co.uk for all game-related information, match fixtures and results, player 
injuries, absences and suspensions, extra games played in other competitions, and the net 
107 
 
transfer spent by each club in each season. We use Soccerbase.com for teams’ managerial 
records. We obtained club wage bill data from The David Conn Blog in the Guardian 
Newspaper, which were derived from the published annual reports at Companies House. 
To examine the HF advantage in the PL, we tested for its effect on team performance. 
Match points won were used as a proxy for performance where a win was 3 points, a draw was 
1 point, and a loss was 0 points. We followed the approach of Bell et al. (2013) to estimate 
team performance, but extended their model by including an HF variable. The HF advantage 
(e.g. Dobson & Goddard, 2009) shows that the percentage of home wins is higher than away 
wins. The minimum spread between those two percentages is 13%; this is the difference 
between the home win percentage 43% in 2009 and the corresponding 30% away win 
percentage in the same year. Thus, we predict that merely playing at home produces better team 
performance even after controlling for relevant team characteristics such as players’ absences 
and fatigue as well as team financial resources.  
The descriptive statistics for home and away team performance are reported in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We categorised teams into three groups based on performance: top six, mid-table, and 
relegation zone teams. The latter consists of four teams, and the ten remaining teams occupied 
the mid-table slot. We conducted equality of means tests for points earned by teams in these 
three groups. These show that team performance was better on average when a team played at 
home than when it played away. Better performance persisted across the sample period and 
across all team groups. The overall average (i.e. from 2012 to 2016 seasons and for all teams) 
for team performance was 1.57 points earned at home with a standard deviation of 0.06, 
compared to 1.14 points earned in away games with a standard deviation of 0.04. The difference 
of 0.43 between the two averages was statistically significant at the 1% level with a t-statistic 
of 10.9. This confirms that teams earned more points at home than at away venues. The small 
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standard deviations from average points indicate a consistent pattern. These results reflect the 
first 20 games played (10 home and 10 away games), which represents the first half of the 
league (38 games are played in total).  
The detailed performance for the first 10 home games over all seasons was as follows: 
The top six teams averaged 2.2 points, mid-table 1.42 points, and relegation zone teams 1.1 
points. The correspondence performance for the first 10 away games was as follows: top teams 
averaged 1.77 points, mid-table 0.99 points, and relegation zone teams 0.66 points. Table 1 
shows that the equality of mean tests for all team levels and across all seasons was statistically 
significant. Hence, it made no difference whether a team was a European competition candidate 
or in danger of relegation to the lower tier league (i.e. championship league) in exploring the 
psychological advantage stemming from playing at home.  
4.3.2 Panel regressions 
 
Several characteristics influenced actual team performance in terms of points. Bell et al. (2013) 
devised a model that separated a team’s manager impact from the effects of other team 
characteristics. This is estimated through a fixed effect model where the manager of a team is 
assumed to be an unobserved effect. This allows one to capture managerial skills relative to 
team resources and conditions. We followed their approach but took a different starting point. 
We expected that playing at home was associated with a higher probability of better 
performance and, consequently, a higher win rate. Its effect on team points is crucial. This is a 
prerequisite for the assessment of its predictive power for team success, which is discussed at 
a later stage of this model.  
The home field effect was estimated by means of a fixed effects panel regression model. 
The dependent variable was team performance, represented by the team points measure12 
 
12 Points are more direct and clear performance measure than goal difference. Nevertheless, adding goal 
difference to the estimation is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
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(where the number of points scored for a win was 3, 1 for a draw and 0 for a loss) for team i in 
fixture t. 
yi,t = ηi + ∑ 𝜷𝒋𝒌𝒋=𝟏  xj,i,t + ui,t           (1) 
where ηi is the team fixed effect, x is a vector of team characteristics, ui,t are zero mean i.i.d. 
disturbances, i=1,…,N; t=1,…,T so that there are N teams with a total of T matches during the 
2012/13–2016/17 seasons (total of 5 seasons). The number of matches in our sample ranged 
from a minimum of 38, where a team played only one season in the Premier League during our 
sample period, to a maximum of 190, where a team played the full five sample seasons in the 
PL. There were 1900 matches over the five-season period that involved a total of 28 teams 
playing in the PL (20 teams only in each season).  
We estimated model (1) using variables that were expected to capture team 
performance. These include (i) the log of the total wage bill for team players over each season 
in £m. There is evidence in the literature (e.g. Pedace, 2008) suggesting that player wages 
explain almost 90% of the variability in team performance. This indicates that clubs hire the 
best available players subject to the constraints of their financial resources. We opted not to 
include the net transfer spend variable used by Bell et al. (2013) (which measures the extent to 
which the club is currently able to hire new players) due to its complicated cumulative effect. 
Simultaneously, it was insignificant in the model estimation, both in statistical and economic 
terms. The other variables are (ii) the total number of injured players in match t, (iii) the total 
number of suspended players in match t, and (iv) the total number of unavailable players in 
match t for reasons other than suspension or injury (e.g. playing with their national team or the 
reserve team of their own club), (v) the total number of games that the team played in 
competitions other than the PL (e.g. EFL or Carabao Cup, Champions or Europa Leagues), and 
finally, (vi) match t venue, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the team i 
played at home, and 0 for its away games. 
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We expected that playing at home and the player wage bill would positively affect team 
performance. Conversely, we expected player absences to negatively affect it. The impact of 
non-premier league games on team performance is somewhat tricky to predict. This is because 
playing more games in other competitions (especially the European Champions League) 
indicates a higher quality team, while on the other hand, playing too many games may lead to 
a degree of exhaustion for (some) team players that may adversely affect performance levels. 
Additionally, the same above-mentioned characteristics of the opposing team for match t are 
also included in the model as explanatory variables, and their coefficients were expected to 
have the opposite sign. Each game accordingly is included twice in the dataset (i.e. one 
regression each for home and away teams/games).  
4.3.3 Bootstrap approach 
 
Bell et al. (2013) used the bootstrap to analyse the impact of the manager effect. They extracted 
the manager fixed effect from their original model in order to generate bootstrap replications 
for team performance that were unaffected by manager skills or interventions. Then they 
compared the actual points achieved by each manager for their team with the bootstrap 
generated or expected points. We employed a similar bootstrap procedure to isolate the impact 
of the HF effect to test for the reliability of the HF effect over the full course of the season. 
More specifically, we tested whether the results of the first 20 games of the season could help 
to predict the final league position outcomes in terms of top four or relegation. 
We proceeded with estimating model (1). This adds the HF effect to the Bell et al. 
(2013) model in the estimation. Then, we sampled with replacement from the dependent 
variable constructed in (1), where for each j=1,…,1000, bootstrap replications were run to 
generate the average number of points scored and their confidence interval for team i at each 
replication j. We opted for 1,000 replications as experimentation with 10,000 replications for 
a sample of games that produced qualitatively similar results. The resulting sampling 
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distribution represents the expected match points for each team i that could be collected relative 
to team characteristics and unobserved effects based on our model specification.  
The bootstrap estimates produced reliable confidence intervals (CI) of the sample 
distribution using data from the first 20 games of the season only. This allowed for 
success/failure predictions for the remaining games of the season. We then examined where 
the actual points achieved by each team fit relative to the 95% CI of the bootstrap distribution. 
This was examined for home and away games separately. We defined team performance as 
above average if its actual collected match points lay above the 95% CI boundary, as below if 
it was below the 5% lower boundary, and as standard if it lay between the upper and lower 
boundaries.  
Based on these definitions, we sought to predict a team’s promotion to the top four, 
survival in the Premier League, or relegation to the Championship League (next lower league 
division). Securing a place in the top four promotes English teams to the Europa Champions 
League, which is the most prestigious football tournament for European football clubs. The 
team in fifth place gains automatic promotion to the Europa League, which is a lower level but 
well respected European tournament, while the sixth-placed team qualifies for the knock-out 
competition for the Europa League. The bottom three teams in the league are relegated to the 
Championship League.  
4.4 Regression and Bootstrap Results 
 
4.4.1 Regression results 
 
The results from estimating model (1) are reported in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Our focus in the results is on the association between team performance after controlling 
for other relevant factors that may influence the match result and the home field effect. The 
results show that the HF (venue) variable positively affected team performance with a 
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coefficient of 0.46 and was highly significant at the 1% level. This implies that playing at home 
increased the expected points per match by 0.46 points on average. This huge economic impact 
strongly supports hypothesis H1 on the HF effect. The result was robust to teams other than 
the top six. While this is a novel finding in the context of the Premier League, it is in line with 
the supportive evidence for the HF advantage in other studies in different sports (Bray, 1999; 
Jamieson, 2010; Pollard, 1986). 
The wage bill also positively affected team performance, as expected, with a coefficient 
of 0.32 that was significant at the 1% level. This is intuitive, as wages reflect the quality of 
players hired for the team and subsequently their expected contribution to team performance 
and success. We also used the wage bill in the estimation in a non-log form and obtained a 
coefficient of 0.0024 compared to the 0.007 of Bell et al. (2013). This indicates that, for each 
£100m increase in the home team wage bill (or fall of the same amount in the opposing team 
wage bill), there was an expected increase of 0.24 in match points. The lower effect of wage 
bills in our sample did not change when we removed the home variable from the estimation. 
This may be attributed to the escalating wage bills, especially in the last decade.  
The absence of players (represented by injuries, suspensions, and other reasons) from 
the team squad on the match day was not significant for team performance, although the 
coefficients had the expected signs. However, injuries were significant at the 10% level in the 
estimation of a random effect panel regression. Player absences were a significant factor in the 
Bell et al. (2013) results. We interpreted our results as indicating that the magnitude of the HF 
effect outweighed it.  
Injuries in the opposing team, on the other hand, were significant at the 1% level with 
a coefficient of 0.029 compared to 0.04 in Bell et al. (2013). Our results for the extra games 
variable (or non-Premier League) contrasted with those in Bell et al. (2013). Our estimation 
results show that home teams were negatively affected by those extra games with a significant 
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coefficient of 0.015 at the 1% level, while the effect for opponents was statistically 
insignificant. Bell et al. (2013) found that opposing teams were positively influenced with a 
coefficient of 0.016, but that home teams were unaffected. 
The variation in wage bills in our sample was higher than that reported by Bell et al. 
(2013). It ranged from £61m (Burnley) to £264m (Manchester City) for the 2016/17 season. 
This difference of £203m far exceeds that of £140m in the Bell et al. study (2013) sample for 
the 2008/09 season. This indicates a higher spending pattern on players, especially in the top 
six teams, in our sample. Therefore, we split the sample into two subsamples to account for the 
top six and the rest separately. The overall average wage bill was £104m with a median of 
£79.5m. The top six teams were well above the average. Three teams (Everton, Leicester, and 
Southampton) recorded higher than average wage bills in the 2016/17 season only, but we 
opted not to include them in the top six. This was to allow for the financial, team quality, and 
psychological differences between the two groups.  
The regression results for the two subsamples are reported in Table 3(a).  
[Insert Table 3(a) here] 
The top six teams subsample (1) includes 988 observations (26% of the total sample), 
while the other teams subsample (2) accounts for the remaining 2812 observations. The results 
were similar for the two subsamples. First, the venue coefficient was virtually identical at 0.46 
in the two subsamples and highly significant at the 1% level. This implies that the economic 
significance of the HF effect was not associated with a specific group of the total sample; rather, 
teams in both subsamples could exploit the HF advantage. Second, the opponent’s wage bill 
was significantly negative at the 1% level for both groups. However, it was stronger for the top 
six teams with a 0.75 point increase on average for a lower opponent’s wage bill as compared 
with a corresponding 0.59 point increase for the remaining subsample. 
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However, there were significant differences between the two groups. The wage bill was 
insignificant for the top six teams, whereas it was significant at the 5% level for the remaining 
teams with a coefficient of 0.28. The gap in wage bills was considerable between both groups 
(see Figure 1). The top six average wage bill was £196m with a standard deviation of £34m, 
compared to £72m with a standard deviation of £16.8m for the other subsample. While wages 
bills are perceived to play a foremost role in determining teams’ competence, its coefficient 
results imply a reduced sensitivity to increments in wage bills within the top six teams. These 
teams may need to excel on factors beyond mere high wages (e.g. elite football technical 
director, coaching staff, composed players dressing room) to secure promotion to the 
Champions League or winning the Premier League title. On the other hand, the aim for 
mediocre teams may be confined to securing another season in the PL. This is, to a certain 
extent, less demanding than the top six level and thus they become less sensitive to high wages. 
The extra-game variable was significant at the 5% level for the top six teams but insignificant 
for the remaining teams. The top six team rankings promoted them to additional European 
games involving mid-week travel. The negative effect may thus result from player fatigue, 
which limits the options for team managers in their squad selections for PL games.  
The other two differences relate to opponents’ injuries and suspensions, which were 
significantly positive for the top six teams but insignificant for the remaining teams. This 
reflects the superior ability of the top six to cope with these due to the larger number of quality 
players in their squads. 
As a further robustness check on the HF effect, we divided teams into three other 
categories. These were as follows: top four teams (which secured promotion to the Champions 
League), mid-table teams (from the 5th to the 17th league ranks, which secures a further season 
in the Premier League), and lastly relegation teams (from 18th to 20th league ranks, which move 
to the lower league division next season). 
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The regression results for these three subsamples are reported in Table 3(b).  
[Insert Table 3 (b) here] 
The home field effect prevailed across all subsamples and was highly significant at the 
1% level. The economic impact remained strong and robust, with very close coefficients of 
0.51, 0.44, and 0.49 for the three subsamples, respectively. These strongly support the results 
in Table 3(a) that even mediocre and relegation zone teams could benefit from the HF 
advantage. This is not very intuitive for lower-level teams, and hence the effect was novel in 
this context. Similar to the top four teams, the wage coefficient was insignificant for the 
relegation teams. This implies a different view as opposed to top teams. Team management 
might not have been on the right track within the relegation teams, which produces more 
manager sackings. In our sample, most of the sackings were associated with teams performing 
below average relative to our bootstrap expected results. Of 31 manager sackings in our sample, 
only three were associated with top teams (Chelsea in 2012, Tottenham in 2013, and Liverpool 
in 2012).   
4.4.2 Bootstrap results 
  
Table 4 shows the actual teams’ performances relative to the bootstrap CIs. 
      [Insert Table 4 here] 
Interestingly, in the overall bootstrap average (i.e. across all seasons), points from the 
first 20 games were calculated to be 1.37 points per game. This is identical to that of Bell et al. 
(2013), where it was the average expected points for the full season games during the period 
2004/05 to 2008/09. The top six teams had an average score of 1.46, while the others had an 
average of 1.33. Teams with superior financial resources were always in the top four, with a 
few exceptions. These include Manchester United in 2013 when the Sir Alex Ferguson era had 
come to an end, and the phenomenal achievement of Leicester City in 2015 when they won the 
league title under Claudio Ranieri. 
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The average team points reported in Table 1 represent the actual points won. Comparing 
these to the bootstrap generated points (those predicted by team financial and player availability 
characteristics) enables one to better understand team performance. For home games of the top 
four teams, the difference between the actual and bootstrap points ranged from 0.46 for Arsenal 
in the 2012/13 season (4th place) to 1.5 for Manchester City in the 2013/14 season (winner of 
the league title), while the average difference was 0.88. Winning the league title was associated 
with an average points difference of more than 1.0 points in home games.  
Leicester City was an exception in the 2015/16 season with just a 0.57 difference, 
despite the other top four teams enjoying a higher point difference that season. Leicester 
balanced their average home results with a very high away games point difference of 0.77 (the 
maximum point difference in the away games across the sample is 0.85). The point difference 
for relegated teams ranged from 0.31 for QPR in 2014/15 to -0.78 for QPR in 2012/13. The 
positive difference for QPR in 2014 is uncommon and far from the average difference for 
relegated teams of -0.25. This was due to their exceptional home results with average points of 
1.8, which more often than not guarantees team survival in the Premiership. However, they had 
exceptionally bad results in their away games where not a single point had been collected. 
The differences between the actual and bootstrap points for away games were wider. 
Some top four teams had a negative point difference, which shows that playing away from 
home negatively influenced team performance—this can be seen as an implication of the HF 
effect for teams outside the top four. The point difference ranged from 0.85 for Tottenham in 
2013/14 to -0.51 for Manchester United in 2014/15. This is a range of 1.34 between the 
maximum and the minimum points relative to a difference of 1.04 in home games. The point 
difference criterion for title-winning teams is less clear in away games. Manchester City won 
the league in the 2013 season with a point difference of just -0.09. This may reflect the fact that 
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teams outside the top four were more motivated (‘up for it’) in their home games against the 
top four opponents.  
4.4.3 Comparisons relative to the bootstrap confidence interval (CI)  
 
The next step in the analysis is comparing the actual collected points to the CI of the bootstrap 
distribution. This process provides a benchmark in predicting a team’s success and failure. 
Table 4 shows that the majority of teams across the sample fell either above or below that 
benchmark. This applied to both home and away games. The number of standard performance 
teams in home games ranged from 6 to 11, where 11 occurred only once, and there were no 
instances for 9 and 10. For away games, this ranged from 2 to 7. The number of instances of a 
bad (below average) performance in away games was, as expected, considerably higher than 
those in home games, while on the other hand, the number of good (above average) 
performances in home games was higher than in away games. 
It is plausible to assume that higher wages can attract players with stronger qualities. 
Thus, predicting success for teams’ promotion to the top four or six is associated with higher 
spending of club financial resources. On the other hand, it is more challenging to predict 
survival or relegation teams, as differences in player wages among these teams are narrower 
and so are their playing qualities (see Figure 1). Clubs hire managers to boost their team 
standing through more efficient use of available club resources. With our bootstrap approach, 
we also aimed to assess if teams were on their right track in that regard. Analysing home games 
as opposed to away games results provided a basis for predicting team success or failure. 
Nevertheless, this process may also contribute to prediction patterns in sacking team managers.  
4.4.4 Survival and relegation teams  
  
We started with predicting survival and relegation teams, as these predictions were novel and 
beyond the notion of predicting success only for top teams. When comparing actual team 
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results with the bootstrap generated CIs, five possible scenarios arose based on our team 
performance definition: (i) Below-Below where team performance was below the 5% bootstrap 
distribution benchmark in both home and away games; (ii) Standard-Below where team 
performance was standard at home and below average away; (iii) Above-Below where 
performance was above average at home and below average away; (iv) Standard-Standard 
where team performance was standard at both home and away games; and (v) Above-Standard 
where performance was above average at home and away.  
Observations of teams in these categories are presented in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Interestingly, there was no single incidence—within our performance definitions—of a 
team performing below average at home and above average away (i.e. Below-Above scenario). 
There were nevertheless only 15 cases out of 100 observations where a team collected more 
actual points in away games, but these did not suffice to move out of the CI boundaries.  
There were seven teams in (i) representing 17 observations across the sample period. 
In 10 of these observations, teams managed to survive in the PL (Sunderland alone had four 
observations). We infer that below average performance at home increased relegation chances 
by around 41% on average (7 out of 17). The majority of teams that survived had some common 
factors. First, seven managerial changes took place during the season, and in six of these, the 
change was made before the 20th match week. Teams that did not change their manager were 
West Ham and Aston Villa in 2013/14, and Leicester in 2014/15. The remaining seven 
observations in (i) were relegated teams. These involved five managerial changes, of which 
three were made before the 20th match week. This indicates that early (before the 20th match 
week) managerial changes for teams that were underperforming could have been vital to 
improve team performance. Second, 8 out of the 10 survival teams achieved better results in 
the second half of the league. It is noteworthy that this particular achievement is beyond our 
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prediction period used for the bootstrap (i.e. the first 20 games), but it provides an explanation 
for most teams that survived. The average ratio of the second half to the first half results in the 
league was 1.08, with a standard deviation of 0.39. This shows that teams on average performed 
8% better in the second half (last 19 games). There were at least eight teams each season in our 
sample period that performed better in the second half of the league. However, the data show 
that teams who achieved a ratio higher than 1.47 (this is equivalent to the average ratio plus the 
standard deviation) were more likely to survive. The eight teams that managed to survive 
achieved higher than that required ratio, whereas only three relegated teams achieved that ratio. 
Those relegated teams, despite their better results in the second half, had very poor results in 
their away games (less than 0.6 points on average). The overall average point for away games 
was 1.15, while this fell to just 0.6 for relegated teams. The actual away games results for 
relegated teams who outperformed in the second half varied between 0.2 and 0.4. Hence, 
struggling teams need to significantly improve in the second half of the season in order to 
survive in the PL. One possible way to achieve this is to implement an early managerial change.  
There were 18 teams under scenario (ii) with 21 observations. There was a 38% chance 
on average (8 out of 21) that teams in this scenario would be relegated.  
Some 10 teams fall under scenario (iii) with 11 observations, and three teams fall under 
scenario (v) with four observations. Strikingly, all of these teams managed to survive in the 
PL. This suggests that above-average home performance, regardless of away performance, is 
sufficient for teams to survive in the PL. Interestingly, teams under those two scenarios kept 
their manager over the sample period with just two exceptions: Newcastle in 2014/15 and 
Leicester City in 2016/17. This indicates that club owners perceived good (above average) 
home performance as implying that a team is on the right track.  
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There are 12 observations (8 teams) under scenario (iv) where all teams survived well. 
This indicates that survival with a standard home performance was conditional on at least a 
standard away performance.  
To sum up, teams need to achieve a good (above average) performance in their home 
games to secure survival in the Premiership. By contrast, a below average performance at either 
home or away games, or both combined, increases the relegation hazard by roughly 40%. In 
other words, for non-big 6 teams, it is possible to predict team success based on merely home 
field results. Away results count for less in this respect. This supports our hypothesis H2. 
4.4.5 Top six teams  
 
When comparing the top six teams’ actual results with the bootstrap CIs, four possible 
scenarios arose based on team performance: (i) Above-Above where team performance was 
above the 95% boundary of the bootstrap distribution in both home and away games; (ii) 
Above-Below where performance was Above at home and Below away; (iii) Above-Standard 
where performance was Above at home and Standard away; and (iv) Standard-Above where 
team performance was Standard at home and Above at away. Observations of teams falling 
within these categories are presented in Table 6. 
[insert Table 6 here] 
There is no single incidence—within our performance definition—of a top six team with a bad 
(below average) home performance. In three seasons in our sample, all top six teams enjoyed 
good (above average) home performance, one season with five teams and another with four 
teams. In away games, above-average performance was less frequent, and there were two 
incidences of below-average performance.  
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A total of eight teams with 28 observations enjoyed good (above average) performance 
at home.13 The majority of these teams (20 observations) secured a top four ranking as follows: 
13 observations associated with an Above-Above scenario, 2 observations with Above-Below 
scenario, and 5 observations with Above-Standard scenario. There were only two observations 
under the Standard-Above scenario where teams did not manage to secure a top four place. 
This shows that qualifying for the elite European Tournament (Champions League) was 
associated with at least an above-average home performance. To qualify for the Europa League, 
above-average home performance was also required, but to a lesser extent.  
To sum up, top teams need to achieve a good (above average) performance in their 
home games to secure promotion to the Champions League. By contrast, a standard 
performance at either home or away games, or both combined, did not suffice to secure a top 
four place. Nevertheless, it could lead to a promotion to the Europa League. In other words, 
away results count for less for the elite European Tournament (Champions League). This also 
supports our hypothesis H2. 
  All of these teams kept their manager during the sample period with just two 
exceptions: Chelsea in 2012/13 and Tottenham in 2013/14. Like mid- and lower-table teams, 
an above-average home performance signals a stable team that significantly reduces the 




This paper introduced a novel home field effect in studying team performance in the English 
Premier League. It is well documented in the literature that, across different sporting 
 
13 These teams were; Manchester United, Manchester City, Chelsea, Liverpool, Arsenal, Tottenham, Everton 
and Leicester. The first six were perceived as the big six clubs in English football, mainly due to their financial 
power. Throughout English football history, Manchester United and Liverpool (in addition to Arsenal and 
Chelsea in the last two decades) have been specifically known for their dominance over football trophies and 
competitions.    
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disciplines, teams win more often when playing at home than when playing away. Several 
studies have focused on the psychological aspects (e.g. crowd effect, opponents travel fatigue, 
familiarity with stadium features, sporting rules favouring home team) that might be driving 
this phenomenon. Another strand of literature has attempted to test home advantage 
empirically, with a focus on within-match performance measures. These include, for instance, 
differences in teams’ tactical approaches and playing style at home as opposed to away games, 
players’ behaviour and aggressiveness while playing away from home, goal differentials, and 
how they reflect better overall performance for home teams. There is also a strand that focuses 
on forecasting match results through different modelling techniques, such as Monte Carlo 
simulations and artificial neural networks (ANNs). 
We combined these strands of literature to test for a new HF advantage/effect and its 
predictive powers. We first used fixed effect regressions to test conjecture that playing at home 
could positively affect team performance even after controlling for other relevant team 
characteristics. Our results established a highly significant HF effect of 0.46 points per game 
over our full sample period. The result was robust for the top six teams and the lower level 
teams. Running a regression for five subsamples showed an almost identical effect where the 
coefficient preserved a narrow magnitude between 0.44 and 0.51. This is a novel effect in the 
context of Premier League football. Additionally, we found that wage coefficients were 
insignificant for the top and relegation teams. This indicates that the HF effect can dominate 
the wage effect once teams are fighting for promotions to elite tournaments or for survival in 
the Premiership.   
Second, we employed a bootstrap approach to test whether home advantage could 
predict team success and failure in the Premier League. Early league games (i.e. first 20 games 
in the league fixtures) were used in the prediction process. The proposed predictive power of 
home over away games was supported by our empirical findings. Teams who outperformed in 
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their early home games would stay in the Premier League even if they performed poorly in 
away games. A standard home performance combined with above average away performance 
may not suffice to secure a top four ranking. Moreover, a standard team performance at home 
that is associated with a below average performance away from home increased the probability 




4.6 Tables and Figures 
 
4.6.1 Table 1 Descriptive statistics for team point averages 
    
 
Panel A: Home games 
    
    Season (1)               (2)        (3)     (4) 
 Top 6 avg Mid-table avg Relegation avg Total avg 
 
2012 2.10 1.55 0.98 1.54 
2013 2.40 1.27 1.15 1.61 
2014 2.17 1.43 1.20 1.60 
2015 2.00 1.34 1.05 1.46 
2016 2.32 1.49 1.13 1.64 
    Total avg 2.20 1.42 1.10 1.57 
  Panel B: Away games   
     
2012 1.82 0.88 0.60 1.10 
2013 1.70 1.02 0.80 1.17 
2014 1.68 1.02 0.70 1.13 
2015 1.70 1.26 0.60 1.19 
2016 1.93 0.77 0.60 1.10 
   Total avg 1.77 0.99 0.66 1.14 
 Panel c: Equality of means tests   
 t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
2012  5.44*** 7.24*** 2.42** 5.14*** 
2013 5.39*** 6.16***  4.25*** 4.48*** 
2014  5.40*** 6.51***  4.31*** 4.79*** 
2015  5.40*** 6.11***  3.33*** 3.48*** 
2016  5.88*** 7.34***  3.70*** 6.52*** 
   Total avg  5.72*** 10.23***  10.1*** 10.9*** 
Notes: Average points are calculated from only 10 game results in panels A and B, while the rankings are based 
on the end of season results. The first column reports averages for teams placed in the top 6 rankings. The second 
reports mid-table teams’ rankings from the 7th place to the 16th (total of 10 teams). The third reports the last 4 
bottom teams in the table, out of which 3 teams will be relegated to the lower league (Championship League). 
The fourth is the total average of all teams. Panel C reports the t-statistics of the equality of mean difference tests 
for the corresponding pairs of games in each column, with their relevant significance levels. ***, **, and * indicate 





4.6.2 Table 2 Regression results of model (1): Home field effect on team performance 
 (1) 
 Team Performance 
 b/se 

























R2 (within) 0.1062 
R2 (between) 0.4391 
Notes: A fixed effect panel regression model is used. The dependent variable is team performance, represented by 
its match points. This takes a value of 3 for a win, 1 for a draw, and 0 for a loss. The following variables belong 
to the hosting team: Match venue is where the match is held. It is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a 
home game and 0 for an away game. Log-wage is the wage bill of clubs in each season; its original values are in 
£million and reported in a log form. Injured is the number of injured players in a match day. N/A is the number 
of unavailable players in a match day for different reasons, such as playing for international or team of the reserves 
team within their club. Suspended is the number of suspended players in a match day due to either red/consecutive 
yellow cards or a misbehaviour suspension. Extra-games are the number of non-Premier League games that a 
team plays during a season. The rest of the variables (that end with _opp) are identical but relate to the opponent 






4.6.3 Table 3(a) Regression results of model (1): Subsamples of top six teams and the 
rest of table ranking 
 (1) (2) 
 Top six teams All other teams 
 b/se b/se 
Match venue 0.4606*** 0.4596*** 
 (0.075) (0.045) 
Log-wage 0.2849 0.2897** 
 (0.330) (0.134) 
Injured -0.0285 -0.0063 
 (0.025) (0.015) 
N/A -0.0085 0.0031 
 (0.014) (0.009) 
Suspended -0.0287 0.0375 
 (0.125) (0.076) 
Extra-games -0.0168** -0.0119 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Log-wage_opp -0.7456*** -0.5904*** 
 (0.116) (0.068) 
Injured_opp 0.0506** 0.0198 
 (0.021) (0.012) 
N/A_opp 0.0125 0.0077 
 (0.013) (0.008) 
Suspended_opp 0.2954** -0.0647 
 (0.122) (0.075) 
Extra-games_opp -0.0020 -0.0070 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
_cons 3.7703** 2.4295*** 
 (1.628) (0.561) 
N 988 2812 
R2 (within) 0.1285 0.1019 
R2 (between) 0.2816 0.0155 





Table 3(b) Regression results of model (1): Subsamples of top four, mid-table, and 
relegation teams  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Top four teams Mid-table teams Relegation teams 
 b/se  b/se 
Match venue 0.5079*** 0.4382*** 0.4900*** 
 (0.083) (0.049) (0.091) 
Log-wage 0.4086 0.3752** 0.4610 
 (0.421) (0.152) (1.061) 
Injured -0.0196 -0.0099 0.0226 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.033) 
N/A 0.0006 0.0067 -0.0025 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.022) 
Suspended 0.0573 0.0354 -0.1341 
 (0.147) (0.078) (0.213) 
Extra-games -0.0125 -0.0058 -0.0549 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.069) 
Log-wage_opp -0.6624*** -0.6208*** -0.5891*** 
 (0.129) (0.074) (0.140) 
Injured_opp 0.0388* 0.0269** 0.0211 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.026) 
N/A_opp 0.0044 0.0128 -0.0101 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.016) 
Suspended_opp 0.2291* 0.0183 -0.1310 
 (0.136) (0.082) (0.154) 
Extra-games_opp -0.0093 -0.0063 -0.0008 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) 
_cons 2.8414 2.1669*** 1.5980 
 (2.145) (0.642) (4.311) 
N 760 2470 570 
R2 (within) 0.1352 0.0988 0.1170 
R2 (between) 0.0068 0.4794 0.1243 
 Notes: Identical variable definitions of Table 2. Column (2) presents teams from the 5th rank in the league table 




4.6.4 Table 4 Actual team points compared with the bootstrap C.I.s 
  (1) (2)     (3)    (4) 
  Home games Away games     
Club Season Actual pts Within C.I Actual pts Within C.I Bootstrap pts Table rank 
Man Utd 
2012 
2.7 above 2.2 above 1.64 1 
Man City 2.3 above 1.9 above 1.71 2 
Chelsea  1.9 above 2 above 1.37 3 
Arsenal 2 above 1.6 - 1.54 4 
Spurs 1.8 above 1.8 above 1.40 5 
Everton 1.9 above 1.4 - 1.39 6 
Liverpool 1.5 - 1.3 - 1.48 7 
West Brom 2.2 above 1.1 below 1.37 8 
Swansea 1.4 - 1.4 - 1.23 9 
Westham 1.5 - 0.8 below 1.38 10 
Norwich 1.7 above 0.8 below 1.27 11 
Fulham 1.4 - 0.7 below 1.53 12 
Stoke 2 above 0.9 below 1.41 13 
Southampton 1.2 - 0.6 below 1.33 14 
Aston Villa 1 - 0.8 below 1.31 15 
Newcastle 1.6 above 0.4 below 1.22 16 
Sunderland 1.2 below 1 below 1.39 17 
Wigan 0.9 below 0.9 below 1.26 18 
Reading 1.1 below 0.2 below 1.36 19 
QPR 0.7 below 0.3 below 1.49 20 
Man City 
2013 
3 above 1.4 - 1.50 1 
Liverpool 2.7 above 1.2 below 1.71 2 
Chelsea  2.8 above 1.5 - 1.53 3 
Arsenal 2.3 above 2.2 above 1.50 4 
Everton 2.1 above 1.7 above 1.43 5 
Spurs 1.5 - 2.2 above 1.35 6 
Man Utd 1.4 - 2 above 1.64 7 
Southampton 1.5 - 1.2 - 1.37 8 
Stoke 1.7 above 0.5 below 1.31 9 
Newcastle 1.8 above 1.5 - 1.40 10 
Crystal Palace    1.1 below 0.6 below 1.38 11 
Swansea 1 - 1.1 - 1.20 12 
Westham 0.9 below 0.6 below 1.32 13 
Sunderland 0.7 below 0.7 below 1.34 14 
Aston Villa 0.8 below 1.5 - 1.43 15 
Hull 1.8 above 0.5 below 1.12 16 
West Brom 1.2 - 0.9 below 1.38 17 
Norwich 1.2 - 0.8 below 1.38 18 
Fulham 1 below 0.9 below 1.43 19 
Cardiff 1.2  - 0.6 below 1.38 20 
Chelsea  
2014 
3 above 1.9 above 1.62 1 
Man City 2.3 above 2.3 above 1.59 2 
Arsenal 2.1 above 1.5 - 1.38 3 
Man Utd 2.5 above 1.2 below 1.72 4 
Spurs 1.5 - 1.7 above 1.27 5 
Liverpool 1.6 - 1.5 - 1.58 6 
Southampton 2 above 1.6 - 1.29 7 
Swansea 2 above 0.9 below 1.47 8 
Stoke 1.4 - 1.2 - 1.25 9 
Crystal Palace    1.1 - 0.8 below 1.32 10 
Everton 1.3 - 0.9 below 1.36 11 
Westham 1.9 above 1.3 - 1.38 12 
















Leicester 1 below 0.6 below 1.27 14 
Newcastle 1.8 above 0.9 - 1.21 15 
Sunderland 0.9 below 1.1 below 1.34 16 
Aston Villa 1.1 - 1.1 - 1.29 17 
Hull 0.9 below 1 below 1.41 18 
Burnley 1 - 0.7 below 1.10 19 
QPR 1.8  - 0 below 1.48 20 
Leicester 
2015 
1.9 above 2.1 above 1.32 1 
Arsenal 2.3 above 1.9 above 1.42 2 
Spurs 1.9 above 1.7 above 1.18 3 
Man City 2.4 above 1.5 - 1.34 4 
Man Utd 1.9 above 1.4 - 1.36 5 
Westham 1.6 above 1.6 above 1.16 6 
Liverpool 1.6 - 1.5 - 1.41 7 
Southampton 1.4 - 1 below 1.31 8 
Stoke 1.6 above 1.6 above 1.22 9 
Chelsea  1.4 - 0.9 below 1.48 10 
Everton 1.2 - 1.5 above 1.19 11 
Swansea 1.3 - 0.6 below 1.36 12 
Watford 1.4 - 1.5 above 1.14 13 
West Brom 1.1 - 1.3 - 1.30 14 
Crystal Palace    1.4 - 1.7 above 1.27 15 
Bournemouth 1 - 1 - 1.20 16 
Sunderland 1.1 below 0.4 below 1.45 17 
Newcastle 1 - 0.7 below 1.23 18 
Norwich 1.5 - 0.8 below 1.44 19 
Aston Villa 0.6 below 0.5 below 1.34 20 
Chelsea  
2016 
2.7 above 2.2 above 1.66 1 
Spurs 2.6 above 1.6 above 1.33 2 
Man City 2.1 above 2.1 above 1.51 3 
Liverpool 2.3 above 1.9 above 1.55 4 
Arsenal 2.3 above 1.8 above 1.41 5 
Man Utd 1.9 above 2 above 1.39 6 
Everton 1.9 above 1.1 below 1.43 7 
Southampton 1.5 - 0.9 below 1.25 8 
Bournemouth 1.7 above 0.8 below 1.35 9 
West Brom 1.7 - 1.2 - 1.37 10 
Westham 1.4 - 0.8 - 1.18 11 
Leicester 1.8 above 0.3 below 1.35 12 
Stoke 1.5 - 0.9 below 1.42 13 
Crystal Palace    0.7 below 0.9 below 1.33 14 
Swansea 0.8 below 0.7 below 1.35 15 
Burnley 1.9 above 0.1 below 1.21 16 
Watford 1.4 - 0.8 below 1.30 17 
Hull 0.9 below 0.4 below 1.17 18 
Mid'brough 1.1 - 0.8 below 1.17 19 
Sunderland 1.1  - 0.4 below 1.22 20 
Notes: The double columns (1) and (2) report the actual number of points that teams collected during the first 10 
games in each venue (i.e. 10 home games in (1) and 10 away games in (2)). The C.I. is the confidence interval of 
the distribution generated by the bootstrap, which is based on the data of the first 20 games of each team during 
the season. Bootstrap points in (3) are calculated using the median of the bootstrap distribution. Table 4 shows 
the team rank in the league table by the end of the season. The hyphens in (1) and (2) are equivalent to ‘standard’, 





4.6.5 Figure 1  
 
Note: The vertical axis represents clubs’ wage bills in £million. The horizontal axis represents clubs examined in 
the sample period. One can notice that the differences (clustering) in wages for mid table teams are thinner than 
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4.6.6 Table 5 Relegated and survived teams’ performance in home/away scenarios (top 
six rankings teams are excluded) 
       (i)        (ii)        (iii)         (iv)           (v) 
Season  Below/Below rel Standard/Below rel Above/Below rel Standard/Standard rel Above/Standard rel 
           
2012 4 3 4 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 
2013 4 1 3 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 
2014 4 1 4 2 1 0 3 0 3 0 
2015 2 1 5 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 
2016 3 1 5 2 4 0 2 0 0 0 
Note: Under each of the 5 scenarios, there are 2 columns; the first one defines team performance at home and 
away fields based on our scenario criteria, under which the number of observations for teams falling within that 
scenario are presented. The second column is the relegation (rel), under which the number of observations for 




4.6.7 Table 6 Top six teams’ performance in home/away scenarios 
         (i)         (ii)          (iii)          (iv) 
Season  Above/Above Top Above/Below Top Above/Standard Top Standard/Above Top 
         
2012 4 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 
2013 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 0 
2014 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
2015 5 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 
2016 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Under each of the 4 scenarios, there are 2 columns; the first one defines team performance at home and 
away fields based on our scenario criteria, under which the number of observations for teams falling within that 
scenario are presented. The second column is the promotion (Top), under which the number of observations for 




5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The notion of rational economic decisions has been challenged by behavioural economics. 
Much of that literature is based on artificial experiments, but sports fields introduce a real-life 
setup for scientific research. One of the earliest contributions was by Staw and Hoang (1995), 
who tested their earlier behavioural hypotheses with regard to decision-making processes 
(particularly agents’ tendencies to escalate on their commitments) through the NBA. There are 
several ways in which decision-making can drift from rationality. We investigated sunk costs 
and discriminatory behaviour within a football context, particularly the English Premier 
League. In addition, we explored how athletes could be privileged when playing at their home 
venues. 
This thesis contributes to the literature from three different perspectives. First, it 
contributes to the sunk cost (or escalation of commitment) literature (e.g. Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Staw & Hoang, 1995). These studies show behavioural biases, namely the need to avoid 
feeling like resources have been wasted and escalating commitments, particularly in social and 
sporting setups. We utilised the unique features of European football, especially from a 
financial perspective, to test for those biases. The rationale was that managers should play their 
most effective players regardless of their cost. However, when a player’s transfer fee escalates, 
it may induce the manager’s need to not feel resources have been wasted on him, in addition 
to the pressure from fans to play the team stars (i.e. high cost players). Hence, those players 
may get more playing time even after controlling for their performance. Moreover, we explored 
the frequent manager turnover within clubs to test whether the sunk cost effect could be 
mitigated. The rationale of this conjecture was that a self-justification explanation of the 
escalation of commitment situation or sunk cost effect was removed when a new manager 
replaced the one who was involved in signing the players (i.e. who bore the sunk cost account). 
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Our empirical findings supported the sunk cost hypothesis. The transfer fee was shown to be 
positively related to playing time.  
Second, it contributes to the literature on labour discrimination. It is complicated to 
measure employees’ productivity with precision. However, assessing investment managers’ 
performance is one of the few fields for such measurement, and another is the sporting field. 
In any case, discrimination is usually empirically measured through wage equations. We 
introduced a new discriminatory variable associated with player playing time in the English 
Premier League, which we call the nationality effect. The basic idea was that managers 
favoured players who shared a common cultural background with them, be it nationality, 
language or even a particular playing style. Additionally, clubs’ sources (e.g. managers, agents, 
scouts) who are responsible for searching and recruiting players may be embedded with social 
networks, and hence seek players who resemble the local standards even if equal or even better 
foreign talent is available in the market. Therefore, we conjectured that players who shared a 
common cultural background with their manager would be allocated extra playing time per 
season relative to those who did not, beyond what could be attributed to mere performance. 
The nationality effect was supported by our empirical findings. For instance, British players 
playing under a British manager got an extra 100 minutes of playing time per season.  
Lastly, it makes a contribution to the literature that is associated with home field 
advantage in sports. It examines the persistence of that advantage in the Premier League and 
how it can affect team performance. Additionally, we explored how the home advantage could 
predict team success or failure, from the perspective of promotion to elite European football 
tournaments or relegation to the lower tier in the English league system. We conjectured that 
playing at home could positively affect team performance even after controlling for other 
relevant team characteristics. Our results established a highly significant HF effect of 0.46 
points per game. We employed a bootstrap approach to test whether home advantage could 
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predict team success and failure. The proposed predictive power of home over away games 
was supported by our empirical findings. Teams who outperformed in their early home games 
stayed in the Premier League even if they performed poorly in away games. Moreover, a 
standard home performance combined with above average away performance did not suffice 
to secure a top four ranking, and a standard team performance at home that was associated with 
a below average performance away from home increased the probability of relegation to the 
Championship by about 40%.  
5.1 Future Research 
 
An interesting avenue for future research emerges from our results in Chapters 2 and 3. Based 
on our findings, researchers could investigate similar effects in other football leagues such as 
the La Liga in Spain or the Bundsliga in Germany, especially with more detailed player wages 
data availability with respect to the Bundsliga in particular. It would be interesting to test for 
the same effects but with a recent dataset that encompasses the surge in TV rights deal values 
for Premier League games, and accordingly higher player wages.  
Further insights can also be gained from Chapter 4 results. This could be through 
investigating the home field effect from the perspective of team goal scoring, as well as the 
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